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Abstract 
The contributions in this volume investigate interconnected aspects of the democratic deficit in global 
constitutionalism.  
The commonly shared question is the following:  to what extent, if any, a global (or cosmopolitan) shift 
of international law can proceed absent a transnational democratic check? Some scholars are convinced 
that this is a real problem since that a ‘division of labour’ is to be recognized between national and 
regional/international legal levels, only the first needing a democratic legitimacy. The contributors to 
this volume, on the contrary tend to share the view that detaching the production of international law 
from constituent will, as well as from a democratic framework, can indeed undermine constitutional 
legitimacy. Furthermore, this may open the way to forms of domination that affect also state’s 
democratic institutions from within.  
What is the way out from this deadlock? How is it possible to tame global constitutionalism in order to 
avoid a global Leviathan? The collection of essays here presented attempts to conceptualize some of the 
central challenges affecting contemporary patterns of legal dispersion and fragmentation. They follow 
a conceptual-historical thread which starts with a modern Kantian understanding of the problem, and 
unfolds into the discussion of issues of constitutional pluralism, institutional legitimacy and the risk of 
tyranny. The volume includes analyses of the role of China and the EU, two of the most important actors, 
even though perhaps at the opposite pole of the global constitutional project.  
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Introduction: Global constitutionalism without global democracy (?) 
 
Claudio Corradetti and Giovanni Sartor (eds.) 
 
As a result of a collaboration between Giovanni Sartor at the Faculty of Law of the European University 
Institute and Claudio Corradetti at PluriCourts, University of Oslo, on 14-15 January 2016 a number of 
scholars gathered together to discuss the historical development and contemporary features of global 
constitutionalism, and how this can be reconciled with a certain notion of democratic legitimacy beyond 
the state level. This is certainly an enormous task to undertake, but one which deserves international 
consideration. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the picture is complicated even further by the fact that 
international law is undergoing several profound transformations. New lega l  sectors a r e  r ap id ly  
developing, including the consolidation of the regime of Investment Arbitration, and the advancement 
of already existing areas such as the WTO. At the same time, claims about the “judicialization” of 
international law and processes of constitutionalization of multilateral agreements and regimes call for 
more precise theoretical definitions and categorizations. 
The starting assumption of the workshop, and the leading research question shared among the 
contributions collected here, focused on whether global constitutionalism requires more democratic 
legitimacy. Furthermore, it was asked to what extent forms of democratic legitimacy can be conceived 
at the global level notwithstanding structural differences between domestic and global 
constitutionalism. Should global constitutionalism incorporate mechanisms and standards of democratic 
rule-making? If so, how? 
The difficulty appears to be that some of the building blocks characterizing domestic constitutionalism 
seem unavailable in the transnational realm. How to transfer, for instance, the constituting democratic 
force of the “we the people” to the shaping of the global constitutional order?  
What also appears unclear is what sorts of institutional implications a global democracy will have, such 
as whether a transnational process of democratization would imply the strengthening of centralized 
bodies. Is a reformed UN General Assembly part of the solution or part of the problem? Would this 
entail expanding the conformity of a global rule of law by yet further institutions of global governance 
such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, to mention only a few? Alternatively, w o u ld  the  
incorporation of international law into domestic democracy checks, “democratic iterations” as some 
have argued,1 provide sufficient democratic control? 
The contributions from the workshop collected here e n c o m p a s s  b o t h  d e s c r i p t i v e  a n d  
n o r m a t i v e  themes. The collection b e g i n s  w i t h  a mapping of the problems in modern, 
Kantian, and contemporary global constitutionalism. In particular, Corradetti, in his two contributions, 
reconstructs core aspects of the Kantian “cosmopolitan constitution” and its implications for 
contemporary notions of sovereignty, transnational citizenship and coercion. This picture is extended 
by Van den Meerssche to the analysis of three contemporary versions of constitutional pluralism and to 
the understanding of legitimate authority beyond states. Both modern and contemporary versions of 
global constitutionalism answer the more fundamental question of what reason justifies a move to global 
constitutionalism. The contribution by O’Donoghue considers whether this shift in public law is justified 
as a reaction to a system of tyrannical powers. But how does legitimacy and its inherent constitutional-
institutional pluralism reconcile itself with global justice? This is the question answered by Eleftheriadis 
who proposes a legal constructivist method, one based on Kant and Rawls, to the understanding of the 
                                                     
1 See S.Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008. 
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moral legitimacy of international law and the institutional practices that accompany its instantiations. 
Does this view imply a commitment to the development of a global democratic institutional scheme? 
Some scholars are not convinced by the idea that there are any convincing arguments in support of the 
view that international courts should act as building blocks for a global democratic setting rather than 
as engines of an accumulative constitutional-like transformation of public international law. However, 
even if this picture promises to work for (western) liberal democracies, how does it fare with the 
‘exceptionality’ of non-democratic superpowers? Carrai discusses to what extent global 
constitutionalism promotes a rather comprehensive picture of what the author calls “moral monism” and 
how the case of China favors a more pluralist view of the global constitutional order. This point is of 
capital relevance, particularly since one wants to reinvigorate the “cosmopolitan foreign policy 
mandate” of the European Union (EU) with non-European countries, as Petersmann argues in his paper. 
Whereas Free trade agreements (FTAs) have secured improved standards of living and political 
integration within the EU, transatlantic externalization of FTAs have backfired consolidated rights. A 
new vision is therefore requested for the EU to countervail legitimacy disruptions of regional rule of 
law by exercising leadership, as the author claims, in ‘disconnected UN/WTO governance’. 
There is no clear agreement on how and where to locate the problem of democratic deficit beyond the 
state. Yet, the drafts in this collection aim to suggest some possible lines of reflection on an ongoing 
and pressing issue that will occupy legal scholars, philosophers and political scientists, at the least, for 
the next years to come. 
 
Rome-Florence 
Claudio Corradetti and Giovanni Sartor 
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SECTION I. HISTORICAL ROOTS AND CONTEMPORARY TRENDS IN GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Constructivism in cosmopolitan law: Kant’s right to visit 
 
Claudio Corradetti 
 
Introduction 
If you agree that state legitimacy depends on both an internal and an external legal standard, then you 
are likely to be a global constitutionalist. But if you also think that these are juridical expressions of a 
principle of universal equal freedom, then you are a cosmopolitan constitutionalist. Constitutionalism 
in global law has gained significant new momentum in recent years, benefitting from a truly 
interdisciplinary debate among international law scholars, political theorists and legal-political 
philosophers. It is hard to believe, though, that this has been the outcome of fashionable academic 
thinking. It is rather the case that post-1989 international relations have profoundly changed the way 
states act in relation to new conceptions of legitimate sovereignty, authority and state powers, in 
particular the democratic rule of law and respect for human rights. As a result, academic interest in 
global constitutionalism has followed the course of development of new jurisdictional events: from the 
end of a bipolar world to the emergence of a plurality of regimes. These developments have also raised 
the question of whether national and international law should be conceived as integrated elements of 
one single constitutional framework and, furthermore, what degree of pluralism it should allow.2 
However, one could hardly claim that also as a philosophical project the cosmopolitan ideal is anything 
new. Limited to modern times, cosmopolitanism was a project of the Abbé de St. Pierre and Rousseau 
whose conception, as Kant reminds us, was “ridiculed” by contemporaries “because they believed its 
execution was too near”.3 Kant began his reflections bearing this legacy in mind, while aiming to 
relaunch cosmopolitanism as a serious philosophical project for framing the legitimacy of individual 
and state relations and ultimately for the achievement of a gradual approximation to peace. Kantian 
insights, as sketchy as they are, nevertheless frame several of the contemporary issues of 
constitutionalism now facing us. Kant was neither a blunt natural law philosopher nor a positive legal 
thinker. He was, as I claim, a legal constructivist. This makes his reflections a relevant starting point 
also for our contemporary understanding of the validity of the global rule of law. 
In the following essay, I examine in particular the relation Kant establishes between “the right to visit”4 
and the generation of a global rule of law — what is called alternatively a “cosmopolitan constitution” 
(Weltbürgerliche Verfassung), a “cosmopolitan commonwealth” (Weltbürgerliches gemeines Wesen)5 
                                                     
2 Selecting from the burgeoning literature on the topic I suggest M. Kumm, “On the Past and Future of European Constitutional 
Scholarship”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 7(3) 2009, 401-415; Neil Walker, “Taking Constitutionalism 
Beyond the State”, Political Studies 56, 2008, 519-543; P. Dobner and M. Loughlin (eds.), The twilight of constitutional 
law: demise or transmutation?, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010. 
3 I. Kant, 2009 [1784], “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim”, in Kant’s Idea for a Universal History with a 
Cosmopolitan Aim. A Critical Guide. Ed. A. Oksenberg Rorty and J. Schmidt, 9-23. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 17. 
4 I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.329. 
5 See, respectively, for “cosmopolitan constitution” I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical 
Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, 329; whereas for “cosmopolitan 
commonwealth”, see I. Kant, “On the Common Saying: that May be Correct in Theory” in Immanuel Kant. Practical 
Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, 307. In the following sections I 
Claudio Corradetti 
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or even, in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, “a cosmopolitan whole” (Weltbürgerliches Ganze) 
— (§1).6 Here I pursue a Kantian argument, grounded on textual evidence but arguably extensible 
beyond Kant’s writings. A connection between the above-mentioned concepts is evidently established 
in the following passage: 
“this right to hospitality [or to visit] — that is, the authorization of a foreign newcomer — does not 
extend beyond the conditions which make it possible to seek commerce with the old inhabitants. In this 
way distant parts of the world can enter peaceably into relations with one another, which can eventually 
become publicly lawful and so finally bring the human race ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution” 
(I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and 
ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, 329, emphasis mine). 
I argue, furthermore, that the idea of a cosmopolitan constitution reflects a historical process of 
progressive constitutionalization of international law, starting from the adoption of a domestic “civil 
constitution” and then converging towards an incipient transnational constitutional arrangement 
(phoedus pacificum).7 Moreover, I claim that such a progressive constitutional consolidation depends 
on a ‘constructivist’ conception, not just one that holds between morality and politics,8 but one where 
the “innate right of humanity” of freedom as independence 9 constrains a system of private and public 
rights as respectively property, contract status and so on, while connecting morality to law. I consider, 
then, that Kant’s legal constructivism answers the general question of how to justify cosmopolitan law 
starting from a procedural method for the justification of a public system of rights.10  
Based on these premises the “right to visit”11 establishes a relation with domestic constituencies — (§2). 
In other words it establishes a constitutional connection among previously autonomous judiciaries. I 
submit that the rational engagement of different peoples in peaceful relations follows from a 
constructivist role played by the cosmopolitan right to visit — something, as Kant considers, that is not 
simply equivalent to a moral sentiment of philanthropy or virtue.12 I suggest, in turn, that the overall 
structure of Kant’s cosmopolitan constructivism assumes that a system of rights is valid if it fulfils the 
standard of a normative theory, one based on the grounding concept of equal freedom as an “innate 
                                                     
quote different English editions of Kantian works. The choice will depend on the version I find most adequate to the point 
I intend to make.  
6 I. Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, P. Guyer (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 300. 
7 I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.327. In the following I will use “cosmopolitan” and “global” constitution(alism) as 
synonymous terms. 
8 On the moral-political form of Kantian constructivism see in particular J. Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, in 
The Journal of Philosophy, 77/9, 1980, pp.515-572; T.E. Hill, Jr., Kantian Constructivism in Ethics, Ethics, vol.99/4, 1989, 
752-770; as well as O. O’Neill, Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1989. 
9  See A. Ripstein, “Law and Justice”, in Kant’s Ethics, ed. T.E. Hill, Jr, Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, 162 ff. 
10 See the parallel for moral and political constructivism in L. Krasnoff, ‘How Kantian is Constructivism?’, in Kant Studien, 
90 (30), 385-409. This seems also the strategy endorsed by Forst’s “right to justification” as the most “fundamental moral 
demand that no culture or society may reject”. R. Forst, The Right to Justification. Elements of a Constructivist Theory of 
Justice, Columbia University Press, New York, p.209 ff. 
11 I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.329. 
12 I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.328. 
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right”13 of humanity and thus realizing the presupposition of the Universal Principle of Right 
(Allgemeines Prinzip des Rechts).14  
I conclude that each domestic jurisdiction has to strive not only internally but also externally towards 
the realization of peace as an approximation of the idea of reason “to which no object given in experience 
can be adequate – and a perfectly rightful constitution among human beings is of this sort – is the thing 
in itself ”15 and that this is also the task of the “moral politician”16 in aligning the critical demands of 
cosmopolitan citizens with the requirements of public reason set by a Universal Principle of Right — 
(§3).  
Taken together, these three components contribute to a general ‘transitional’ scheme for Kantian 
cosmopolitan constitutionalism, one which accounts for why a) Kant can claim that “each of them 
[states], for the sake of its security, can and ought to require to others to enter with it into a constitution 
similar to a civil constitution”,17 and one where b) the constitutional level established by the “league of 
nations” (Phoedus Pacificum or Völkerbund), is in continuous approximation with the ideal of a 
republican multistate confederation (Völkerstaat).18  
As anticipated, the above steps are held together by an all-encompassing strategy of justification where 
the “innate right” of humanity — the idea of an equal freedom among persons — represents the 
grounding concept of a general constructivist theory of the law.19 This suggests the view of a sort of 
Kantian “reflective equilibrium” that holds between the Categorical Imperative and the Universal 
Principle of Right through the mediation of “use [of] humanity…as an end”.20 As in the more recent 
case of Rawls,21 the starting point of legal constructivism for Kant was a conception of rational agency 
marked by freedom and equality as the basis of a procedure of justification of law. The right to visit 
represents the point of view of the “citizens of the world”,22 that is, of a universally shareable practical 
perspective on rational deliberation. I discuss later what reasons human beings might be considered to 
have for the adoption of this clause. With regard to the procedure, though, it is only the protection of a 
formal condition of right, as one provided by the idea of humanity as an end, that autonomous beings 
can be enabled to bring their aims together into rational union. This allows for the exercise of external 
                                                     
13 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in M. Gregor, Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 393. 
14 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.387. 
15 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in M. Gregor, Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.505.  
16 I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, 338. On this point see Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Constitutionalism as a Mindset. 
Reflections on Kantian themes about international law and globalization’ (2006) 8 (1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law, ISSN 
(Online) 1565-3404, 9–36.  
17 I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.326. 
18 I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.326. 
19 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in M. Gregor, Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 393. 
20 I. Kant, “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals”, in M. Gregor, Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. 
and ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, 80. 
21 See in particular J. Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, in The Journal of Philosophy, 77(9), 1980, pp.515-
572. 
22 I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.322. The expression is use also in I. Kant “An Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment?”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2006, 18. 
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freedom in view of the requirements of the Universal Principle of Right, making possible a transition 
from a “provisional” to a “conclusive” ownership under a system of rights.23  
Concerning the constructivist justification of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, it is from the presumption of 
“possession of the land […] as possession of a part of a determinate whole […] to which each [...] has a 
right” that the right to visit is derived.24 The basic idea here is to consider first-order principles of right 
as at least provisionally valid as they are agreed upon by all members of an initial condition of choice. 
It follows that the coerciveness of any system of law depends upon a ‘procedure of justification’ that 
specifies its own conditions of validity. What I argue is that the acceptability of such a procedure requires 
the adoption of a ‘compensatory’ principle of justice (“iustitia brabeutica”)25 to territorially excluded 
people, one rebalancing land-ownership through the allocation of a qualified right — the right to visit. 
I define the principle of compensation as an obligation arising from a rightful appropriation of land. A 
legitimate appropriation of land in circumstances of limited resources (Kant speaks of “determinate 
limits…as the spherical shape of the…globus terraqueus”) requires that others are left with 
comparatively undiminished opportunities to access land and its goods.26 This understanding 
reformulates the Lockean clause of appropriation, as famously defined with the “enough and as good 
left in common for others”.27 But, more generally, it responds to a fundamental problem discussed in 
the natural law debate: how to justify negative externalities of territorial appropriation by establishing 
obligations towards the exclusion of third parties. This was indeed also the problem of Grotius who 
allowed for interference with private property in cases of necessity by non-members.28 Going back to 
Locke, if the “enough and as good” clause is interpreted as a sufficiency rather than as a restrictive 
principle, it then becomes clear on which basis a compensatory principle could be justified.29 For Locke 
the “enough and as good” represents a ‘factual circumstance’ and not a restrictive standard of original 
appropriation. Accordingly, when money is introduced, as with civil society, he appeals to a natural duty 
“to preserve the rest of Mankind”30 in response to the “spoilage proviso”.31 Kant replies to the issue of 
a re-equalization of opportunities by introducing the cosmopolitan right to visit. In contrast with the 
general Lockean natural law “duty of preservation”, the cosmopolitan right to visit leaves unaltered the 
                                                     
23 See I. Kant “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in M. Gregor, Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, §15 , p.416. On a different interpretation of the role that “a community of 
rational beings” holds with regard to the mediation between Kant’s ethics (Categorical Imperative) and Kant’s philosophy 
of right (Universal Principle of Right), see H. Pauer-Studer “‘A Community of Rational Beings’. Kant’s Realm of Ends 
and the Distinction between Internal and External Freedom”, in Kant-Studien, 107(1), 2016, 125-159. Unlike Pauer-Studer, 
I argue that this mediation is of a regulative and not of a constitutive type.  
24 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in M. Gregor, Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.489. 
25 See I. Kant “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in M. Gregor, Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.600. Kant does not make use of this notion and he limits to notice that it 
would be a “contradiction” if it were postulated between God and human beings. I argue nevertheless that such a relation 
should be inferred from the negative externalities on third persons coming from the establishment of a civil condition. 
26 I. Kant “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in M. Gregor, Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.489. 
27 J. Locke, Two Treaties on Government [1690], P. Laslett (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1960, §27. 
28 See Alice Pinheiro Walla, “Common Possession of the Earth and Cosmopolitan Right”, Kant-Studien, 107(1), 160–178, 
ISSN (Online) 1613-1134, ISSN (Print) 0022-8877, DOI: 10.1515/kant-2016-0008, March 2016. 
29 As Waldron acutely remarks “In §27 the rather ambiguous logical connective 'at least where'. the meaning of 'at least where' 
may differ, but surely reading of it is as a connective introducing a sufficient where Q' seems to me to be most naturally 
rendered as than as 'If P then Q'; the words 'at least' indicate that whenever Q obtains, there may also be other circumstances 
even though Q does not obtain.” In J. Waldron, “Enough and as good left for others”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 29(117), 
1979, p.321. 
30 J. Locke, Two Treaties on Government [1690], P. Laslett (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1960, II 6; also in 
J. Waldron, “Enough and as good left for others”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 29(117), 1979, p.325. 
31 J. Waldron, “Enough and as good left for others”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 29(117), 1979, p.319. 
Constructivism in Cosmopolitan Law: Kant’s Right to Visit 
7 
possibility of interaction by members of an original community. Accordingly, the institutionalization of 
a juridical condition, and more generally the legitimacy of the State comes to depend not only on an 
inner-boundary but also on an outer-boundary of lawful relations. Both elements, together, define state’s 
territorial rights according to a cosmopolitan standard of the law.32 Unlike a ‘permissible’ principle for 
territorial rights,33 a compensatory theory of cosmopolitan law considers that states are peremptory and 
not conditional jurisdictional entities, where the reduction of opportunities they create for legally 
excluded members is acceptable only if it provides a qualified standard of right-constraint interaction 
also with non-members.  
Starting points for the justification of the cosmopolitan right: on the inherent connection between 
(external) freedom and possession within the original community 
In this section, I discuss the significance of Kant’s idea of an original common ownership of the earth 
where individuals are in a condition of free interaction (communio fundi originaria).34 As Kant observes, 
since “all nations are originally members of a community of the land” and since the community of the 
land is not a legal community of ownership but rather “a community of possible physical interaction 
(commercium),”everyone is in “a thoroughgoing relation of each to all the others of offering to engage 
in commerce with any other […] without the other being authorized to behave toward it as an enemy 
because it has made this attempt”.35 The juridical transformation of the never exhaustible possibility for 
every individual to interact with all others takes place only under the precepts of the Universal Principle 
of Right which, in turn, generates the legal-moral justification of the cosmopolitan right to visit. 
Furthermore, I reconstruct Kant’s rationale for entering into a civil condition. I focus on the role of a 
“general united will”36 to be laid down a priori. As a corollary, I argue that in so far as an omnilateral 
will legitimizes unilateral acquisitions, it also defines a compensatory standard for political obligation 
that applies to excluded people. In so doing, the a priori anticipation of a public authority sets a formal 
standard for the unity of a legal system articulated into a system of distributive justice within a territory 
and a regime of compensatory opportunities distributed extraterritorially.  
To begin with, Kant’s idea of an “original community” — the communio fundi originaria — reinterprets 
in ideal terms the traditional concept of Grotius and Pufendorf of the communio primaeva as well as 
later criticisms in Achenwall’s Elementa Iuris Naturae.37 For Kant, the ‘factual’ understanding of an 
                                                     
32 This view therefore integrates the purely domestic conception of state’s territorial rights legitimacy advanced by A. Stilz, 
Nations, States and Territory, Ethics, 121(3), 2011, 572-601. The author explicitly recognizes that the rights to territorial 
jurisdiction are “limited by external legitimacy conditions that constrain how the state should exercise these rights when 
their exercise affects foreigners” p.573-4. 
33 As L. Ypi in her otherwise well conceived argument argues that “permissive principles justify states of affairs incompatible 
with the idea of ‘right’ only provisionally and conditionally”, in L. Ypi, “A Permissive Theory of Territorial Rights”, 
European Journal of Philosophy, 22(2), 2012, p.290 ff. The problem I see with this account, in so far as it relies on a 
Kantian argument, is that the ‘permissible’ justifies an act of the will in a condition deprived of law, as with the unilateral 
exercise of the will (lex permissiva).  
34 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.405. 
35 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996, 489. 
36 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.491. 
37 See, respectively, H. Grotius, De Iure Belli ac Pacis [1625], B.J.A. de Kanter-van Hettinga Tromp (ed.), Leiden: Brill (1939) 
and S. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium [1672], F. Böhling (ed.), Berlin: Akademie Verlag (1998). See also, G. 
Achenwall and J.S. Pütter, Elementa Iuris Naturae [1750], in G. Achenwall and J.S. Pütter, Anfangsgründe des Naturrechts, 
Jan Schröder (trans. and ed. 1995), Frankfurt: Insel. For Kant “community” is primarily, even if not uniquely, a “pure 
concept of the understanding”. As Milstein notes, this illustrates a form of “relation” rather than a sociological or a political 
concept. This relation of interaction is characterized by “reciprocal causality”, one where the affirmation of one member 
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original community of the earth is mistaken. This is because he considers that a community regulated 
by features of identity and property relations is a non-starter: “the community of the mine and thine 
(communio) can never be conceived as original”.38  
Not surprisingly, the original community is a regulative idea on which to justify political obligations as 
well as rights between citizens, between states and citizens, and among states. A distinct set of reasons 
applies, then, to the relation between an original community and the formulation of a cosmopolitan right 
to visit. Kant’s argument for the justification of the cosmopolitan right assumes, on a preliminary basis, 
that we are all endowed with an original right to freedom as non-domination.39 Freedom for Kant is 
either internal — related to virtue — or external, 40 that is, connected to an interpersonal obligation for 
agents to comply with the Universal Principle of Right according to which “Any action is right if it can 
coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of 
choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law”.41 In this way 
the formal constraints on justice are defined in terms of standards of “interpersonal consistency” and 
“demands for universality”.42 Freedom and particularly “external freedom” is equal to independence, 
that is, to be an equal subject of self-determination. External independence from the mastery of others, 
from control, follows from the postulate of “giving laws to oneself” of the Categorical Imperative.43 As 
a result, a reciprocal coercive authority of legal obligations is derived from respect for everyone’s 
freedom.  
In addition to these formal constraints, material limitations apply. Unlike internal freedom, external 
freedom is subject to space boundaries, that is, to the shape of the earth as a condition for social 
formation and demands for justice in circumstances of moderate scarcity.44 As noted, for Kant there is 
a necessary connection between external freedom and the possession of external objects,45 so that if I 
                                                     
implies the denial of all others and vice versa. In B. Milstein, ‘Kantian Cosmopolitanism beyond ‘Perpetual Peace’: 
Commercium, Critique and the Cosmopolitan Problematic’, European Journal of Philosophy, (21)1, 2010, p.121. The 
disjunctive relation between a member and the original community can be understood only on the presumption of an 
original unified concept of possession which considers the totality of human beings. It is only on the premise of an original 
form of interconnection among all individuals that a disjunctive relation of interaction among all members is established.  
 
 
39 I. Kant, ‘The Metaphysics of Morals’, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.392. 
40 I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, 329.  
41 I follow here M. Gregor’s translation in Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. 
Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.387. 
42As T. Pogge puts it: “If persons were to embrace […] “what seems just and good” (Rechtslehre 312), then a social order 
ensuring interpersonal consistency would once again not be achieved. Different schemes for achieving mutual consistency 
will be mutually inconsistent […] Kant’s later theory of justice sees its task then in pruning further the set of consistent 
systems of constraints – ideally down to a single one […] The first step in this reduction is taken through the other 
component of pure practical reason’s formal aspect – the demand of universality. One person should have a particular 
external freedom only if that same freedom is enjoyed by everyone”. T. Pogge, “Kant’s Theory of Justice”, in B. Sharon 
Byrd and J. Hruschka (eds) Kant and Law, Ashgate 2006, p.413. 
43 As Ripstein synthesizes this point: “Interference with another person’s freedom creates a form of dependence; independence 
requires that one person not be subject to another person’s choice”, in A. Ripstein, Force and Freedom. Kant’s Legal and 
Political Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Boston, Mass., 2009, p.15. 
44 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in M. Gregor, Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.489. With regard to T. Pogge’s “lexical hierarchy” of Kant’s principles 
of justice, two formal and one material {FP-1}Consistency{FP-2}Universality{MP}Enlightenment, I would add a fourth 
element concerning the ‘circumstances of justice’ as the material constraints on justice. I would suggest calling this {MC-
2} Geographical/Resources Scarcity. See T. Pogge, 2006, p.414. 
45 This is also called the “right of possession in common of the earth’s surface”, in I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in 
Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.329. 
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were denied a place on earth, my original right to freedom would also be infringed. The original right 
to external freedom justifies therefore my right to a “place on earth” — what Kant defines as a 
“disjunctively universal right”, that is, a right to be here or there.46 In Kant, the legitimate acquisition of 
an external object depends on the possibility of “taking control of it [occupatio]”47 and this, in turn, 
requires the recognition of having a place on earth. As one moves from acquisition to property and from 
a state of nature to a juridical state, the general recognition of a place on earth shifts into a cosmopolitan 
right to visit.48 This rationale shows how for Kant there holds an inherent connection between an innate 
right to freedom and the idea of possession of the earth given in common.49  
The interactions within an original community of commercium grant to its members the possibility to 
put forward reciprocal requests.50 Relations of this type define a community that is radically different 
from that regulated by property relations (communio). However, a community of common possession 
lacks features of social stability. For Kant, the state of nature, and with that an original community of 
interaction, though not necessarily unjust, (iniustus) is certainly “devoid of justice” (status iustitia 
vacuus) due to the absence of a “judge competent to render a verdict having rightful force”.51 As a result, 
in order to defend the right to externally acquired objects, as well as for these rights to be granted a 
peremptory status, a form of coercion is required. It would be contradictory to claim rights to external 
objects without at the same time holding others to a duty of compliance. “Hence”, Kant concludes “[…] 
there is connected with right by principle of contradiction an authorization to coerce someone who 
infringes upon it”.52 In this way, Kant justifies the duty to enter into a juridical condition and, ultimately, 
the creation of the state.  
Since the unilateral exercise of the will (lex permissiva) and the ensuing property relations are legitimate 
only on the presupposition of an omnilateral a priori will by which they are legitimized, to argue for an 
individual right to a place on earth requires an original community characterized by an “a priori united 
will”. 53 The subjective right to a particular possession on earth holds only in so far as this becomes a 
generalizable interest for all other members (Principle of External Acquisition). What follows is an 
obligation to divide the earth in accordance with an ‘absolutely commanding will’, a concept paving the 
way for the development of a civil condition.54 In the community of commercium my right to possess a 
particular share of the land and the will that accompanies it — “the mine” — requires this to be derived 
analytically from an a priori united will that includes all other potential human beings.  
                                                     
46 I. Kant, Vorlesungen Rechtslehre [23:323:26-30;23:320:20-23] and [23:321:14-16]. Quoted by B. Sharon-Byrd “Intelligible 
possession of objects of choice”, in L. Denis (ed.), Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: a Critical Guide, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2010, 108 
47 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 412. 
48 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 456 
51 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.456. 
51 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.456. 
51 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.456. 
52 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.388. 
53 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in M. Gregor, Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.491. 
54I. Kant, ‘The Metaphysics of Morals’, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.415. 
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However, if my right to intelligible possession (possessio noumenon, “possession merely by right”)55 is 
implicit in an a priori united will,56 I assume that my rights to property “do not depend on social 
approval”.57 Intellectual possession of external objects is based on a general united will that is given a 
priori and which legislates necessarily, not contingently.58  
If this is the case, then, also my duty to be part of a civil order is linked to securing everybody’s rights 
through the coercive force of the law. It is with a view to securing my provisional rights to external 
objects that the right to coerce others is upheld. The general united will, in so far as it justifies coercive 
laws through an omnilateral will, defines a general standard of public authority.  
However, as argued, the instantiation of a public authority is not only required for the purpose of framing 
by legal means unilateral appropriations of the will through the creation of states, but also to compensate 
those who are affected by being excluded from such appropriations. Since the earth is limited, territorial 
exclusion can be omnilaterally acceptable only if state authority is held under an obligation to allocate 
a compensatory measure. This justifies the Kantian interpretation of the cosmopolitan right to visit in 
terms of a right-based measure for the rebalancing of opportunities due to territorial restrictions. Under 
a general scheme of law, the right to visit allows for the coexistence of individual maxims of freedom 
of choice under “a universal law”,59 thus establishing an overall lawful condition in accordance with the 
Universal Principle of Law. As a result, states have the right to rule and may thus reasonably expect 
others to accept exclusion, not only if (a) they establish a rule of law and a system of justice on their 
territory, but also if (b) they allow foreign visitors to enter their territory on the basis of publicly 
justifiable reasons aimed at compensating a unilateral appropriation of the land. 
The right to visit as a constructivist principle of cosmopolitan law  
As a result of the interpretation outlined above, in the following section I contend that the cosmopolitan 
right to visit is best considered on a par with the right ‘to be heard’ posed by a visitor travelling to a 
foreign state (“visit”).60 I divide this section into three sub-sections: first, I argue for the ‘right to be 
heard’ in terms of a general principle of law; second, I examine a plurality of right-claims that can be 
grouped into either negative or positive categories; third, I consider how the right to visit as a principle 
of cosmopolitan law overcomes the divide between natural and positive law and it lays out a 
constructivist agenda for the cosmopolitan constitution. 
To be sure, the cosmopolitan right as a “subjective right” represents an acquired property. Whereas 
granting permission for a temporary visit as a ‘right’ takes on significance only based on a positive 
system of law justifying appropriation of the land, in terms of content the right to visit is not ‘created’ 
anew by any positive system of law. Rather it exists prior to any such system of positive law. It appears 
                                                     
55 M. Gregor’s translation in Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. 
and ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.412. 
56 Kant distinguishes between three types of possession (empirical, as a concept of the understanding and as intelligible 
possession), M. Gregor’s translation in Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. 
Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.401. Where the first two categories pertain to the 
notion of having control over something, either directly or indirectly, intelligible possession pertains to the legal 
requirement that others should not interfere with my possession. 
57 B. Byrd, “Intelligible possession of objects of choice”, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, L. Denis (ed.), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016, p.94. 
58 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.491. 
59 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in M. Gregor, Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, 387. 
60 See P. Niesen when he claims that “The subjective cosmopolitan right thus appears to constitute a third category of subjective 
right to communication”, in P. Niesen, “Colonialism and Hospitality”, Politics and Ethics Review, 3(1) 2007, 92. 
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therefore that, more than as a right tout court, the right to visit is primarily a general principle of 
cosmopolitan law which becomes ‘positive’ once it is incorporated into domestic constitutions.  
However, this point has gone largely unnoticed by Kantian scholars. Indeed, apart from general 
consideration as a “right to visit on a temporary basis” scholars have understood the right to visit (or the 
right to hospitality) as either an innate right to freedom,61 or as a more property-oriented understanding 
of “the mine and the thine”.62 Whereas, for instance, Benhabib has equated the cosmopolitan right with 
the right to non-refoulement,63 others have defined it as a right to commercial exchange.64 By means of 
a textually-oriented analysis, Byrd and Hruschka have suggested that Kant changed his mind after the 
Perpetual Peace. In particular, they considered whether in the Doctrine of Right, the right to visit was 
incorporated as an element of international law (rather than of cosmopolitan law).65 As a result of this 
apparent shift, the two scholars argue that the cosmopolitan right to visit is better understood in terms 
of a collective peoples’ right to freedom of trade.66 Others, like Bohman, have suggested instead an 
interpretation emphasizing the role of the cosmopolitan right to visit in terms of a critical exercise of 
public reason.67 All in all these interpretations testify to a semantic openness of the cosmopolitan right 
to visit. I think that there is a reason for this that is not detrimental to Kant’s interpretation.  
I thus reject the hypothesis of Byrd and Hruschka’s semantic reduction of the “Verkehr” (commercium, 
interaction) to a notion of ‘trade’. Rather, I submit that the right to visit is reflective of the interactional 
element of the original community and that this can assume a variety of constitutionally defined rights 
once the process of a lawful territorial appropriation is activated. As human beings we are entitled to the 
cosmopolitan right to visit as foreign nationals whenever our innate right to external freedom provides 
a sufficient reason ‘to be heard’. In all cases, the right to visit is justified on the basis of a general 
presupposition of individual inclusion into the society of human beings. It assumes, that is, that one can 
be a visitor only as a member of a foreign society. Recursively, moving beyond a lawless condition 
justifies the view of a general individual attribution of (world) citizenship. A system of rights can be 
established together with a rightful condition only if individuals enjoy the status of equal citizenship 
under general principles of reciprocity and universality of rights.  
In §62 of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant defines the cosmopolitan right as the capacity to “offer to 
have commerce with the rest”:  
“each has a right to make this attempt without the other being authorized to behave toward it as an 
enemy because it has made this attempt. - This right, since it has to do with the possible union of all 
nations with a view to certain universal laws for their possible commerce, can be called cosmopolitan 
right (ius cosmopoliticum). (I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in M. Gregor, Immanuel Kant. 
Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, 489). 
                                                     
61 P. Kleingeld, “Kant’s Cosmopolitan Law”, Kantian Review, 2(1),1998, 73-90; S. Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, 
Residents, and Citizens, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
62 As Hruska and Byrd put this: “securing the mine and thine…can be done only in a juridical state, only in a state of distributive 
justice, only in a situation of a lex iustitiae…Provisional ownership is not secured, but instead preliminarily legal 
possession…earth’s surface must be divided before any individual has a property claim to secure”, in Hruska and Byrd, 
2010, p.138-9. See also K. Flikschuh, 2000, p.469 ff.  
63 S. Benhabib, The Rights of Others. Aliens, Residents and Citizens, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004. 
64 B.S. Byrd and J. Hruschka, Kant’s Doctrine of Right. A Commentary, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
65 B. Sharon Byrd and J. Hruschka, 2010, 208. 
66 B. Sharon Byrd and J. Hruschka, 2010, 208-9. On this restrictive interpretation see also Flikschuh “Cosmopolitan Right 
concerns just trade relations” in K. Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, p.476. 
67 “In the cosmopolitan case, the supreme coercive power of public right in the state is replaced by the initially very weak 
power of the public opinion of world citizens, that is, the power of a critical public.” J. Bohman, The Public Spheres of the 
World Citizen, in J. Bohman and M. Lutz-Bachmann (eds.), Perpetual Peace. Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal, MIT 
Press, Mass.: Boston, 1997, p.180. 
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What Kant says here is that interpersonal relations should be seen primarily in terms of a capacity and, 
only then, as a right. Kant distinguishes between the privacy of interpersonal relations as a capacity and 
the publicity of the cosmopolitan right as an element of cosmopolitan law. He also considers the 
cosmopolitan right as an individual right of foreign nationals not to be treated as enemies, thus resulting 
in universal laws that regulate the intercourse among nations. Note here the recursive use of the word 
“nation” [Volk].68 This explains why Byrd and Hruska argue for the cosmopolitan right in terms of a 
collective right.69 However, this reading leaves unanswered the question as to why Kant considers on 
an equal plane the individual-collective “human being” as in the case of when he refers to “a human 
being (or a nation)” [Der Mensch…(oder das Volk)].70 This use is intelligible only based on the premise 
of an original community by virtue of which we are individual citizens of a “universal state of mankind” 
[allgemeinen Menschenstaats].71 The cosmopolitan right, as a condition of “universal hospitality”,72 
bridges the multidimensional gaps between individuals, peoples and states. The status of world 
citizenship, when projected onto the political plane, refutes any definitive assimilation within a specific 
jurisdiction even within a comprehensive world state since, as Kant says, whereas a world republic is 
an unrealizable ideal, a world monarchy would soon turn into “soulless despotism”.73 The more 
geopolitically connoted expression “nations on the earth” [Völker auf Erden]74 testifies to the relations 
that the cosmopolitan right establishes also between individuals and peoples. 
In so far as the right to visit represents a general principle of cosmopolitan law as a ‘right to be heard’, 
it represents a ‘response-triggering’ principle rather than a specific ‘claim-right’. It is thus a 
constructivist principle of cosmopolitan law giving rise to enlarged more wide-ranging pattern of 
reasoning; that is, a presumption of a general scheme of realization for a rightful condition by means of 
a critical use of public reasoning. I return to this point in the final section (§3).  
The cosmopolitan right to visit presents both a ‘negative’ and a ‘positive’ aspect. With regard to the 
negative aspect, the cosmopolitan right takes hospitality as a minimum threshold for protecting life as a 
precondition for legitimate possession. However, preservation of life is not a right of necessity but a 
conditional duty, provided it can be achieved “without a crime”.75 Today this right is captured by the 
notion of non-refoulement as Benhabib has rightly pointed out. As the right of a foreign national not to 
be turned away in the case of mortal danger, the right to visit reflects the core of Kantian 
cosmopolitanism rooted in the universal entitlement to a place on earth. It might be objected that states 
do not have a duty to comply with the demands of non-citizens except in cases of non-refoulement. As 
a result, it might be argued, the right to visit has no constitutional-constructive output. However, Kant 
                                                     
68 I. Kant “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2006, 322. 
69 Byrd and Hruska, 2010, p.208. 
70 I. Kant “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2006, 322. 
71 I. Kant “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2006, 322. 
72 I. Kant “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2006, p.328. 
73 I. Kant “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2006, p 336. 
74 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in M. Gregor, Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, 489. 
75 As Kant makes this general point: “For to preserve my life is only a conditional duty (if it can be done without a crime); but 
not to take the life of another who is committing no offense against me [der mich nicht beleidigt] and does not even lead 
me into the danger of losing my life is an unconditional duty” in I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in M. Gregor, 
Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996. p.299, 
note*. On a similar point see Alice Pinheiro Walla, “Common Possession of the Earth and Cosmopolitan Right”, Kant-
Studien, 107(1), 160–178, ISSN (Online) 1613-1134, ISSN (Print) 0022-8877, DOI: 10.1515/kant-2016-0008, March 2016. 
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explicitly rejects the idea that in a legitimate state there is no such duty. On the contrary, he urges the 
“moral politician” to bring the constitution of the state into line with the principles of right. Then, my 
argument goes, since the right to visit ensues from a compensatory principle of territorial delimitation, 
the moral politician is under a political obligation to provide a justification for the demands of the foreign 
visitor. In the case of justified acceptance, the domestic constitution incorporates a cosmopolitan 
request, so that a ‘juridical interconnection’ is established between disparate legal domains and 
individuals.  
Although it might appear at first sight as a functionalist argument, i.e. motivated by protective measures, 
it suddenly turns into a constructivist justification for the consolidation of the cosmopolitan constitution 
(one realizing an original right to have a place on earth). The moral politician has a ‘duty to justify’, 
either accepting or rejecting, claims to visit, and any acceptable outcome has to be brought into line with 
an overall system of law.76 One might speculate and argue that it is only if political judgment strikes an 
equilibrium between the external freedom of domestic and foreign nationals, that the Universal Principle 
of Right justification is achieved. If this is the case, it also becomes possible to understand why the right 
to universal hospitality, in allowing for a communicative interaction among disparate legal communities, 
gives rise to the conditions for a supraordinate global rule of law.77  
Since citizens of a state are also “citizens of the world” ,78 they have in common a reciprocal and 
universal right to societal inclusion, at least the right to visit on a temporary basis. Within the limits of 
a ‘right to be heard’, a qualified right to visit has to define a minimum threshold. However, with regard 
to the positive aspect, the right to visit instantiates the preconditions for laying out a more properly 
articulated cosmopolitan constitution, once that lower threshold has been set. Here, the idea of 
interaction as commerce is subordinated to compliance with the critical use of reason. That is, individual 
claims are presented to a foreign decision-making body that remains under an obligation to justify its 
territorial possession based on a public compensatory principle of cosmopolitan right. The recognition 
of a cosmopolitan demand for justification by state-constituencies widens the domestic standards of 
public reasoning to the extent that external wrongs are felt everywhere as one’s own.79  
These final considerations find textual support in the nexus that Kant establishes between cosmopolitan 
right and the standard of public reason as delineated in the Perpetual Peace. Kant claims that public 
reasoning has moved to the global level, so that legal integration among different regimes has become 
so pervasive that “a violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all”.80 Following on from this 
observation, the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ side of the right to visit can be grasped only by presupposing 
a critical-constitutionalist dimension of public use of reason where cosmopolitan citizens challenge 
‘from within and from without’, so to say, public domestic constitutional standards, making them 
porous. What ensues from this process of dialogical interaction is that the critical bite of Kantian 
cosmopolitan right highlighted by authors such as Bohman represents only a stepping stone towards the 
juridification of public international relations and, finally, to the constitutionalization of public 
                                                     
76 “A moral politician will make it his principle that, once defects that could not have been prevented are found within the 
constitution of a state or in the relations of states, it is a duty, especially for heads of state, to be concerned about how they 
can be improved as soon as possible and brought into conformity with natural right, which stands before us as a model in 
the idea of reason, even at the cost of sacrifices of their self-seeking [inclinations]” I. Kant “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in 
Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.340. 
77 On the subjects of cosmopolitan rights including not only individuals, but also states and peoples, see P. Niesen, 2007, p.98.  
78 I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.322. 
79 I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, 330. 
80 I. Kant “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2006, 330. 
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international law.81 The critical force of communicative interaction obliges individuals to engage with 
a consideration of reciprocal standards of public reasoning as if in a Gadamerian ‘fusion of horizons’.82 
This process, as noted, represents only an intermediate step towards the realization of the cosmopolitan 
project as a whole and it would establish a relation between the right to visit and the cosmopolitan 
constitution under public standards of reason.83  
In addition to the relation between a public critical standard and the adoption of a cosmopolitan 
constitution, Kantian cosmopolitanism establishes a connection between a critical-political dimension 
of the cosmopolitan right to visit and the form of rationality of the juridical system. This explains the 
proper constructivist character of Kantian cosmopolitan and his departure from a natural law scheme. I 
now seek to clarify this final point. 
Kant attempts to reinterpret the natural law framework of the “common possession on earth” and “the 
right to visit” as elements of global system of law. By virtue of their earthly affiliation, as original 
members of a community on earth, individuals are entitled to submit requests for hospitality to 
contingently formed positive jurisdictions. 84 However, as a right grounded in an original natural law 
condition, the cosmopolitan right to visit is not exhausted by any positively given jurisdictions. With 
regard to the character of cosmopolitan right, Kant does not define this in terms of a cosmological order, 
nor as a theological or anthropological essence of the human being. Natural law is rather grounded on 
reason: it represents a purely practical aspect, one which can be known a priori through rational 
enquiry.85  
However, there seems to be a bi-univocal relation here between natural and positive law. Whereas 
natural law establishes a distinct standard for the validity of positive law, its content as a right can be 
articulated only within a positive system. With regard to the first aspect, Kant notes that the lack of 
compliance of positive law with natural law is “Like the wooden head in Phaedrus’s fable, a merely 
empirical doctrine of right is a head that may be beautiful but unfortunately it has no brain”.86 For Kant, 
there is an appearance of law also when normative validity is lacking; but in the absence of moral 
legitimacy, positive law is defective law. As for the second aspect, the “interaction” which characterizes 
the communio fundi originaria becomes a “right to visit” (or “to be hosted”) only once as a positive 
system of law is established on the basis of the Universal Principle of Right.  
                                                     
81 J. Bohman, The Public Spheres of the World Citizen, in J. Bohman and M. Lutz-Bachmann (eds.), Perpetual Peace. Essays 
on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal, MIT Press, Mass.: Boston,1997. 
82 H.G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, Continuum, London, 1989. 
83 Bohman emphasizes this point in his reactualization of Kant’s cosmopolitanism when he asserts that: “When community-
wide biases restrict the scope of such self-scrutiny, usually by leaving relevant problems of the public agenda, a new public 
emerges to press for public self-scrutiny and sometimes for new rules and institutions…The civil rights movement, rather 
than the Supreme Court, is the exemplar of the public use of reason that can be extended to cosmopolitan conditions” J. 
Bohman, The Public Spheres of the World Citizen, in J. Bohman and M. Lutz-Bachmann (eds.), Perpetual Peace. Essays 
on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal, MIT Press, Mass.: Boston,1997, p.190. 
84 For a different position on this point see A. Pinheiro Walla, “Common Possession of the Earth and Cosmopolitan Right”, 
Kant-Studien, 107(1), 2016, 160-178. The author quite rightly argues that Kant abandons Grotius’ traditional view on needs 
as grounding elements for the common possession on earth. However, while she establishes important connections with 
the right not to be refused when in danger of life, not much is said with regard to the positive “interactional” aspect of 
Kant’s right to visit, namely, the right to submit communicative demands that lead to the formulation of transnational legal 
principles. Since Kant explicitly defines the right to visit as a “natural right” (see note 70), it can be inferred that it relates 
constructively with positive domestic constitutional systems of law.  
85 See Höffe, 2006, p.95. As such, it concerns the justification of the law, its character of justice. One might argue, then, that 
Kant places his views on the relation between positive law and natural law on the side of what is currently defined as 
positivist inclusivism, a view according to which the validity of institutionally enacted laws are partially depending on their 
compliance to natural standards of validity. See C. Corradetti, Relativism and Human Rights. A Theory of Pluralist 
Universalism, Springer, Dordrecht, 2009, pp.111-152. 
86 I. Kant, ‘The Metaphysics of Morals’, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.387. 
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Taken together, the positive-constitutive and the natural-law character of the cosmopolitan right to visit 
tend to subordinate the domain of international law to the legitimate demands of individuals as world 
citizens. Coordination among states by means of international law is justified only when individual 
requests remain mindful of standards of equality and non-discrimination, thus resulting in further 
integration between different legal domains. I turn next to the assessment of how this view of the law 
impacts on the construction of a cosmopolitan system of state-relations hopefully leading to peace. 
Thinking cosmopolitan through the ‘critical’ public use of reason  
In this final paragraph, I consider how the Kantian idea of “freedom as independence” is linked to a 
cosmopolitan use of public reason. In particular, I explain how a progressive trajectory of human 
emancipation is realized by the capacity to give oneself universal laws as citizen of a cosmopolis.87  
As argued above, the right to universal hospitality, as the negative-limiting definition of the right to visit 
(the right “not to be treated with hostility”),88 is explicitly connected by Kant to an original community 
on earth: “this right [the right to visit], to present oneself for society, belongs to all human beings by 
virtue of the right of possession in common of the earth’s surface on which, as a sphere, they cannot 
disperse infinitely but must finally put up with being near one another; but originally no one had more 
right than another to be on a place on the earth”.89 Cosmopolitan right, in so far as it is connected to the 
original community of earth, is not only dependent on the notion of a common will, but also on the 
content that is commanded by the obligating will as with the division of the earth held in common.90 
Since the unity of the will has an original character — it can never be exhausted by a factual arrangement 
— relations among the inhabitants should also be conceived as regulated by a permanent condition of 
continuous interaction.91 This inherent tension within the original condition is evident also in Kant’s 
characterization of the cosmopolitan order which remains a project in continuous search of a long-
standing approximation towards peace. Consider the following passage:  
“If it is a duty to realize the condition of public right, even if only in approximation by unending 
progress, and if there is also a well-founded hope of this, then the perpetual peace that follows upon 
what have till now been falsely called peace treaties (strictly speaking, truces) is no empty idea but a 
task that, gradually solved, comes steadily closer to its goal (since the times during which equal progress 
takes place will, we hope, become always shorter)” I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel 
Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, 
351. 
The achievement of peace implies the persistence of an unsolved tension between a cosmopolitan 
juridical ideal and its positivist instantiation. This should come as no surprise since, as noted above, the 
original community represents a normative concept: “a practical rational concept which contains a priori 
the principle in accordance with which alone people can use a place on the earth in accordance with 
                                                     
87 On the link between autonomy and public reason in Kant, see O. O’Neill, “Autonomy and Public Reason”, in M.Timmons 
and R. N. Johnson (eds.), Kant, in Reason, Value, and Respect: Kantian Themes from the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, 
Jr.,Oxford University Press, 2015, 119-134.  
88 I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, 329  
89 I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, 329. 
90 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.415. 
91 This hypothesis diverges profoundly from Byrd and Hruska’s thesis for whom once the disjunctively universal right to a 
place on earth is met, then the right to be located in a particular location disappears “and with it the right to visit that other 
place” Byrd and Hruschka, 2010, p.207. Contrary to this interpretation, I consider that the availability to the cosmopolitan 
citizen of the right to visit prevents closure as with final-state individual geographical assignment. 
Claudio Corradetti 
16 
principles of right”.92 Its critical force, then, remains in place even after the original division of the earth 
has been accomplished. It follows that the exhaustion of the original mandates to establish a rule of law 
can never be concluded in factual terms, and that even with the historically given division of the earth, 
there remains a permanent demand for territorial legitimation. Cosmopolitan right cannot thus be 
equated with positive law: it is not exhausted by a command or by permission granted in any given code. 
In so far as it consists in an enabling condition for foreign nationals to visit and to present their claims 
to alien jurisdictions, the right to visit grants the right to be considered in the broad sense. The positive 
effects that the right to visit has on domestic systems may be considered as the ‘public justificatory’ 
strategy for the cosmopolitan constitution. Practical assessment requires the political autonomy of state 
citizens to be considered in light of external demands requiring a public use of reason beyond state 
borders where each is not only a “member of a commonwealth” but “even of the society of citizens of 
the world”.93 For this reason, continues Kant, positive laws, even if they must be obeyed, can 
nevertheless be criticized so that a “citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed upon him…But the 
same citizen does not act against the duty of a citizen when, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his 
thought about the inappropriateness or even injustice of such decrees”.94 
A corollary of this line of argumentation expands the constructivist purchase of the right to visit upon 
Kant’s anthropological views on the “unsociable sociability” of the human nature. This approach 
captures the problem from an a posteriori perspective.95 As the argument goes, it appears that in an 
empirical perspective, unsociable sociability motivates the perpetuation of claims of interaction in a 
context of moderate scarcity of land resources.  
The argument of the “unsociable sociability” also requires the “public justificatory” argument to be 
valid. The fact that further demands for legitimation are presented following justified schemes of 
redistributive justice presupposes that the cosmopolitan right to visit reflects the idea that a rightful 
relation between individuals and states should be independent from historically given determinations of 
citizenship. Rather, these relations are valid on the premise of a priori principles. As Kant claims in the 
Conclusion of the Doctrine of Right: “the rule for this constitution, as a norm for others, cannot be 
derived from the experience of those who have hitherto found it most to their advantage; it must, rather, 
be derived a priori by reason from the ideal of a rightful association of human beings under public laws 
as such”.96  
Both the public justificatory and the “unsocial sociability” argument account for establishing a 
constructivist relation between the “critical-constitutional” function of “right to visit” and the making 
of the cosmopolitan constitution. This point remains implicit in Kant’s writings and it can be 
reconstructed only conjecturally. In the following paragraph I will therefore abandon the pretence of a 
philological reading of the texts in order to pursue a purely Kantian argument.  
                                                     
92 I. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.415. 
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As Kant observes, since peoples are subjected to a geographically constrained place on earth, each must 
receive a share the earth’s resources in accordance with an original right to earthly affiliation. Since this 
condition is that of a community of reciprocal action, or commerce, cosmopolitan right allows 
individuals to engage in communicative interaction under the conditions of limited availability of the 
earth’s space and resources. The cosmopolitan right regulates the relation between law and space by 
legitimately restricting individual external freedoms on the basis of a Universal Principle of Right. From 
the “attempt” to enter into differential relations, the right to visit allows the submission of claims as a 
foreign national to a different public sphere and, ultimately, to a different jurisdiction.  
The distinction between the ‘negative’ and the ‘positive’ aspect of the right to visit finds a further 
grounding here. Whereas the endangering of one’s life advances only an unchallengeable claim to the 
“moral politician”,97 that is, a claim-duty to host temporally anyone who is endangered upon return to 
her native land, the same does not hold for the ‘positive’ critical aspect of cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism. Whereas in the ‘negative’ aspect of the right to visit the endangering of an original 
right to equal access to a portion of land compels the moral politician to comply, the ‘positive’ aspect 
of the right to visit leaves the claims of the foreign visitor open to rejection. A striking case is that of a 
claim to trade advanced by foreign nationals. In this case nobody could claim that even a “moral 
politician” has a duty to comply. Here, the form of the claim that is advanced with the capability to be 
heard within a different jurisdiction is not necessarily linked with the violation of the content of the 
cosmopolitan right, namely the respect of an equal right to have a place on earth. As a result, one might 
arguably infer that the cosmopolitan-constitutional outcome of the right to visit is necessarily activated 
only on conditional acceptance of the trade-claim by a foreign jurisdiction. That is, whatever the specific 
trade-agreement offered, it has to comply with certain universal standards of public reason arising from 
the right to visit. Several examples are on offer here to account for this general constraint. One example 
for all is the exclusion of colonial relations of domination that violate the equal standing before the law 
of the participants in the agreement.  
Kant is undoubtedly supportive of anti-colonialist views, since any imposition by force even of a rule 
of law would create a legal void in the target population.98 This means that he places a global 
constitutionalist burden primarily on the shoulders of the visitor, so to speak. It is for this reason that 
Kant approved the restrictions on European visitors adopted by China and Japan.99  
But what if the trade proposal — in terms of its provisions — is fair to the peoples addressed and does 
not violate their respective external freedoms? I believe that Kant would agree that a cosmopolitan-like 
public standard of trade-fairness applies also in this case. The agreement would turn into one not 
violating the cosmopolitan constraint of access to the earth for humanity, for instance, one causing 
massive environmental devastation or resulting in severe economic impoverishment for third-parties. 
Where these catastrophes do occur, access to earth’s resources would be prevented and an interaction-
based standard of cosmopolitan justice violated.100  
                                                     
97 I. Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace”, in Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (trans. and ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006, 338. On this point see Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Constitutionalism as a Mindset. 
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However, it remains the case that any cosmopolitan request, whenever successful, would give rise to a 
‘constitutional crisis’ since it would raise self-reflectivity by questioning how to relate externally with 
other constituencies. This would eventually lead to a transformation of the domestic constitutional 
system. In light of such considerations Kant’s cosmopolitan right to visit can be taken as the prompting 
element of a process of public reasoning. Individual requests nudge domestic constitutions to comply 
with the generalizable public principles of law. Whereas domestic constitutions, stricto sensu, derive 
their legitimacy from a self-determining collective body that by definition excludes those subjects who 
are not recognized as members of the constituency — the people — cosmopolitan right gives rise to 
such a self-referential understanding by introducing the possibility of interaction between non-citizens, 
communities and foreign states.  
New constraints of public reasoning lay down limits to strategic state-behaviours with regard to external 
relations and hence to their use of secrecy and political expediency.101 Publicity empowers the 
individual as a generalized other, that is, as a representative of an unrestricted audience in the 
“communication between audience and speaker”.102 In this way cosmopolitan law realizes an 
“interconnection” among jurisdictions. Thus, the gap is closed between a) the assumptions of a rightful 
cosmopolitan condition from which the cosmopolitan right to visit is legitimately enforced b) a specific 
content-related claim submitted by a visitor, and c) a domestically defined context of public reason 
(following a “constitutional mindset” as Koskenniemi defines the thinking of Kant’s “moral 
politician”).103 Integration between these three levels allows for the transnationalization of domestic 
public legal standards. This process completes what I have referred in the opening sections as the second 
part of Kantian political-juridical aspect of cosmopolitan constructivism.  
As observed, the outcome of the construction of a cosmopolitan public sphere by the public use of 
reason, while necessary and valuable, should not be regarded as the end-point of Kantian cosmopolitan 
concerns. It is rather the juridification of the global public sphere that ultimately brings about a lawful 
condition between citizens and foreign states among themselves, as well as between domestic citizens. 
As Kant says: “The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is dependent on the problem of 
a lawful external relation between states and cannot be solved without the latter”.104 Here is the link 
with the law: in so far as standards of public reasoning are reflected in domestic constitutionalism, the 
incorporation of new interactional claims gives rise to further codifications in compliance with the 
general principles of public law. This time, though, such norms reflect an external —cosmopolitan— 
perspective, filling the gap between domestic and international law. Whereas national constitutional law 
may be seen as the product of a domestic constituent power —a sovereign people— the cosmopolitan 
constitution results from a more fundamental source of legitimacy: the common possession of the earth.  
Kant seems to suggest that the construction of a cosmopolitan constitution is to be conceived along the 
lines of global citizenship and civil society as when he states that “the condition of peace is alone that 
condition in which what is mine and what is yours for a multitude of human beings is secured under 
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laws living in proximity to one another, hence those who are united under a constitution”.105 More 
precisely, the cosmopolitan legitimacy of the state as a subject within the international order is the result 
of two intersecting parameters: national constituent sovereignties for self-legislating peoples and global 
citizenship. For Kant this condition is far from being unrealizable. However, if peace has to be preserved 
as a realizable aspiration, then, it has to be achieved through counterfactual-regulative conditions. As 
Kant argues in the Metaphysics of Morals “we must act as if it [perpetual peace] is something real, 
though perhaps it is not; we must work toward establishing perpetual peace and the kind of constitution 
that seems to us most conducive to it (say, a republicanism of all states, together and separately)”.106 
For Kant, the time seemed ripe to conceive a “realistic utopia”107 to gain momentum. 
A crucial question arises at this point: what sort of institutional progression is generated by the Kantian 
“general united will” and how does it connect to state sovereignty and more in general to a cosmopolitan 
order? These remarks also help to frame under a constructivist presupposition the institutional aspects 
of cosmopolitan approximation. I consider that Kant conceived of the role of a republican confederation 
of states also in terms of counterfactual guidance and not as an empirical condition to be realized.108  
The idea of a positive instantiation of a cosmopolitan republic would be plausible only if it were the 
case that Kant’s concept of a general united will justified moving beyond a lawless scenario on the basis 
of contractarian terms for political obligation. Only in so far as a global cosmopolitan covenant could 
be derived from the general will to abandon the original condition would it be possible to conceive the 
idea of world sovereignty and a global state. However, this hardly seems to be the case from the 
interpretation outlined above. The notion of a contract conflates the unconditional and transcendental 
force of political obligation of the general united will with a conditional and contractual will of a 
constituent people. However, it contravenes Kant’s overall rationale and his explicit denial of the fact 
that the communio fundi originaria is like the communio primaeva, “[…] one that was instituted and 
arose from a contract by which everyone gave up private possessions […]”.109 
The question that one can legitimately ask then is: Why does Kant make use of a key Rousseauian 
concept by referring to the idea of a general united will? This is a complex question that can only be 
addressed here with regard to its relevance for the establishment of a civil condition. Kant reinterprets 
in conceptual terms the Rousseauian “volonté générale” in the co-legislating activity among equal 
members.110 For Kant Rousseau’s conception of the general will does not suffice to account for the 
transformation of a multitude into a unity of self-legislating constituent people. Sovereignty in this 
regard, as for Hobbes, pertains not to the people alone but to the ruler and to the state as a community.111 
Unlike Hobbes, though, Kant does not accept the idea that coercive authority is justified simply because 
a multitude has transferred authority on it. On the contrary, he holds that coercive authority is subjected 
to a concept of legitimacy. As a result, the notion of a general united will lays down a standard of 
legitimacy of coercive authority. A multitude of interactive individuals can be thought of as a community 
of right only in so far as a general united will is presupposed as a unifying concept, so that the sum total 
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of individual actions is accountable to a standard of public authority. This means that the absence of an 
antecedently constituted people, which in Hobbes justifies the rejection of a democratic standard, is 
reconstituted in Kant based on the notion of a general united will, one of equal deliberating members as 
for Rousseau, where real citizens take part in town assemblies. Unlike Rousseau, though, Kant believes 
that an association of equals is not a society, because there is no “commander (imperans) and the subject 
(subditus) […] it rather makes one”.112 This is where Kant envisages conferring a distinctively 
legitimating form of the general united will on sovereignty. The general united will represents a more 
fundamental concept from which individual sovereign authority derives legitimacy while ceasing to be 
an arbitrary coercive force. 
The absence of a rightful condition reappears at an international level in the relations between states. 
Also with regard to states’ external relations there is a duty to move beyond the state of nature and to 
comply with the principles of public right. However, since for Kant only republics are eligible for 
cosmopolitan peace, it may be asked: On the basis of what reasons should states be obliged to move to 
an external condition in compliance with a global rule of law? 
Consider an a contrario argument. In the absence of a scheme of (distributive) justice among states, one 
that for Kant would result in a civil condition and therefore require an impartial adjudicator, solutions 
could be sought only on an individual basis and with the use of force. This would eventually undermine 
the internal juridical condition of Republics. For instance, it is imaginable that as a result of unregulated 
controversies between states, at least some citizens would lose their possessions and ultimately their 
freedom.113 It could be argued, then, that it is only in so far as inter-state external relations are regulated 
by principles of public law that it would follow that internal conditions of states could be lawfully 
maintained.  
At this point one arrives at a non-contractualist account, one where the notion of a common possession 
on earth allows for either determinative or regulative guidance by cosmopolitan law. As noted above, 
the distinctive element that Kant introduces into the debate is that the communio fundi originaria does 
not represent an historical event, as in the case of the communio primaeva (Grotius), but it is rather an 
idea of reason. It is therefore a regulative idea. In fact, if it were a determinative idea one would objectify 
the command of the general united will and the realization of freedom. For Kant “[…] the concept of 
freedom cannot hold as a constitutive but solely as a regulative” and therefore unilateral choices can be 
assessed only “as if” they were in line with the regulative standards of a general (a priori) united will.114  
Conclusion 
In this article I defended the idea of a juridical constructivist notion of Kant’s theory of cosmopolitanism. 
I claimed that the right to visit represents a formalization of the right-interactions among members of an 
original community of commercium. In so far as cosmopolitan right requires the justification of political 
decision-making and territorial boundaries, it gives rise to the need for mechanisms of constitutional 
coordination among individuals, peoples and states. A hierarchy of legal principles, equal protection and 
constraints on hegemonic states are just a few of the features of such a project.  
Kantian cosmopolitan constitutionalism includes innovative elements with respect to his natural law 
tradition as well as constitutional theory as such. It not only envisages a form of cosmopolitan 
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constitution without a state, wherein the idea of a progression under the guidance of a multistate 
confederation (Völkerstaat) becomes apparent, but it also argues for a form of world citizenship without 
world sovereignty, one where the cosmopolitan point of view gives rise to a critical stance against an 
ultimate assimilation to a de facto constituency. It is not only the case that constitutional progression is 
part of the Kantian vision of a regulative function based on the cosmopolitan ideal of an original shared 
possession of the earth but also, and more importantly, that the obstinate commitment to the idea of 
freedom as independence is not only an internal domestic resource but also a cosmopolitan liberty 
limited to the right to be heard in another jurisdiction.  
There is a way in which great thinkers remain contemporary. This, I believe, is by virtue of the possibility 
of a continuous reinterpretation of their ideas in light of presently unsolved challenges. It is in this sense 
that I have considered Kant’s cosmopolitan theory to be relevant for guiding our contemporary 
reflections on the standards of legitimacy of international law. For Kant, as I attempted to show, valid 
law should reflect an ideal of moral freedom. Following on from this premise, public right generates a 
rightful condition — a constitution (constitutio) — at both state and international level. This notion is 
constructed on the model of the Categorical Imperative and, particularly, on the idea of a submission of 
maxims as if one were to regard oneself as “a lawgiving” member “in a kingdom of ends”.115 For Kant, 
public right enhances freedom not only within the state, that is, internally and in the form of domestic 
right (civil constitutional law), but also externally through international right — jus gentium. The 
innovative nature of Kant’s thinking, as I argued, is that he claims that international law should be 
supplemented by one further component, one regulating primarily relations between non-citizens and 
states. This is what Kant has called the “right to hospitality”.116 Arguably, the constitutional effects of 
such a right should by now be clear. 
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Kant’s sovereignty dilemma 
The Kantian view on the legitimacy of the state cannot be disembodied from the international and 
cosmopolitan dimension of public law. Yet, prima facie, these sources of obligation generate a 
dialectical tension between the domestic right of state-citizens (citoyens)117 and the international and 
even cosmopolitan level of the rights of people as a “right of citizens of the world” (Weltbürgerrecht) 
118 or as “citizens of the earth” (das Recht des Erdbürgers).119 If the state is sovereign, then its will must 
be autonomous. This means that at the risk of losing their sovereignty, states cannot be coerced by a 
heteronomous will ─ neither internally by an independent force, as a revolutionary power, nor externally 
by an internationally independent body, as in the case of an international court. For Kant, however, law 
requires coercion, and since international and cosmopolitan right are two of the three pillars of public 
law, they are enforceable rights. This conundrum is known as Kant’s sovereignty dilemma.120  
Kant uses the terms “Herrschergewalt” and “Souveränität” to define sovereignty as something primarily 
linked to legislative authority.121 For Kant, sovereignty requires holding exclusive legislative functions: 
states cannot be externally coerced. This would violate the Kantian republican principle of legitimate 
coercion, namely the tracking of state sovereignty to an ultimate constituent will.122 External coercion 
is thus incompatible with state authority as expressed by its constituent source: “the people”. Kant’s 
sovereignty dilemma thus poses the problem of reconciling states’ autonomous will with the duty to 
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comply with international obligations.123 Given his views on sovereignty and enforceability of the law, 
Kant is not explicit on how and through which institutions states are to comply with international and 
cosmopolitan standards of the law. Nevertheless, he mentions the “proposal for a universal state of 
nations [Völkerstaat] to whose power all individual states should voluntarily accommodate themselves 
[emphasis added]”.124 Kant wants to give momentum to this apparently utopian project, initially 
introduced by the Abbé St.Pierre and Rousseau.. In particular, Kant aims to provide a reason for 
compliance to those states determined to “never submit to coercive laws of this kind” as well as to their 
unified stand on one single “rational ground”, so that what “holds for theory [holds also] for practice”.125  
 It is here, however, that the problem lies. Thus, how to reconcile this sort of “ought-can” divide? Kant 
suggests “to assume” a certain practical attitude, one considering that “such a universal state of nations 
[…] is possible (in praxi) and that it can be”.126 It appears here as if the theory-practice divide is solved 
by assuming, cognitively, the possibility of such unity from the state perspective. What this means is 
that if states must comply with the coercive demands of international and cosmopolitan law, then they 
can do so only by assuming a regulative role for the coercive power that an international institution, (i.e. 
the universal state of nations), would exercise on its members. States would adopt laws, judicial 
decisions etc. issued by a supraordinate political entity only “as if” they were externally coerced to do 
so. In fact, however, they would maintain an always actionable opting-out reservation to the demands 
of an international body. Suppose that international obligations are regulated and enforceable. This 
means that states’ compliance with the commands of an external agency would occur analogously to 
their external enforcement without in fact being so. Actual enforceability is left to states’ exercises of 
sovereign will and to their understanding of the compulsory character of non-domestic law in regulative 
terms. 
In this fashion, I consider that Kant has maneuvering space to conceive of the possibility for states to 
conform to the constitutional cosmopolitan demands adjudicated by a transnational institution such as a 
court of arbitration. Nevertheless, in all these cases it would remain true that none of the organs of a 
transnational institution would legitimately enforce the law by threat of legitimate punishment, and 
therefore, compliance would remain in the hands of the states themselves.  
If this interpretive hypothesis is sound, then it also becomes possible to explain why Kant is in the 
position to maintain the idea that states will never give up their sovereignty, as well as to account for 
the likelihood that their practices be understood as advancing a global rule of law, as with the case of 
approximation to a universal state of nations. The ‘drama’ of an insoluble conflict of duties would be in 
such a way diffused. To be sure, there is here no logical contradiction between duties to comply with 
the commands of a state’s sovereign will, and obedience to the commands of an international or 
cosmopolitan norm externally issued. As far as such order obligates in a regulative manner, 
enforceability requires a state’s incorporation of an international or cosmopolitan standpoint “as if” the 
supranational juridical order to which it belongs were directly enforceable. 
Accordingly, the thesis I defend consists in identifying a regulative role for the ideal of peace towards 
which public international and cosmopolitan law would approximate. Whereas nature for Kant provides 
us with the idea of a general compatibility of such mechanisms with the possibility of peace, it is only 
by striving morally towards peace that we might hope to achieve moral progress. Similarly, Guyer 
considers that the “morally motivated acts of human will” complete the Kantian picture of a 
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cosmopolitan progression which nature alone makes simply possible but not necessary.127 The 
regulative force of peace is therefore of relevance to establish the duty of the moral politician to comply 
with the demands of practical reason. However, my argument goes, the moral striving towards human 
progression turns into the constitutionalization of interstate relations. It is the legal point, which in the 
end, interests Kant. The difference is subtle but crucial: states’ motivating reasons for compliance are 
based on moral reason, but the reason for other states’ parties to form/create (?) a federation to coerce 
is law. That is, it is because a member state violates interstate agreements (and not just the morality of 
such agreements), that other parties have a legal right to intervene.128 Furthermore, in the second 
appendix, Kant argues that politics and morality can be reconciled among themselves only through 
publicity, and that conversely, any maxims that “need publicity (in order not to fail in the end) harmonize 
with right and politics combined”.129 (?) This also helps to clarify some institutional aspects of Kant’s 
cosmopolitan project, such as the apparently enigmatic sentences of the Perpetual Peace in which Kant 
asserts that the realization of a civitas gentium (Völkerstaat) does not match what nations want: “they 
do not at all want this”.130 To argue for this view, Kant draws a distinction between what is ideally right 
(“in thesi”), and what states would actually reject (“in hypothesi”).131  
Several readings of this passage have been suggested. All in all, one can distinguish between two groups: 
those considering that states would never allow for external interference — so that only a non-coercive 
“league of states” would be admissible — and those considering that states would eventually embrace a 
global confederation, such as the universal state of peoples or the multistate confederation (Völkerstaat). 
Whereas the first group expresses a liberal internationalist view à la Rawls,132 the second is typical of 
cosmopolitan theories à la Held or, in line with present interpretive purposes, of Kleingeld’s 
interpretation of Kant.133  
Liberal internationalists consider from their perspective that, insofar as democracies do not wage war 
with one another, this suffices to bring about international peace. Kleingeld, instead, holds that the 
Kantian starting assumption of a “no analogy” thesis between the domestic and the international realm 
does not prevent cosmopolitan approximation and, with that, the realization of a multistate confederation 
(Völkerstaat). Differently from individuals who can be coerced to exit the state of nature, sovereign 
states cannot be obliged to do so.134 Coercion to enter a multistate confederation would infringe upon 
“people’s autonomy”.135 Accordingly, it would create a relation of subordination of an “inferior (the 
people obeying the laws)” to a “superior (the legislator)” that would ultimately lead to a “contradiction” 
between the “presupposition” of international law and that of a universal state of peoples.136 At face 
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value, this would also prevent the possibility to conceive of a plurality of self-legislating states, such as 
that arising from the departure of a lawless condition characterizing the original state of nature.137  
Kleingeld considers that the multistate confederation is a realizable ideal, even if one difficult to achieve. 
It is an ideal that can be reached starting from a league of states.138 Coherently with such a rationale, 
Kleingeld aims to solve the sovereignty dilemma by claiming that for Kant a “global federation of states” 
requires at some point a “transfer of external sovereignty”.139 The problem, however, is that for Kant, 
sovereignty as the capacity to enforce the law is indivisible. The solution envisaged by Kleingeld would 
be feasible only if it were the case for Kant that a new notion of sovereignty would eventually replace 
the old one in the future. Unfortunately, Kant at no point suggests this possibility. We are thus left with 
the sovereignty dilemma unsolved.  
The alternative reading, the one I have offered here, is that control of law-enforcement by states’ parties 
does not prevent conditional delegation of authority to a transnational body. The conditionality of 
authority transfer here means that states always remain the ultimate subjects to exercise authority upon 
their territory; that is, to decide whether to enforce or not the commands issued by international bodies.  
Let us take the case of international adjudication. What is conditionally delegated by states, in this 
instance, is an adjudicative competence that is useful to solve rather complex international issues 
involving two or more states. However, this requires no actual delegation of sovereign power as with, 
for instance, the cession cessation (?) of functions, not to mention the delegation of sovereignty, or the 
“monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory” — to use a Weberian definition.140 
Enforcement of decisions remains to be ultimately interpreted and implemented by an act of will of the 
state. It follows that the conditional transferring of authority leaves the ultimacy of state sovereignty as 
well as of its power unity unchanged. Let us explain this point with reference to the Kelsian distinction 
between “direct” and “indirect motivation” of states for compliance to the law. Even though this 
explanation is far from being Kantian in a strict sense, one might assume that Kant would have possibly 
endorsed this view. Kelsen argues that the coerciveness of the law is not guaranteed only by the threat 
of punishment (indirect motivation). In addition “voluntary obedience is itself a form of motivation, that 
is, of coercion, and hence is not freedom”. 141 For Kelsen, one can conceive of coercion simply “in the 
psychological sense”.142 Differences arise with regard to the efficiency wherever an institutional 
apparatus lacks a sanctioning system. If one now substitutes the Kelsian “psychological” character for 
self-coercion with a properly Kantian “morally” motivating character of the law, then it becomes 
possible to understand why for Kant compliance to international law requirements is in need of a 
“constitutional mindset”. This is yet another step in the construction of an argument for states 
compliance to international law. 
“Constitutional mindset” and the progression towards cosmopolitan peace  
These reflections provide a supply of arguments for interpreting one of the most crucial, as well as 
puzzling, passages of Kant’s cosmopolitan theory: what I have mentioned before with the distinction in 
the Perpetual Peace of what is right in theory (in thesi) ― as in the case of the institutionalization of 
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the universal state of peoples ― and what is right in practice (in hypothesi) --- as exemplified with the 
federation of states as a “negative surrogate of a league”.143  
What my interpretation suggests is that the move from the league of states does not allow for a positive 
instantiation of a universal state of peoples. The Völkerstaat understood as either a universal state of 
peoples, or as I prefer, in terms of a multistate confederation, can never be for Kant something 
empirically realizable from the perspective of a state’s sovereignty, but only a regulative function to be 
adopted as a model for global coordination of spheres of law among states in their transitional 
progression towards peace. In the eyes of the states, therefore, the multistate confederation would 
represent only an “as if” rule for the coordination of states among themselves on the basis of the 
presumption of a universally shared jurisdiction.  
In Appendix I of the Perpetual Peace, Kant explains why there is a connection between morality and 
politics and why morality as such constrains meaningful projects for political action.144 Kant claims that 
if there were an irreconcilable conflict between theory and practice, between what we are required to do 
by the moral imperative and what we are in fact capable of doing in practice, this would amount ‘to 
deny[ing] that there is a [doctrine of] morals at all’.145 If we could not act in accordance with moral 
demands, any use of politics would become a legitimate means for advancing expediency and self-
interest. This point is captured by the distinction Kant draws between the “moral politician”, i.e. “one 
who takes the principles of political prudence in such a way that they can coexist with morals,” and “the 
political moralist”, i.e. one “who frames a moral to suit the statesman’s advantage”.146 
On the one hand, the moral politician sees the subordination of political action and legal reforms to the 
duties of morality. On the other hand, the political moralist disguises his personal advantage in moral 
terms and “on the pretext that human nature is not capable of what is good in accord with that idea”.147 
Unlike the moral politician, the political moralist sees the cosmopolitan project in terms of a “technical 
problem,”148 and perpetual peace as simply the result of the adaptation of morality to political advantage. 
According to the latter perspective, it is based on states’ interests and in view of a cost/benefit analysis 
that solutions to international problems are to be sought. Kant rejects this possibility, and in the 
concluding paragraphs of Appendix I of Perpetual Peace, he declares that “The right of human beings 
must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice this may cost the ruling power”,149 alluding to a non-
managerial interpretation of the significance of the law in view of its non-instrumental value. It follows 
that when confronted with the question of how to construct the cosmopolitan project, the moral politician 
interprets this as a moral task. Nevertheless, such a task does not end, in my view, in a merely moral 
endeavor as Guyer has argued.150 It leads instead to the establishment of a global rule of law, and thus 
to “the cosmopolitan constitution” which provides for the ordering of the sources of international law in 
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relation to itself.151 This moral striving of the suitable political that Kant presents us lays down the 
preconditions for the construction of a cosmopolitan rule of law. For Kant, this also means that 
constitutional thinking represents an instance of practical reasoning. It concerns the process of 
unification of public international law by means of compliance with a cosmopolitan ideal. As Kant states 
in the fourth thesis of Idea: “nature employs in order to bring about the development of all their 
predispositions . . . their antagonism in society, insofar as the latter is in the end the cause of their lawful 
order”.152 The lack of sociability depicted here with the word “antagonism” gives rise to the need for 
domestication through the enforcement of valid laws. This process should take place not only among 
individuals per se and within domestic borders, but also among states engaged in warfare or aggressive 
behaviour (i.e. through colonisation). A “cosmopolitan condition” (weltbürgerlicher Zustand)153 must 
be instantiated, in which a global rule of law is realised through a cosmopolitan “right to visit”.154 
With regard to Kleingeld’s interpretation of the unwillingness of states to comply with transnational 
demands of reason, the hypothesis of a Kantian transferring of “slices of sovereignty” to a hierarchically 
supraordinate institution, even if a federated one, appears counterintuitive. This differs from the case of 
the transferring of competences for interstate coordination, where implementation remains ultimately in 
the hands of states themselves. Transferring of adjudicative competences, for instance, can always be 
claimed back by states even when this might result in a breach of law. Furthermore, the potential 
contradiction between the dissolution of state sovereignty and the persistence of international law is 
diffused by a division of labor throughout dispersed juridical sources. The division between domestic 
and transnational adjudicative sources thus bears no substantive effect on the unity of state sovereignty 
as such.155 This reading requires a corollary, namely, the idea that for Kant cosmopolitan peace 
represents a regulative ideal rather than being a constitutive notion.156 It orients stages of approximations 
without proposing an “either/or” standard for legal validity. Kant’s regulative function for the multistate 
confederation offers, therefore, a precise understanding of the validity of institutional decision-making 
and adjudication. Overall, it provides a criterion for defining the formal unity of the law.  
A further speculation on what Kant might have had in mind when sketching the institutional 
progressions towards perpetual peace would also consider the significance of the distinction between 
compulsory and non-compulsory jurisdiction. As referred initially, for Kant right is defined by its 
coerciveness and coercion, in turn, requires an enforcing agent. Thus, the dilemma of sovereignty is not 
solved by simply avoiding a state’s delegation of legislative functions. In addition, it must tackle the 
problem of law coerciveness. In this case, it also seems that Kant holds a view based on progressive 
stages of legal coercion. At the end of the Perpetual Peace, indeed, he observes that “public right […] 
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must proceed from some kind of pact, which need not (like that from which a state arises) be based on 
coercive laws but may, if necessary, be a condition of continuing free association, like that of the 
federalism […]”.157 
In the case of transnational adjudication, the problem turns into how to ground obedience to a judicial 
decision issued by an international body. If sovereignty is to retain any significance at all, it has to 
require state-consent. As we know, there are two purposes for demanding consent, either in view of 
compulsory or in view of non-compulsory forms of jurisdiction.158  
Whereas compulsory forms demand that states enforce the law without a renewal of their consent once 
this has been initially granted, non-compulsory mechanisms conceive interstate arbitration as requiring 
a renewal of state consent each time. In either case, a state’s refusal to comply with the law raises 
complex issues of international legal enforcement, but it does not set aside the duty to comply.  
How does the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory jurisdiction help in understanding 
Kant’s sovereignty dilemma? One might argue that for Kant a non-compulsory form of adjudication 
would be compatible with the unwillingness of states to subordinate to supranational law-enforcing 
bodies. In this way, both coerciveness of the law as well as state sovereignty would be saved by 
admitting self-enforcement.  
Under the regulative rationale for a progressive instantiation of perpetual peace, one would also consider 
where Kant would place a shift between non-compulsory and compulsory forms of transnational 
adjudication. Let us recall Kant’s three-step leeway, namely, starting from an unbound Hobbesian 
conception of international relations and progressing towards forms of interstate relations under an 
inclusive rule of law. First, Kant mentions the case of the Hague arbitration tribunal at the beginning of 
the 18th century: the “permanent congress of states” (Kongreß), where “each neighboring state is at 
liberty to join”.159 This represents a weak form of association since it lacks a constitution, and therefore, 
it “can be dissolved at any time”.160 Nevertheless, Kant recognizes that it plays a significant role in 
allowing the possibility for states to introduce “the idea of a public right of nations” so as to allow states 
to solve their disputes “by a lawsuit, rather than in a barbaric way”.161 As starting points of departure, 
both the congress and the league of states contribute to the construction of a domestic cosmopolitan 
mindset. This constitutes the premise for a higher degree of state interdependence, something that would 
eventually lead to compulsory mechanisms of transnational adjudication. Whereas the first two phases, 
the congress and the league of states, are characterized by non-compulsory jurisdiction, it is only starting 
from the progression towards the third phase that states conceive the idea of compulsory judicial deferral 
to international courts. We know nowadays what such mechanisms are, an example being the European 
Convention of Human Rights and its judicial organ, the Strasbourg Court.  
Indeed, even if coercion cannot be demanded by states, certainly a form of “moral suasion” appears to 
be possible, as when Kant claims that states “can and ought to require the others to enter […] into a 
constitution similar to a civil constitution, in which each can be assured of its right. This would be a 
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league of nations, which, however, need not be a state of nations”.162 Since states already do grant 
themselves an internal rule of law, if it holds true that internal enjoyment depends partially on the 
enforcement of external legal condition, then this should also be established among states themselves.163 
Ergo, it appears that citizens should want, at least because of prudential reasons, to exit an interstate 
lawless condition by complying with a cosmopolitan rule of law.  
This element also explains why Kant conceives the formation of a league of states (Völkerbund) as 
feasible, even if suboptimal, without the additional consideration that the lack of an international 
confederation of states (Völkerstaat) would compromise the project of cosmopolitan peace. 
Furthermore, one might think that a non-compulsory form of dispute settlement would serve the purpose 
of overcoming a lawless scenario by “enlightening” and “educating” states, as it were, to solve interstate 
disagreements through law (by means of a legal process). This would cohere with the general Kantian 
view on the regulative role that the ideal peace would have with regard to history as a learning process.164  
I propose, accordingly, to understand this point through an argument based on regulative analogy. Kant 
considers that as individuals enter into a “civil constitution” due to the insecurity of an “omnilateral 
violence”, similarly states “even against their will” will eventually “enter into a cosmopolitan 
constitution; or else […] a federation”.165A partial dissimilarity with the domestic level remains, 
however , with regard to the normative reasons that the members of an original community of interaction 
— a communio fundi originaria —166 would have, but state citizens would not share, with regard to the 
duty of conforming to a general principle of right conceived in a transnational fashion. What remains 
permanently available here is compliance to an a priori, adjudicative, and united will aiming to solve 
disputes through the medium of the law.  
According to the regulative analogy I propose, the political will of cosmopolitan citizens is grounded 
not only on the compulsory entrance of individuals into the civil state, but also on the political request 
to their states for a voluntary inclusion into a cosmopolitan rule of law. It is indeed from the presumption 
of a general political will compelling a move towards a juridical condition that each “citizen of the 
world” would also want the enactment of a cosmopolitan rule of law. As in the domestic constitutions 
“…the well-being of a state is understood [as] that condition in which its constitution conforms most 
fully to principles of right.” Similarly, one could argue that compliance of constitutions to standards of 
reason represents “that condition which reason, by a categorical imperative, makes it obligatory for us 
to strive after”.167  
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Based on these assumptions, it is not difficult to imagine, therefore, that the demand of (for?) enjoyment 
of the cosmopolitan “right to visit” would pave the way to the enhancement of domestic public fora.168 
Here the citoyens, once having shifted their thinking to earth citizenship, would likely raise demands for 
the formation of a league of states (Völkerbund), and then request entrance to compulsory forms of 
jurisdictions “as if” they were members of a multistate confederation (Völkerstaat). The projection of a 
state’s self-contained civil condition into a transnational plane does not exhaust the domestic sovereign 
capacity of states to remain ultimate “self-enforce[rs] of […] international obligations”.169 Nevertheless, 
the implementation of an international decision should not be conflated with the autonomy and the 
compulsory force of an international adjudicative institution.  
What ensues from this process is the undertaking of a further step, one in which Kant’s state-subjective 
anticipation of a community of earth citizens is followed by a conditional delegation of authority to a 
transnational body with compulsory adjudicative functions. This is the most significant shift in 
contemporary international adjudication, and while it was still far from realization in Kant’s time, it was 
certainly not inconceivable.  
For Kant, there is no shortcut to the achievement of a legitimate order, one derogating from compliance 
with both an internal and external standard of legitimacy. This means that no solution is available in the 
direction of a centralized institutional system, neither republic nor monarchy. Both options are to be 
excluded because they are empirically unrealizable or normatively undesirable.170 Transition, instead, 
should be sought starting from a weak congress of states (Kongreß) and progressing towards a league 
of states (Phoedus Pacificum). Finally, the advancement into jurisdictional strictures would occur under 
the counterfactual guidance of a multistate confederation (Völkerstaat).  
In the absence of further institutional details, it remains problematic to identify in Kant the alternatives 
to the realization of the co-dependence of all states and peoples under a common legislation.171 
However, what Kant indicates here is that the cosmopolitan constitution backed up by a multistate 
confederation, is an arrangement of a particular kind: one that needs to be appropriate to the goal that it 
serves; namely, the achievement of perpetual peace. Yet the movement on the progressive advancement 
of compulsory adjudication does not elicit the idea of a form of adjudicative pluralism; that is, the 
possible coexistence of compulsory and non-compulsory forms of adjudication within a single 
cosmopolitan framework.  
In this way, state sovereignty is saved, and with that the formal unity of the legal system. Indeed, such 
unity does not require a global institutional hierarchy. On the contrary, it is compatible with institutional 
heterarchy, or the recognition of a relative autonomy of adjudicative bodies understood in terms of 
functional specialization. Since the unity of the global system of law is conceived in counterfactual 
terms, there is no logical contradiction between global constitutional pluralism as the idea of a plurality 
of constitutional sources and the view of a formal unity of law. It follows that in the case of constitutional 
disagreement, there would always remain open the possibility to resort to interstate arbitration as a way 
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to identify who is the legitimate subject of authority.172 Given such institutional trajectory, the question 
arises as to how is it possible to instantiate a cosmopolitan rule of law in the absence of a world state?173  
As Hruschka and Byrd observe, Kant’s move from a state of nature to a juridical condition first requires 
the postulation of a form of iustitia commutativa — the type of justice connected to the public market 
as a realm of free interactions —174 something also realizable outside of a statehood framework.175 
However, this requires the establishment of an interstate rule of law which would regulate property 
outside states’ jurisdictional domain and in the absence of a world state. The regulation of the market in 
accordance to a general principle of right would thus have to take place counterfactually, “as if” 
occurring within the jurisdiction of an international state confederation. Second, in the progression of 
states towards a cosmopolitan condition, incremental demands of “possible commerce”176 are 
achievable only as elements of public law-giving. This could take place only in the absence of a 
transnationally centralized legislative power. Such a second requirement is indeed, what Kant defines 
as iustitia tutatrix: a public law-giving process protecting rights. This is subjected to public 
enforceability — what Kant calls iustitia distributiva — and only when framed in terms of transnational 
public justice can it also be administered by an impartial arbiter, something along the lines of 
(resembling) an international court of arbitration. 
Once the above framework is assumed as a plausible interpretation of what Kant might have agreed with 
for the definition of the legitimacy conditions of the transnational realm, how would coordination 
problems among members of a federation be solved? How to conceive forms of coercive powers 
exercised within a transnational entity in accordance with Kant’s principles, and particularly with a 
‘thick’ conception of state sovereignty? Perhaps a few features can be sketched. An international court 
operating under the regulation of Kant’s cosmopolitan constitution could authorize the use of force 
against a member or a non-member to the federation. Yet, no state member of the transnational entity 
could be obliged to comply with such a command since this would violate the autonomy of its 
sovereignty. Therefore, as each of the member states could only enter the transnational confederation of 
states voluntarily, similarly it could only voluntarily fulfill the commands of an international adjudicator. 
Whatever a state decided upon to comply with such a decision, it would act in accordance with a rightful 
coercion, one conceived in accordance with the laws and treaties of a transnational federation. This 
means that within this Kantian picture, there remains an unsolved tension: one between the non-
enforceability on member states of a lawful transnational decision, on the one hand, and the mandatory 
compliance to transnational adjudications, on the other hand. This implies that, as sovereignty would be 
infringed upon if states were compelled to punish another state for non-compliance to a transnational 
command, similarly, a state’s non-compliance to judicial decisions would represent a violation of the 
transnational law of the federation. In other words, it would manifest the will of the state to withdraw 
from the obligations set out by the transnational entity, thus legitimizing a war against it. In conclusion, 
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given the mandatory character of law as such, whereas international entities cannot by themselves 
constrain other states’ members to compliance, for Kant this role can be performed horizontally, so to 
speak, by reciprocal compulsion of the member states to a federation. 
The “general united will” as a transcendental constituent power for the cosmopolitan rule of law 
Progressive legal stages of enforceable transnational justice (iustitia) require the interplay of a 
multilayered conceptual apparatus. Given the notions displayed by Kant, it appears that a number of 
mediations are realized between: a) the perspective of individuals both as state-citizens (citoyens) as 
well as citizens of the earth (Erdbürger) and; b) the anticipation of a necessary transcendental constituent 
will, as with the idea of a “common united will”. Finally, c) the cosmopolitan “right to visit,” resulting 
from the liberties set forth by both a) and b), realizes the jurisdictional unity of the Kantian cosmopolitan 
constitution, providing a view that accommodates the individual “at home” in this world. The right to 
visit brings together constitutional progressions by transforming distant jurisdictions into legally porous 
wholes.  
In the following paragraphs, I discuss the relation between a) and b) with regard to the significance of 
what it means, from the standpoint of state and earth citizenship, to comply with the demands of a 
transcendental united will.  
As anticipated, the legitimacy for states to move towards transnational realms of adjudication and 
power-sharing relations depends on the presumption of a transcendental role played by the general 
united will. Once individuals progress towards a condition regulated by principles of law, as with the 
creation of states, a claim to a general united will reappears with regard to the peaceful establishment of 
interstate relations. State demands for a cosmopolitan rule of law are justified not only by virtue of 
security threats, but also because international trade undertakings and interstate cooperation demand 
altogether the construction of a cosmopolitan legal framework.  
As previously observed, Kant claims that the citizens of the earth are the subjects of cosmopolitan rights 
among which is recognized the right to visit.177 Furthermore, in identifying the conditions of a “rightful 
constitution”,178 he considers not only “the right of the citizens of the state”179 as well as “the right of 
the nations”,180 but he also speaks of “the right of citizens of the world, insofar as individuals and states, 
standing in the relation of externally affecting one another, are to be regarded as citizens of a universal 
state of mankind (ius cosmopoliticum)”.181 This bi-directional relation points to a critical tension 
between natural and positive law in as far as earth’s citizens are defined by the former and states by the 
latter. For Kant, it appears, therefore, to be justified to conceive both strands of law as mutually defining 
planes. It is by such reciprocal determination that external relations among states become regulated by 
an overarching legal system.  
In this light, Kant’s explanation of “earth citizenship” as a form of “citizens[hip] of a universal state of 
humankind” (allgemeiner Menschenstaat)182 can also be interpreted. This is a condition where 
individual relations are coherent with a transcendental constituent will — a general united will — 
presupposed necessarily a priori. By advancing a claim to visit, the citizens of earth aim at transforming 
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the positivist strictures of national jurisdictions, ultimately creating the legal conditions for earth 
citizenship. In this respect, state citizenship as well as earth citizenship qualify as mutually 
interdependent forms of community affiliation. To be a citizen of the state is also to be a world citizen 
in as far as both affiliations realize an original right to freedom within a whole of rationalized 
institutions.  
Let me illustrate this point by confronting Kant’s position with an opposite view such as Schmitt’s 
constitutional theory.183 Whereas for Schmitt, modern constitutionalism is characterized by the never 
pacified antagonism between the primacy of a constituent will (the democratic system) and a constituted 
power (a rule of law), the Kantian notion of a transcendental united will stands quite at the opposite 
spectrum, subordinating democracy to a cosmopolitan rule of law.184 For Schmitt, the democratic will 
can never be represented, which he often claims by referring to Rousseau’s Social Contract.185 In 
Schmitt the relation between what comes first, whether the constituent or the constituted will, is inverted 
with respect to Kant’s transcendental account. Furthermore, for Schmitt, the constituent will is 
subordinated to an empirically identifiable constituent power, which is prior. In Kant, in contrast, the 
(cosmopolitan) general united will is transcendentally anticipated, and this is why it regulates the 
legitimacy conditions for the formation of empirically constituted powers. These latter are subordinated 
to the legitimacy conferred by a transcendental constituent will; therefore, by the general united will 
ending the state of nature. Through the anticipation of a transcendental will, it follows that empirically 
constituted powers fall into a general concept of unity of a cosmopolitan rule of law. Unlike the 
Schmittian identitarian seizure of membership,186 such unity in Kant remains open to critical demands 
of inclusivity. The cosmopolitan “right to visit” testifies to the ineradicable openness of any constituted 
jurisdiction to the legitimate demands of cosmopolitan interaction. It follows that the concept of a 
general united will provides reflexive conditions that realize the constitutive unity of the polity by 
“means of” and “of” a collective body.187  
If this interpretation is sound, then Kant’s views are incompatible with any attempt to subordinate law 
to politics. On the contrary, for Kant the demands of the transcendental united will demand to conceive 
of the legal and the political as united and co-dependent concepts.  
The Kantian understanding of the transcendental conditions legitimizing a historically given constituent 
power also provides for an indication of the debate concerning the self-reflexive character of a 
constituent collective selfhood.188 Based on these normative assumptions, the construction of a 
cosmopolitan constitution is not simply the precipitate of a historically given constituent power as it is 
in the liberal constitutional processes of national jurisdictions. Unlike domestic social movements of 
sorts, the ultimately transcendental character of constituent power places Kant’s natural right to visit 
into a constructivist tension with the positive laws of states. Such tension confronts opposed 
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constituencies, such as an empirically domestic and a cosmopolitan transcendental one, out of which 
springs the notion of earth citizenship.  
If this is compatible with Kant’s views, a problem arises here that goes far beyond a textual exegesis. 
Indeed, were it the case in Kant of a circular movement between the constituting will of historically 
determined peoples and the notion of a transcendental rule of law, then the demands for the transnational 
legitimacy of an agent (“I”) could be assimilated into her acting as a subject representing an already 
constituted will. On the contrary, she could act only based on a transcendental presumption of a yet to 
be constituted collectivity.189 Such a community can never be constituted exhaustively and therefore it 
cannot be represented as a whole. Renewals of claims of cosmopolitan representation unfold over time 
with none being conclusive.  
Representation of a collective will identified by an act of transnational agency takes the form of a plural 
“We”. The collective “We”, conceived here in terms of a “double plural”, through the mediation with 
the transcendental general will generates the notion of “the right of the citizens of the earth” (das Recht 
des Erdbürgers).190  
Overall, the formulation of a Kantian argument for the cosmopolitan constitution helps in understanding 
the problematic relation of representation of a transnational constituent whole. First, it avoids a 
simplistic dichotomy between presence and representation, as well as between constituent and 
constituted power. It frames, instead, a number of multi-level relations where a mediation occurs 
between domestic and transcendental selfhoods.  
Regarding the problem of the self-constitution of the political community, one might then wonder how 
this process helps to realize (bring about) democratic-like features within the transnational realm. It 
could be said that, paradoxically, a space for representation remains open when no claim aims at 
representing the whole — even though it is the case that such a new order is constituted only once a 
claim of such sort is made.191 In the Kantian-like argument I propose here, the attempt to replace the 
whole never exhausts the transcendental standard set by the general united will. The transcendental 
collective will represents, therefore, an exhortation to societal emancipation by means of creating a 
progressive cosmopolitan rule of law, which can never pretend to be valid in “the name of humanity”, 
as it were. In this regard, individual cosmopolitan agents (“I’s”) neither only represent nor do they solely 
constitute the whole of collectivity. The author of cosmopolitan acts of constitution remains therefore 
external to the same order that was thereby constituted. Only when cosmopolitan agency avoids 
objectification in an already solidified and constituted rule of law, will earth citizenship as a whole 
remain open to the demands of a transcendental will , which stands as a critical counterpoint against 
power-domination.  
Double sovereignties and plural citizenries: a rejoinder to a (virtual) ‘family quarrel’ between Kant 
and Habermas? 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the dilemma between transnational sovereignty, constituent power and 
transnational democratic legitimacy has been tackled recently by Habermas in his collection of essays 
published with the title: The Lure of Technocracy.192 Under examination, here, is the relation between 
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a European political identity and its division into national and regional constituencies. Habermas 
introduces a conceptual pillar of his cosmopolitan theory, described as the notion of “double 
sovereignty”.193 This is the idea of a “form of sovereignty divided at the root”194 which accounts for the 
legitimate transferring of authority from the national to the transnational level.195 From this notion, it 
follows that a dialectical movement is unleashed between “constituted components” and a “constituting 
power”, wherein “citizens and states (that are already constituted by citizens) can participate on an 
equal footing in constituting a supranational democracy”.196 
In this section, I will claim that the Habermasian notion of an inherent duplicity of constituent citizenship 
can be fatherly expanded by reference to Kant. Notwithstanding differences in perspective, the two 
views integrate reciprocally. In particular, the Kantian distinction between state citizenship and 
citizenship of the earth helps in defining the Habermasian thesis on the internal division of sovereignty 
as well as illustrating the plurality of a scheme of transnational memberships.  
Whereas Habermas’ conception of a “double sovereignty” goes beyond the traditional view of a purely 
domestic source of power for state legitimacy, Kant’s idea of earth citizenship provides the conceptual 
template for framing the tension between a state-constrained conception of sovereignty and, ultimately, 
a critical conception of cosmopolitan affiliation claimed in compliance to global principles of public 
law: “a principle having to do with rights”.197  
Why so? The reason, to employ the Habermas expression, is that “[…] the trust among citizens that 
currently exists in the form of a nationally limited civic solidarity can very well develop into an even 
more abstract form of trust that reaches across national borders. The ‘no demos’ thesis obscures a factor 
that we must take seriously – the conviction that the normative achievements of the democratic state are 
worth preserving”.198 Habermas asks us to formulate a thought experiment: “Let us imagine a 
democratically developed European Union as if its constitution had been brought into existence by a 
double sovereign”.199 These two sovereignties would be the citizens of the European states (the 
European peoples) and the citizens of Europe. Such cofounding powers would then “be reflected at the 
level of the constituted polity”.200 However, as notices Habermas, this determines a situation of deadlock 
where “no longer [anyone would be able to] decide in a real sovereign manner”.201 An assumption arises 
spontaneously, one where the European constituent power has “already committed itself […] to 
recognizing the historical achievements […] by the nation-states”.202  
From a Kantian perspective, an initial argument would take into consideration that no empirically given 
“constituent power” can be postulated from outside a transcendental process of justification of a 
constituent will. This means that the Habermasian conception of a “double sovereignty” can be 
conceived only in the light of a deeper transcendental notion, one resorting to the idea of earth 
citizenship. Habermas also seems to concede this point, as when he claims that “the citizens satisfy their 
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two allegiances [state and EU affiliations][…] from the perspective as if they had participated in the 
constitution-building from the outset as equal subjects in their dual role […]”.203  
Yet, the transcendental assumption of the Kantian general united will also suggests also more for the 
Habermasian conception of a dual sovereignty. The former opens to inclusion different types of 
constituent affiliations established transnationally. Furthermore, it defines standards of legitimacy for 
those kinds of jurisdictional affiliations that do not require conceiving exercises of sovereignty. These 
include, for instance, all those transnational regimes as in the case of commercial trade agreements such 
as the WTO, or the case of networks as with the G8 and G20.  
What a Kantian-like argument has to say here is that it is through the fundamental presumption of a 
general united will that it follows a peremptory command to join a rightful condition of a global polity. 
Once the Habermasian conception of “double sovereignty” is reinterpreted in this Kantian way, it also 
becomes possible to account for both a plurality of transnational forms of sovereignty as well as 
inclusion of transnational but non-sovereign forms of regime. .  
By thinking in Kantian terms with “the benefit of two hundred years’ insight”,204 it can be shown how 
the critical perspective associated with the idea of earth citizenship needs to shift away from the national 
realm of republican states to the burgeoning of transnational regimes. For these cases, the notion of 
“earth citizenship” expresses a pragmatic instantiation of a transcendental collective will.  
That contemporary legal and political regimes continue to express incomplete forms of earth citizenship 
reflects a contingent deficit but not a normative drawback. Nevertheless, in such a plurality of regimes, 
even the non-ideal democratic progressions achieved under the guidance of a transcendental will show 
deficient arrangements in the treatment of their members. Notwithstanding significant progress, moving 
beyond the treatment of individuals as mere objects of concern, a comparably diffused notion of earth 
citizenship framed by human rights is not yet delivering a form of subjectivity fully endowed with 
enforceable constituent powers.  
Legal and institutional integration certainly requires some form of transnational democratic 
accountability, but this does not imply an all-pervasive (insert hyphen) form of global sovereignty. 
Instead, there might be different means by which legitimate forms of transnational powers are realized: 
from the opportunity for citizens to express a critical appraisal of decisions taken by transnational bodies, 
to their participation as members in transnational decision-making processes. Whereas state-sovereignty 
provides, to a large extent, an indirect way for people to influence political outcomes world-wide, it is 
undeniable that decisions beyond the state-level are often made by technocrats rather than by state-
elected representatives pursuing a public agenda — something known in the EU context as the power 
of “comitologies”.  
Unfortunately, the lesson handed down by Kant does not provide guidance with regard to the 
institutional mechanisms for realizing a positive transnational integration among peoples. The time was 
not yet ripe to propose viable institutional steps for the constitutionalization of international law. 
However, what Kant clearly states that continues to remain valid today, is that in a cosmopolitan 
perspective any justifiable arrangement beyond the state has to be consistent with Republican ideals. 
With regard to such enterprise, the cosmopolitan constitution must promote an ideal of freedom as non-
domination, meaning an overall protection of individual rights from domestic and transnational 
domination.205  
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Conclusion 
Let me conclude with a remark concerning the reactualization of Kant’s cosmopolitan insights. It is 
understood that the world of internal law and international relations has changed profoundly. Nowadays, 
we need certainly new categories for reflecting and understanding such transformations. The relevance 
and actuality of Kant, nonetheless, is that of having inaugurated a “modern view” of international law, 
one that later developed through the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, followed by the growth and 
consolidation of the human rights regime. To understand the contribution of Kant, one should first 
underscore his challenge to a persistent dogma of his time: the impossibility to conceive domestic and 
international law as one single legal system. Conversely, Kant argues for the unity of the public law, 
notwithstanding an internal tripartitition into “the right of a state, the right of nations and cosmopolitan 
right”.206 We know how the idea of a unity of the law affected later reflections in philosophy of law 
and, in particular, how such an idea gained momentum with the Kelsenian notion of a “basic norm”. 207  
For Kant, however, such unity is not a matter of defining a law-internal “juristic hypothesis” as it is for 
Kelsen.208 Whereas for Kelsen an internal law-like grounding satisfies the demand on “what the law 
actually is”, avoiding an allegedly widespread confusion with “what it should be”, for Kant such a 
separation does not seem to hold due to the validating force that the categorical imperative provides to 
the principle of right.209  
Thus, it seems that the Kantian conviction for the unity of the law rests on resorting ultimately to a meta-
juristic, transcendental hypothesis validating the legal system as a whole. The suggestion I have made 
throughout this essay detects the juncture between positive law and its meta-legal foundation in the 
Kantian justification of the reasons for abandoning a lawless condition of the state of nature. Such a step 
becomes possible due to an individual convergence into a “general united will” based on intersubjective 
relations regulated by rights. The concept of public right, before being characterized by specific content, 
is an a priori notion. It is the condition through which the structuring of the spheres of a general civil 
condition occurs that can only provide an approximation towards perpetual peace.  
As Kant affirms: “If it is a duty to realize the condition of public right, even if only in approximation by 
unending progress, and if there is also a well-founded hope of this, then the perpetual peace that follows 
upon what have till now been falsely called peace treaties (strictly speaking truces) is no empty idea but 
a task that, gradually solved, comes steadily closer to its goal […]”.210 It is to the understanding of the 
actual stage of international law that one needs to turn in order to see how it might be reasonably 
achieved progress towards perpetual peace. 
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Exploring constitutional pluralism(s): an ontological roadmap 
 
Dimitri Van den Meerssche* 
 
Introduction 
The proliferation in recent decades of new actors and modes of law-making beyond the state has 
splintered the transnational regulatory space into substantively overlapping normative complexes with 
varying levels of institutional embeddedness and claims for authority. This shift in global governance – 
underlined by heuristics such as transnational law212, global regulatory governance213, or international 
public authority214 – questions the orthodox concepts of legal sovereignty (i.e. ultimate legal authority) 
and hierarchy, and signals the obsoleteness of the traditional jurisprudential monism-dualism divide215. 
Apart from jurisprudential puzzlement, the rise of transnational law also raises questions of legitimacy: 
what normative parameters can be used to evaluate the legitimacy of transnational legal sources in areas 
of substantive overlap with pre-existing national law? And where does the constituent power fit in the 
model? In response to these questions of ultimate authority and legitimacy, many influential 
international legal scholars have turned to constitutional language and have developed the paradigm of 
‘constitutional pluralism’ (CP) as a heuristic to approach the questions of legal validity and legitimacy 
in the transnational era. Since its inception, CP has been recognized as one of the brightest beacons in 
the contemporary debates on international legal theory216.  
While the different strands of CP are presented in the literature as different assemblages of 
complementary and cumulative descriptive, prescriptive and epistemic claims217, the first aim of this 
paper is expose and explore the analytical and normative paradoxes and multiplicities within the 
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paradigm. The innovative contribution is to root this multiplicity in the diverging ontological218 
underpinnings of the constitutional heuristic. This analytical exercise, I argue, does not only allow us to 
see the classic jurisprudential schism between legal positivism and normative general jurisprudence 
through a transnational lens219, but – more importantly – it sheds light on CPs reconfiguration of the 
concept of law in a transnational era. My recourse to metaphysics results from the argument – central to 
this paper and generally overlooked – that the different strands of CP holistically (re)define law’s 
ontological foundations in the pluralistic and interwoven normative scheme of global governance. The 
paper reveals and elaborates three distinct (and often unarticulated220) ontological perspectives on 
transnational law in the constitutional discourse: law as (i) an endogenously validated institutional 
product (MacCormick); (ii) a relational, discursive phenomenon (Maduro); and (iii) the outcome of a 
meta-normative, interpretative praxis (Kumm). Departing from these different ontological positions, the 
paper demonstrates, ‘constitutional pluralists’ have developed radically divergent approaches to 
questions of legality and legitimacy in transnational law. The paper offers an analytical roadmap through 
this ontological landscape, thereby providing a typology of the different strands of CP and demonstrating 
how the heuristic has transmuted from an empirically embedded narrative on the end of legal sovereignty 
and the multipolarity of contemporary global governance, i.e. the ‘pluralization of constitutionalism’, 
to a normatively thick model of constitutional unification, i.e. the ‘constitutionalization of pluralism’221. 
The typology will render explicit how the arguments of CP’s proponents222 – ranging from descriptive 
sociology to normative political theory – are plagued by the ontological obscurity of ‘law’ in the 
transnational era.  
The argument proceeds in three stages. First of all, the paper explores the genesis of CP in the seminal 
work of Neil MacCormick. Beyond reformulating his basic claims223, I will highlight MacCormick’s 
reliance on Hart’s Concept of Law and set out the implications of that ontological starting point224. The 
institutional positivist perspective that is employed, the paper argues, is transposed by MacCormick 
beyond general jurisprudence, as a tool of descriptive sociology and normative political theory. 
Consequently, MacCormick’s claim of radical CP – i.e. a multiplicity of non-hierarchical constitutional 
orders within and beyond the European context and across the formal-informal, public-private 
dichotomies – entails a normative paradigm for global governance that favors heterarchy, interaction 
and political conflict-mediation over the traditional notions of legal hierarchy, which define both the 
monist and dualist approaches to international law225. In sum, MacCormick’s dynamic approach of 
Hart’s legal ontology inspired a horizontal, interactive and anti-formalist theory on legality and 
legitimacy in the transnational era: a ‘pluralization of constitutionalism’. 
The second part of the paper offers an innovative typology that systematizes the different descriptive, 
analytical and normative engagements of ‘constitutional pluralists’ with the ‘original’ theory. Focusing 
on the work of Maduro and Kumm, the paper argues that the doctrine of CP has taken a radical turn: 
away from radical pluralism to a constitutional paradigm that overarches the national-transnational 
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divide. This turn, which I call the ‘constitutionalization of pluralism’, is grounded in two different 
ontological theories: while Maduro roots his paradigm in the understanding of law as the product of an 
‘inter-institutional dialogue’, i.e. a discursive practice, Kumm builds his constitutional model upon a 
normative non-positivist concept of law, along Dworkinian lines. Grounded in these ontological 
premises, ‘constitutional pluralists’ either induce (from common institutional semantics) or deduce 
(from moral theory) constitutional principles to reunite and constrain the postnational legal order.  
Although profoundly different in many regards, what these three branches of CP have in common is that 
they combine elements of general jurisprudence (law’s internal validity), descriptive sociology (law’s 
social functionality) and normative political theory (law’s external legitimacy) in one holistic paradigm 
on transnational law. Reconstructing these paradigms root and branch allows us to sharpen the focus on 
the different approaches within CP to the phenomenon of transnational law and the complementary 
debates on (i) the postnational concept of law; (ii) the issue of ultimate legal authority (echoing the 
dualism versus monism debate226); the questions of (iii) sovereignty and (iv) legality; and (v) the 
substantive boundaries of the transnational regulatory space. Informed by these insights, the paper 
describes a general trend in CP from an interactive theory on pluralism and heterogeneity to a rationalist 
revision of legal monism under constitutional principles227.  
In the final section, the paper employs these insights to account for the absence of the demos in CP’s 
different strands. I argue that the democratic deficit of CP has to be understood in the light of its 
ontological roots. In short, the paper explores CP’s diverging approaches to the metaphysical contours 
of transnational law in order to draw two conclusions: first of all, the paper describes a general trend in 
CP from a focus on pluralism and heterarchical interaction to a rationalist renaissance of legal monism 
under constitutional principles. This provides for two distinct models of CP, the former being 
characterized by radical heterarchy, the end of sovereignty, moral relativism and political conflict-
mediation, while the latter reinstalls legal hierarchy under a normatively thick set of principles, 
substantively shaped on the level of (international) constitutional adjudication. Secondly, the paper 
exposes how deeper insight into the ontological premises of CP implicates the democratic deficit that is 
present in its normative political theory. The paper argues that the absence of ‘constituent power’ results 
from the conflation of the jurisprudential, normative and sociopolitical features of CP. 
MacCormick and the pluralization of constitutionalism 
The inception of constitutional pluralism is commonly ascribed to Neil MacCormick, who coined the 
term in Questioning Sovereignty in 1999. The concept is defined as follows: ‘[w]here there is a plurality 
of institutional normative orders, each with a functioning constitution (at least in the sense of a body of 
higher-norms establishing and conditioning relevant governmental powers), […] while none asserts or 
acknowledges superiority over another […], ‘constitutional pluralism’ prevails”228. Remarkably, this 
definition implicitly contains two other definitions: (i) instead of ‘legal’ order, MacCormick refers to 
the ‘institutional normative’ order; and (ii) when referring to the ‘constitution’, MacCormick defines 
this as any ‘body of higher-norms establishing and conditioning relevant governmental powers’. The 
traditional statist constitutional paradigm, which presumes an analytical link between the legal 
constitution, democracy as a foundational value and the authority of the state229 is thereby disregarded. 
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Below I will demonstrate that MacCormick arrives at his conceptualization of CP by applying tools of 
descriptive sociology to a specific ontological claim. The latter – which is inspired by Hart230 and 
conceives of law as a normative structure constituted and systematized by institutional practice – is at 
the core of his concept of CP231 and should therefore be explored in depth.  
The Hartian origins of constitutional pluralism 
Hartian positivism conceives of law as a system that is constituted by the union of primary rules of 
conduct and secondary rules, among which the ‘rule of recognition’ figures prominently232. This rule of 
recognition – which sets out the criteria for norms to be recognized as valid law and is therefore 
ontologically constitutive – is considered to be rooted in customary social praxis233.The importance of 
this claim for MacCormick’s theory of constitutional pluralism can hardly be overstated, as I will 
elaborate below. The being of law, in Hartian logic, is both induced from and constitutive of the 
discourse and ‘official behavior’ by ‘officials’234 or, more specifically, by ‘courts’235. In other words, 
for Hart, official institutional practice systematizes the normative space, thereby existentially 
constituting law236. As I will discuss below, this broad inclusiveness is also at the core of MacCormick’s 
concept of CP. 
MacCormick explicitly roots his paradigm of CP in this Hartian approach237. In line with Hart, for 
MacCormick, institutional praxis is the locus where law emerges from: the rule of recognition, which 
constitutes law and determines its validity, ‘depends on deliberative practice and emergent custom’ and 
is revealed through official ‘practice and argumentation’238. Until this point, MacCormick formulates 
Hart’s claims in a standard and neutral way. To arrive at CP, however, MacCormick takes an important 
and controversial leap239. Since the rule of recognition is induced from an institutional practice that is 
inherently volatile and dynamic, MacCormick argues, the rule can and must ‘evolve and develop over 
time’240. In other words, since law’s validity follows institutional praxis, any changes in the spatial and 
structural features of this praxis – i.e. the transnationalization of institutional regulatory processes – 
impact legal validity. This self-proclaimed ‘evolutionary interpretation’ of the Concept of Law is not 
articulated by Hart, who embeds his jurisprudential theory firmly within the confines of the nation state. 
MacCormick acknowledges this, stating that ‘the pluralistic or polycentric potentialities’ of Hart’s 
ontology remain ‘more a potential than an actual virtue of [Hart’s] work’241. For MacCormick, however, 
this national focus of Hart’s institutional jurisprudence is merely a matter of historical contingency; the 
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‘once-for-all cut-and-dried quality’ of the rule of recognition should be denied. The latter should 
therefore be considered as a living concept, a product of decentralized institutional change.  
The conclusion from MacCormick’s ‘dynamic’ approach to Hart is that any change in, or a 
fragmentation of, ‘official’ institutional praxis has the potential to generate a new rule of recognition, 
which determines distinct criteria of validity that shape an autonomous legal system242. This nascent 
legal system can coexist and substantively overlap with pre-existing legal systems without losing its 
systematic character and without being invalidated. The validity of norms within each legal system is 
determined by their own dynamic processes of institutional (legislative, judicial and executive) practice 
and doctrinal development. Consequently, since institutional practice autonomously shapes and 
systematizes the legal system, institutional fragmentation leads to legal pluralism. Applied to the 
changing landscape of global governance and the emergence of transnational law, this jurisprudential 
step clearly allows for an endless multiplication of rules of recognition. (Global) institutional 
fragmentation and (global) legal pluralism are jurisprudentially equated. 
From legal to constitutional pluralism 
MacCormick’s claim is, therefore, first and foremost, a claim with respect to the ontology of law that 
results in a theory of legal pluralism. While pluralism was traditionally linked to an anthropological or 
sociological exploration of normative pluralism in non-Western societies243, lately it has also become 
pivotal to the study of global governance, which is pointed out by the proliferation of literature on 
‘transnational law’, ‘global legal pluralism’ or ‘global administrative law’244. MacCormick underwrites 
this notion of global legal pluralism on different occasions, claiming that ‘state law is not the only kind 
of law that there is, [there is also] international law, the law of organized associations of states […], the 
law of churches, […] laws of games and laws of […] sporting associations’245 and that we should 
abandon the foundational fixation on state-law, which unrightfully marginalizes ‘international law’, 
‘canon law and church law’ and the ‘living law of social institutions like universities, firms or 
families’246. It is remarkable that MacCormick roots this pluralist claim in the system-theory of Hart, 
which is traditionally conceived as a hierarchical, statist account of holistic legal validity247. To 
understand how MacCormick abandons the hierarchical feature of Hart’s positivism and employs the 
model in favor of CP, we need to turn to his constitutional paradigm. 
MacCormick’s constitutional pluralism goes beyond the claim that a plurality of valid normative orders 
can coexist in one social space (a commonly accepted and quite pedestrian observation): it relates to 
ultimate authority (legal sovereignty) and the relationship between institutionally constituted legal 
systems248. The bridge between pluralism and constitutionalism249 expresses these aims and requires 
MacCormick to develop a constitutional paradigm. This is his definition: ‘the ‘constitution’ of any such 
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[institutional normative] order250 can best be defined in terms of the establishment and empowerment of 
the agencies (‘institutions’ in one sense) that perform the roles of enunciating, executing, administering 
or judging about the norms whose institutional character is established by the very exercise of those 
powers’. This establishment, MacCormick claims, ‘is itself achieved by institutional acts’. So far, the 
constitutional argument seems to be circular: institutional acts determine the constitutional validity of 
institutional acts. ‘To avoid infinite regress’, the argument acknowledges, ‘it is necessarily the case that 
some ultimate empowering norms be informal and customary or conventional in character’. These 
empowering elements, MacCormick concludes, ‘can be self-referential’251. In other words, not only 
does institutional praxis determine legal validity (leading to legal pluralism) in MacCormick’s model, 
it also constitutes ultimate constitutional authority in a self-referential fashion (constitutional pluralism). 
This is quite a revolutionary line of reasoning: with a stroke of the pen, MacCormick transformed Hart’s 
jurisprudential positivist theory on the concept of law into a constitutional paradigm on the question of 
ultimate authority in the sphere of global governance and the interface between domestic and 
transnational law. While Hart’s positivist theory was embedded in a static sovereign model of national 
constitutionalism, which it did not aim to contest, constitutionalization in MacCormick’s ontological 
frame can be multiplied by mere self-referential institutional practice. Whenever this self-referential 
institutional exercise does not voluntarily imbed the nascent legal system in a pre-existing constitutional 
frame, it stands free from it. Concretely, MacCormick’s paradigm necessarily considers organisations 
such as FIFA, ICAO or ICAN to be not only valid venues of transnational law-making, but independent 
constitutional orders. The gap between institutional pluralism and CP is therefore not of categorical 
nature, it can be bridged in a strict self-referential fashion.  
The end of sovereignty 
A logical consequence of this denial of all constitutional interdependency, is that MacCormick has to 
abandon legal hierarchy in favor of ‘interaction’252. The question of hierarchy or heterarchy253 in this 
understanding is determined by institutional subjectivity, i.e. self-reflexive praxis determines ultimate 
authority. This creates a constitutional paradox: the ‘officials’ assigned with the task of determining 
final legal authority derive their capacity to do so on the basis of that very determination254. MacCormick 
underwrites this problem, but does not seek a way out. His claim is that ‘[s]uch paradox, such question-
begging, such circularity of reasoning, is perhaps built into our very understanding of [legal] system’255. 
Indeed, the ontological assimilation of ‘law’ and ‘authority’ with self-referential institutional practice 
renders this circularity inevitable. Consequently, according to MacCormick’s constitutional paradigm, 
there can be no categorical gap between Tuori’s understanding of system pluralism, i.e. pluralism of 
institutional normative orders256, and ‘constitutional pluralism’. In conclusion, it is clear that 
MacCormick’s adaptation of Hartian legal positivism grants legal validity and supreme constitutional 
authority to all normative edicts that emerge from systematized, autonomous and self-legitimizing 
institutional practice. Bluntly put, it seems that MacCormick’s ontology would have to consider ISIS as 
an autonomous constitutional order. 
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MacCormick’s claim, however, is not only of a conceptual nature. Applying his ontological claim – 
defining the legal system as an institutional normative order and constitutional authority as derivative 
of self-referential practice – to the European political reality, he develops the descriptive claim that the 
European Union and its member states are in a state of constitutional heterarchy257. On both sides, claims 
of ultimate legal authority are being voiced and separate set of criteria of validity have been 
developed258. Holding the relevant case-law against MacCormick’s ontological blueprint, the conclusion 
of non-hierarchical CP in the European political space seems inevitable. But why should it stop there? 
While the descriptive elements of MacCormick’s theory are solely focused on the relationship between 
the EU and its member states259, the repercussions of his ontological claim stretch far beyond. He 
acknowledges that the edicts of an ‘international church’ might relate to states in the fashion of CP260. 
Consequently, should the same not be argued also about the WTO261, the European human rights regime 
or even the mafia262?  
MacCormick’s concepts of legal validity and constitutionalism have no way to withhold constitutional 
authority from the contingent multitude of institutional normative structures that shape the transnational 
regulatory space. In terms of the theory on transnational law, the ‘polycentrism’ of legal systems 
inevitably results in CP263. Descriptive sociology now becomes a tool for endless constitutional 
multiplication, and thereby, the identification of different layers of potential constitutional conflict. As 
MacCormick rightfully underlines, this can only lead to the end of sovereignty, understood as ‘near 
absolute legislative power’264. The end of sovereignty is for MacCormick not only factually 
undeniable265, it is also desirable since it may ‘release us from the conceptual fetters of juridical 
foundationalism’266. The sociopolitical – i.e. ‘We the People’ – and normative convergence points of 
this juridical foundationalism, which characterize traditional statist accounts of legal sovereignty and 
constitutional authority267, are disregarded in MacCormick’s constitutional model: institutional praxis 
determines legal validity and ultimate authority, and splinters the legal landscape in endless 
heterarchical venues of normativity. The polycentric interpretation of Hart clearly generates analytical 
consequences beyond general jurisprudence. 
MacCormick’s constitutional paradigm in the light of constitutional theory 
A third part of the analysis of the original account of CP – after addressing ontology and sovereignty – 
relates to the normative repercussions of MacCormick’s theory. Contrary to a broad legacy of 
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constitutional theory268, his institutional constitutional paradigm does not link constitutionalism to any 
substantive normative standard269, nor to any constituent power (as will be further elaborated in section 
3 below). Therefore, MacCormick cannot normatively contain the proliferation of constitutional orders. 
On this basis, Loughlin argues that MacCormick’s theory suffers from the ‘fallacy of equivalence’270: 
every legal system or every constitutional order is supposedly of equal normative significance. This is 
a necessary consequence of the fact that legal positivism is the ontological backbone of his reasoning271. 
The difference with traditional jurisprudential accounts, however, is that the latter differentiate between 
the law’s internal validity and its normative legitimacy272. Due to MacCormick’s instrumentalization of 
the positivist concept of law in favor of a specific normative project, i.e. the replacement of sovereignty 
with CP, this distinction between validity and normativity is blurred: MacCormick argues for the 
normative legitimacy of transnational law-making by making reference to the jurisprudential criteria of 
validity, as formulated by Hart. This conceptual obfuscation is also central to the democratic deficit of 
CP, as exposes in section 3. 
Apart from embracing moral relativism, the non-hierarchical co-existence of constitutional orders also 
seems difficult to rhyme with the rule of law principle, since, as MacCormick acknowledges, ‘the 
maintenance between overlapping systems in [the case of CP] is a matter of political decision, not a 
built-in feature of law as such’273. This claim is reiterated in his later work: ‘acceptance of a radically 
pluralistic conception of legal systems entails acknowledging that not every legal problem can be solved 
legally’274. The conclusion is that ‘there will necessarily have to be some political action to produce a 
solution’275. Political deliberation seems necessary to resolve the tension of ultimate authority, 
MacCormick argues, but he provides no indication on the formal processes of the deliberation, nor does 
his theory provide any substantive limits on its outcomes. An unavoidable repercussion of 
MacCormick’s theory is therefore that a stable continuation of conflict-resolution is ultimately 
dependent on contingent ‘equilibria of power’276.  
It is remarkable how far MacCormick’s concept of CP stands from the traditional virtues of 
constitutional theory. While MacCormick frames his conceptual approach to transnational law in a 
constitutional language, he dismisses (i) the subordination of politics to law (the principle of legality); 
(ii) the recognition of hierarchical superiority of fundamental rights (the principle of substantive justice); 
and (iii) the origin of constitutional authority (the principle of democracy).  
Six years after developing the concept of CP, MacCormick tried to remedy the issues of substantive 
relativism and legal indeterminacy by seeking refuge to the concept of ‘pluralism under international 
law’, according to which ‘the obligations of international law set conditions upon the validity of state 
and of community constitutions and interpretations thereof, and hence impose a framework on the 
interactive but not hierarchical relations between systems’277. This is puzzling. By reanimating Kelsen’s 
monism – the common subordination of the legal system of the EU and its member states to validation 
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by some third system278 – MacCormick explicitly contradicts his own ontological architecture. 
According to the latter, the international legal order surely constitutes a legal system with a distinct rule 
of recognition, i.e. a ‘third perspective on the relationships in question, a further non-hierarchical 
interacting system’279. But the norms of international law can take myriad different forms in each legal 
system, depending on diverging grounds of validity and different interpretative practices: some systems 
might completely absorb them, others not at all. To construct hierarchy, one would have to go further 
and assume that international law does not only provide norms and interpretative tools to be used by 
authoritative judicial actors in different legal systems, but also penetrates these legal systems on its own 
grounds of validity and according to its own interpretative practices. Thereby, the possibility arises that 
an institutionally construed rule of recognition within a legal order (the EU for example) is exogenously 
invalidated. This clearly defeats the very premises on which constitutional pluralism is built, i.e. the 
autonomous, self-referential constitution of legal validity and constitutional authority. Since ‘pluralism 
under international law’ assumes the existence of a legal system with the authority to invalidate 
divergent rules of recognition – however dynamic and argumentative they are construed by authoritative 
powers in the distinct institutional spheres – it is conceptually incompatible with the dynamic 
interpretation of Hart’s positivist system theory, which gave rise to MacCormick’s theory on CP in the 
first place. In sum, ‘constitutional pluralism under international law’ is logically inconsistent and self-
defeating. Employing MacCormick’s concept of law that gave birth to the concept of CP, there can only 
be ‘radical pluralism’. 
Conclusion 
In this section I have demonstrated that MacCormick’s account of CP is not preoccupied with the 
constitutionalization of pluralism or fragmentation, i.e. with providing a constitutional frame that 
overarches and organizes the co-existence and intersection between national and transnational law. On 
the contrary, his notion of CP embraces normative multiplication: the model pluralizes the concept of 
constitutionalism, it does not constitutionalize the reality of pluralism. This pluralization is achieved by 
dynamically applying Hart’s institutional concept of law to the contemporary phenomenon of 
transnational law or global regulatory governance. MacCormick instrumentalizes Hart’s jurisprudential 
theory not only in favor of a broad descriptive claim on the current state of global governance, but also 
in building a normative argument in favor of constitutional heterarchy, political conflict-resolution and 
the end of national sovereignty. This line of argumentation, the paper has demonstrated, dismisses the 
fundaments of orthodox constitutional theory (i.e. legality, fundamental rights and democracy) that 
figured implicitly on the background of the jurisprudential theories that MacCormick borrows. 
Ironically, MacCormick’s notion of radical pluralism in the global sphere opposes him to what his very 
own concept has become. MacCormick used a constitutional discourse to stress the depth of the abyss 
of pluralism and clearly not to provide a heuristic for constitutional settlement of this legal plurality, 
since he considers settlement of these issues to be a political task. This is clearly opposite to the 
contemporary torch-bearers of the discourse, whose goal is to revive the constitutional discourse as a 
way to systematize and control legal polycentrism280. I will turn to their arguments now.  
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The constitutionalization of pluralism 
Both Neil Walker281 and Mattias Kumm282 claim that constitutional language in the international arena 
is ‘viewed with skepticism’. This purported skepticism, Kumm and Walker lament, ties the 
constitutional paradigm to ‘statehood and sovereignty’283 and therefore claims that the merits of 
constitutionalism vanish in the contemporary polycentric legal landscape, which is described and desired 
by MacCormick’s seminal work. Indeed, as argued above, many of the normative tenets of the orthodox 
constitutional paradigm stand in tension with the original ‘radical’ account of CP. Contemporary 
constitutional pluralists, however, refute this restriction of constitutionalism’s normative dimension to 
the limited contours of the national political space. Facing the reality of institutional normative plurality, 
they argue, constitutionalism can provide ‘an integrative basic conceptual framework for a general 
theory of public law that integrates national and international law’284. I will argue that, while 
MacCormick’s original account of radical pluralism provided a conceptual framework for the 
pluralization of ultimate legal authority, contemporary writing attempts to tie the diverging chains of 
validity back together in a singular constitutional knot. The paper shows that this is achieved in two 
ways: by employing constitutionalism as a ‘meta-methodological’ adjudicative hermeneutic (2.2.1), or 
by developing a constitutional paradigm grounded in normative political theory (2.2.2). The innovative 
contribution of the argument is to reveal the ontological underpinnings of both models of transnational 
constitutionalization.  
Constitutionalism as hermeneutic for conflict-resolution 
Echoing MacCormick, Maduro recognizes the possibility of ‘constitutional conflicts between different 
constitutional orders’ and the challenge of resolving those in a ‘nonhierarchical manner’285. While 
MacCormick claims that this inter-constitutional conflict-resolution belongs to the realm of politics (see 
above), Maduro focuses on the role of courts and adjudicators and thereby pulls the issue back into the 
legal sphere. Building on a specific constitutional paradigm, Maduro distills a set of ‘contrapunctual 
principles’286 or ‘meta-principles of constitutional pluralism’287 that overarch the adjudicative practice 
within the European legal ‘system’ and thereby resolve or reduce constitutional conflict. This argument 
can be broken down in three different building blocks: (i) legal ontology and the concept of CP; (ii) the 
management of constitutional pluralism within the European legal ‘system’; and (iii) the normative 
claim of constitutional pluralism. This account will be compared with MacCormick’s in the discussions 
on ontology, legality, legal sovereignty and morality. 
Legal ontology and the concept of constitutional pluralism 
Maduro, first of all, disagrees with MacCormick that the constitution of the EU as an autonomous legal 
system has been achieved in a self-referential dynamic. He argues that ‘this process of creation of a 
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European legal order was only possible because the Court looked for and found the cooperation of 
different national legal actors’288. This does, however, not put the national actors in a hierarchically 
superior position: ‘The relationship established between national courts and individuals on the one hand 
and the European Court of Justice on the other [is] one of dialogue rather than dictation’289. In other 
words, it is a non-hierarchical inter-institutional dialogue that has generated the distinct European 
constitutional order, and not a self-referential practice. For Maduro, this is not only an empirical 
observation, it builds upon a specifically defined legal ontology. Contrary to MacCormick, Maduro does 
not conceive of law as an institutional normative order of which the validity is determined from an 
internal perspective290. Law, it is claimed, is the result of discursive practice, it is ‘invariably a 
consequence of a multilogue between […] different institutional actors291. The validity of a legal norm, 
in this reasoning, is not determined by hierarchical lineage to a jurisprudential vanishing point292, but by 
the relational market logic of discursive practice: legal validity is a result of the supply and demand of 
different legal reasonings in different adjudicative venues, which is determined by contingent and 
indeterminate factors. What is eventually constituted as ‘law’, for Maduro, is a result of this multipolar 
discursive dynamic. Contrary to MacCormick, who pointed to the self-referential institutional creation 
of law, Maduro claims that there is a ‘plurality of actors’ defining ‘what the law is’293 through inter-
institutional dialogue. This ontological position heavily determines Maduro’s constitutional paradigm. 
The management of constitutional pluralism within the European legal ‘system’ 
The second building block of Maduro’s theory is that this discursive practice – which is shaped by a 
heterarchical dialogue between constitutional orders – not only constituted the European legal order, but 
also harmonizes the constitutional polycentrism between the EU and its member states294. The argument 
is that ‘we can conceive of the EU and national orders as autonomous but part of the same European 
legal system’295. This is a remarkable claim that, again, stands in direct opposition to MacCormick, who 
defines constitutional pluralism as the clash between legal systems. Maduro bases his argument on the 
dichotomy between legal order and legal systems, which he borrows from Tuori296. Tuori uses this 
typology to distinguish between law as merely a symbolic-normative phenomenon, i.e. a legal order, 
and law as an institutional normative order that formalizes the production and adjudication of these 
norms, i.e. a legal system297. Contrarily to Maduro, however, Tuori concludes on the basis of this 
typology that the EU is the most explicit example of systemic pluralism, arguing that there is no pan-
European legal system due to the lack of an institutional structure that overarches the EU on the one 
hand and the member states on the other298. The point of divergence is located in a different ontology of 
law: while Tuori’s distinction is based on an institutional approach (similar to MacCormick), Maduro 
claims that law derives its validity and systemic character from a commonly constituted discursive 
practice. In other words, for Maduro, legal validity is not determined within any constitutional order, 
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but in the discursive practice between these orders. Maduro’s notion of ‘legal system’ therefore does not 
require a hierarchical and institutionally embedded lineage of legal validity, but merely an institutional 
platform for discursive exchange, which is grounded in a sufficient degree of epistemic and normative 
commonality. In other words, Maduro’s system-theory is not grounded in institutional homogeneity, but 
in the existence of shared semantics. Remarkably, as with MacCormick, Maduro’s ontology determines 
his analytical reconstruction of the transnational legal space. 
Connecting this ontological claim to the observation that different levels of adjudication in the European 
political space share a common discursive space, Maduro is capable of constructing a pan-European 
legal ‘system’ that bridges the abyss of CP through common ‘hermeneutics’299. The latter are defined as 
‘principles of contrapunctual law’300, which are founded on a ‘normative commitment to European 
constitutionalism’301 and contain ‘common meta-methodological principles of substantive and 
procedural character’302. The use of legal terminology (principles of contrapunctual law, 
constitutionalism, etc.), however, is misplaced and holds the risk of analytical confusion. Clearly, if 
these principles would consist of a set of hermeneutic requirements that determine the legal validity of 
adjudicative decisions, they would construct a new legal hierarchy above the heterarchical relationship 
of the EU and its member states. Establishing this hierarchy is the last thing Maduro wants, since the 
‘commitment [to these principles] is voluntary’303. The state of heterarchy has to remain intact. The 
meta-methodological principles are simply ‘forms of reducing or managing the potential conflicts 
between legal orders while promoting communication between them’304. Management is the key word 
in Maduro’s constitutional model, not legality305. 
In conclusion, Maduro follows MacCormick in the observation that the conflict between constitutional 
orders cannot be integrated into a hierarchical jurisprudential model. By claiming that these 
constitutional conflicts are located within a European legal system that is shaped by a common 
discursive practice, Maduro does, however, hint at a holistic understanding of legal validity across the 
abyss of pluralism. The latter is grounded in the specific ontological understanding of law as a discursive 
practice. Consequently, inter-court or inter-institutional dialogue has the capacity to counter the 
concerns of hierarchy, unity and legality and transform the concerns of pluralism into ‘a kind of 
melodious blend’306. To achieve this, a managerial strategy of conflict-avoidance is formulated in the 
form of ‘principles of contrapunctual law’.  
The normative claim of constitutional pluralism 
In a third line of reasoning, Maduro turns to the following question: is the constitutional authority of the 
EU and the constitutional state of heterarchy within the European political space to be considered 
legitimate307? Maduro argues that this ‘justification and legitimacy […] must be derived from its 
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constitutional added value with respect to national constitutionalism’308. Again contrary to MacCormick, 
we notice that constitutionalism has become a value-laden concept. For Maduro, these different 
constitutional values can be synthesized in ‘two opposing pulls of modern constitutionalism. One, 
towards pluralism, linked to the values of freedom, diversity and private autonomy. The other, towards 
unity or hierarchy, linked with the ideals of equality, the rule of law and universality’309. For Maduro, 
pluralism is thus intrinsically part of the constitutional project. His claim is that this constitutional 
balance between political pluralism and legal hierarchy has to be reconsidered in the contemporary 
‘postnational context’. Since there is no longer a closed political space with ultimate authority at the 
level of the nation state, constitutionalism has to extend beyond those borders in order to protect its 
political values310. This becomes concrete when we see the examples that Maduro gives of how 
constitutional pluralism contributes to the values of modern constitutionalism: by increasing democratic 
inclusiveness beyond state borders; by regaining political control over transnational processes that evade 
national control; and through the correction of political malfunction on the national level311. To counter 
this extension of the constitutional paradigm in favor of its political merits, Maduro describes the 
necessity to develop new jurisprudential models to address the constitutional values of hierarchy and 
legality312. This is precisely what he intends to achieve with the ‘principles of contrapunctual law’.  
This first attempt at the ‘constitutionalization of pluralism’ differs from MacCormick on three levels of 
analysis that have been developed above. Only the claim regarding the end of sovereignty (a unified 
understanding of ultimate legal authority) is maintained313. First of all, Maduro’s legal ontology is 
substantially more restrictive than the one employed by MacCormick. The shift from law as an 
‘institutional normative order’ to law as a result of ‘discursive practice’ entails that the determination of 
legal validity is now made through a process of inter-court dialogue. This specific ‘institutional choice’ 
closes the door to the myriad different sources of law that were considered as valid by MacCormick but 
that are not recognized by the adjudicative practice of the CJEU or the EU member states (e.g. church 
law, the law of transnational economic organizations, the law of universities, etc.). Departing from 
Maduro’s legitimacy claim, it could even be argued that the subordination of these different sources of 
normativity to the centralized political sphere is considered an inherent value of constitutionalism. While 
MacCormick provides a conceptual frame to integrate the wide variety of legal norms, as described in 
theories on transnational law or global legal pluralism314, Maduro reserves the concept of constitutional 
pluralism for the formally entrenched venues of adjudication within the European legal space. The 
‘constitutionalization of pluralism’ thus also seems to be an ontological restriction: many contemporary 
sources of transnational regulatory governance are excluded from Maduro’s concept of law. 
Secondly, where MacCormick’s theory did not ask any questions of normative legitimacy, Maduro roots 
his theory on pluralism in a strong normative claim: constitutional pluralism ‘provides a closer 
approximation to the ideals of constitutionalism than either national constitutionalism, or a form of EU 
constitutionalism’315. A contrario, it seems clear for Maduro that the establishment of autonomous 
constitutional authority in an institutional regime that does not promote or strengthen modern 
constitutional values is considered illegitimate. 
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310 Ibid., 82. 
311 Ibid., 77. 
312 Ibid., 82 
313 One could argue that this is symptomatic for the discourse of jurists with a strong focus on the EU, since, as Kumm argues, 
‘in the law of the European Union, the language of subsidiarity has completely replaced the language of sovereignty’. See 
Kumm 2009, cit. supra n. 18, 293. 
314 Tuori 2014, cit, supra n. 1; Halliday and Shaffer 2015, cit. supra n. 1; Kingsbury 2012, cit. supra n. 2; Twining 2009, cit. 
supra n. 33. 
315 Maduro 2012, cit. supra n. 74, 77-78. 
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Finally, Maduro refutes the claim that CP necessarily has to give up the notions of universality, 
coherence and the rule of law, i.e. legality316. To this end of ensuring coherence and unity, his theory 
develops a set of constitutional317 ‘principles of contrapunctual law’ that serve as hermeneutic guidelines 
for adjudicative conflict-resolution. These principles do not, however, reinstall legal hierarchy in the 
strict sense. They represent a doctrinally construed tool for managing the interface between different 
constitutional orders and do not offer legal norms for the determination of validity.  
The rationalist approach: cosmopolitan constitutionalism 
While Maduro acknowledges the value of a constitutional paradigm as a hermeneutic for adjudicative 
convergence, he is reticent to reinstate legal hierarchy. Kumm’s model of CP goes further and develops 
a cosmopolitan constitutional paradigm with the ambition of holistically redefining the concept of 
legality in the context of transnational law318. His claim is that the end of the statist monopoly over the 
production of (international) law319 should not lead to the demise of constitutional thinking, since 
‘constitutionalism does not require the framework of a state to be meaningful’320. Instead, ‘[t]he statist 
paradigm of constitutionalism needs to be replaced by a cosmopolitan paradigm of constitutionalism’321. 
Remarkably different from MacCormick, this paradigm overarches the plurality of autonomous 
constitutional orders by a set of formal, jurisdictional, procedural and substantive principles. In contrast 
to Maduro, these principles are not induced from adjudicative practice, but deduced from moral 
theory322. Ultimately, I will demonstrate that Kumm’s constitutional paradigm – building on a specific 
ontological perspective on transnational law – completes the process of reversal of MacCormick’s 
radical pluralism back to a monist structure. I will set out his argument focusing on three intertwined 
elements: (i) his concepts of law and the implications on his constitutional paradigm; (ii) the universal 
application of the paradigm in practice; and (iii) his rejection of both dualism and monism – regarding 
the latter, unrightfully so – in favor of CP. 
The turn to Dworkin in Constitutional Pluralism 
It is, first of all, necessary to explore Kumm’s legal ontology, since this fundamental understanding of 
what law is, shapes his constitutional paradigm. While MacCormick explicitly identified Hart’s Concept 
of Law as his ontological starting point, Kumm’s cosmopolitan paradigm, I want to argue, has to be 
understood by reference to Dworkin. Echoing Dworkin’s ‘best fit’ formula, Kumm argues that ‘the 
identification and interpretation of [law] requires engagement with moral arguments, that is arguments 
about what is efficient, fair, legitimate or just’323. This relative detachment of law’s existence and 
validity with sources of positive law is pivotal to Kumm’s constitutional paradigm, which, he claims, 
‘provides a cognitive frame for the construction of public authority’324.  
                                                     
316 This is a response to the critique of J. Baquero Cruz, “The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement”, 
European Law Journal Vol. 14, 2008, 389-422. 
317 N. Krisch, “Who is Afraid of Radical Pluralism? Legal Order and Political Stability in the Postnational Space”, Ratio Juris 
Vol 24:4, 386-412, 2011, 8. 
318 Kumm 2009, cit. supra n. 18, 258-324; M. Kumm, “The moral point of constitutional pluralism”, in J. Dickson and P. 
Eleftheriadis, Philosophical foundations of European Union Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, 216. 
319 A claim that is put forward by, for example, Twining 2009, cit. supra n. 33. 
320 Kumm 2009, cit. supra n. 18, 263. 
321 Ibid. 
322 References to the moral underpinnings of legitimate constitutional authority are made on plenty of occasions. See ibid. 262, 
265, 290 and 303. 
323 Ibid. 262, footnote 10. The link between Kumm and Dworkin is also made in Somek 2012, cit. supra n. 4, 363. 
324 Kumm 2009, cit. supra n. 18, 267. This ‘particular cognitive frame for the construction of legitimate authority’ is what 
makes the cosmopolitan paradigm constitutional, see ibid., 321. 
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This jurisprudential perspective determines Kumm’s constitutional paradigm, and his answer to the 
question of ultimate legal authority. The latter, it is argued, ‘is not located in a particular institution (e.g. 
a constitutional court), a particular text (the Constitution), or a [sociopolitical] source (‘We the People’ 
as pouvoir constituent)’325, but results from the alignment with moral principles326. Taking the normative 
status of free and equal individuals as an abstract moral horizon327, four principles are considered to be 
constitutive of cosmopolitan legality: ‘besides the principle of legality, which establishes a presumptive 
duty to enforce international law, the potentially countervailing principles are the jurisdictional 
principles of subsidiarity, the principle of due process, and the substantive principle of respect for human 
rights and reasonableness’328. These principles might be reflected is some sources of positive law, i.e. in 
national states’ ‘commitments to democracy and the protection of rights’329, but they are not bound by 
them – as reflections of natural law they determine constitutional authority independent from any 
positivist constraints330. In sum, Kumm’s cosmopolitan constitutional paradigm formulates of a set of 
rationally deduced331 principles that provide a holistic, universal concept of legality, which can be 
applied across the polycentric legal landscape of transnational governance. This constitutional paradigm 
builds on the ontological position that the fabric of law is ultimately of a moral quality.  
Cosmopolitan constitutionalism as universal and decentralized judicial practice 
This constitutional paradigm is both descriptive and normative in nature. It comprises not only ‘the basic 
conceptual framework to be used for the interpretative reconstruction of an existing public law 
practice’332, but also ‘necessarily ha[s] an idealizing element’333. In other words, the cosmopolitan 
constitutional paradigm is both a descriptive claim about the contemporary practice of (international) 
public law and a ‘normative horizon within which the future can be imagined and contested’334. This 
allows for ‘the analyses and assessment’335 of all public authority.  
The universe of public law practice sketched by Kumm is, therefore, one in which all splintered sources 
of transnational law are and/or should be evaluated on the basis of his principle-based cosmopolitan 
constitutional paradigm. Following from their universal nature, these omnipresent principles not only 
determine the legality of every freestanding act of public authority, but also regulate the (potentially 
conflictuous) interface between different constitutional venues336. The different chains of legality that 
inspired MacCormick’s heterarchical jurisprudential model are tied together in one normative knot. It is 
important to underline that this normatively thick meta-legal framework is not designed for mere 
doctrinal purposes, but provides practical judicial tools intended to describe and inform constitutional 
adjudication on both the national and the international level: the application of the cosmopolitan 
constitutional paradigm is decentralized and determines ultimate validity within, across and between 
                                                     
325 M. Kumm, “The best of times and the worst of times: between constitutional triumphalism and nostalgia”, in P. Dobner and 
M. Loughlin (eds.), The twilight of constitutional law: demise or transmutation?, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 
203. 
326 Kumm 2009, cit. supra n. 18, 267. 
327 Ibid., 315. 
328 Ibid., 277. This rationalist methodology is underlined by the claim that the ‘cosmopolitan perspective recovers 
constitutionalism’s universal perspective’, see ibid., 322. 
329 Ibid. 
330 This is heavily criticized in Somek 2012, cit. supra n. 4, 365. 
331 This echoes Kant’s claim that moral law is a product of reason and allows for objective universalization. 
332 Kumm 2009, cit. supra n. 18, 311. 
333 Ibid.  
334 Ibid., 324. 
335 Ibid., 263 (emphasis added) 
336 The principles provide ‘a coherent framework for addressing conflicting claims of authority’, see ibid., 274. 
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every constitutional locus337. Concretely, as a judge of the CJEU, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht 
or the WTO’s Appellate Body, one would ultimately be reasoning within the same meta-legal 
framework – i.e. legal validity would be traced back to the same corpus of procedural and substantive 
criteria338. This implies that, when different institutionally embedded normative complexes 
substantively converge in one specific legal issue – imagine a human rights conflict that is 
simultaneously prone to the jurisdiction of the Italian judicial system, the European Court of Human 
Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the UN Human Rights Committee –, principle-
based adjudication in one institutional complex can invalidate any act of public authority emerging from 
another legal system. In short, in the cosmopolitan approach to global constitutionalism, jurisdiction is 
both decentralized and universalized339. The ‘constitutionalization’ of MacCormick’s radical pluralism 
is now complete340: Kumm’s theory provides a constitutional paradigm derived from natural law that 
binds and guides every actor across the splintered postnational spectrum and provides a decentralized 
and universalized model for judicial review. No degree of epistemic independence of self-referential 
institutional practice can immunize venues of public authority from this omnipresent normative 
oversight. Therefore, the concerns regarding legality and morality that were intrinsic to MacCormick’s 
paradigm are no longer valid: every autonomous institutional practice is now recollected under the 
umbrella of cosmopolitan constitutionalism, which comprises both a theory on legal hierarchy and moral 
validity. Heterarchy is recollected, pluralism unified, relativism moralized. CP’s original taste of 
postmodernism seems far gone in this monist and universalist normative account. 
The return of monism under cosmopolitan principles 
Kumm, however, denies this unification, arguing that his model remains pluralist and that ‘the different 
legal orders making up the world of public law are not hierarchically integrated’341. Consequently, when 
turning to the monist-dualist dichotomy, Kumm chooses a third way out: the path of pluralism. His 
arguments for this move are that his paradigm ‘is not connected to the establishment of an ultimate 
authority’342 and that the ‘potential for legally irresolvable conflict between national and international 
law remains’343. Therefore, it is argued, his paradigm cannot be labeled as monist. This claim, however, 
can only work under the assumption that monism is inextricably linked with institutional homogeneity. 
That is what Kumm points at: considering the absence of unified ‘coercive powers’ and ‘federal world 
state’, the pluralist model should be obtained344. This lack of unification, clearly, does not relate to legal 
authority (potestas), which is explicitly unified under his cosmopolitan paradigm, but to power 
(potentia), i.e. the power of one institutional model or set of positive laws (either statist or international) 
to claim superiority345. While Kumm maintains the pluralist position on the level of institutional capacity 
and positive law, his unification of legal authority under a rationally deduced set of formal and 
substantive principles clearly gives the paradigm a monist taste. He can only maintain the claim of 
pluralism by referring to an institutional concept of law (along the line of MacCormick) that is at odds 
                                                     
337 Somek warns that this decentralized application of constitutional principles leads to the ‘privatization’ of the jurisdictional 
space’. See Somek 2012, cit. supra n. 4, 366. 
338 Obviously, the model leaves space for substantive differences between different legal systems. This is guaranteed by the 
procedural principle of subsidiarity and the normative principle of public reason.  
339 Somek notes that ‘[p]rinciples without sources are deemed to be capable of interfering with source-based systems at any 
point and at any time’; Somek 2012, cit. supra n. 4, 365. 
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341 Kumm 2012, cit. supra n. 107, 216. 
342 Kumm 2009, cit. supra n. 18, 260. 
343 Ibid. 279. 
344 Ibid. 259-260. 
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with the rationalist concept of law that informs his constitutional paradigm. In providing a unified 
conceptual framework for the determination of ultimate legal authority, Kumm’s cosmopolitan 
framework performs the same function as Kelsen’s Grundnorm or Hart’s rule of recognition346; it 
provides a legal vanishing point for different chains of validity. Indeed, a diverging and conflictuous 
application of this unified paradigm in positive law or institutional practice might testify of dispersed 
political power (which is a rather pedestrian claim), but it does not pluralize ultimate constitutional 
authority. When Kumm’s conflation between the political and jurisprudential concepts of authority and 
sovereignty are analytically disentangled, it becomes clear that, in the legal sense of the word, Kumm’s 
theory is of a monist nature and directly opposes the jurisprudential core of MacCormick’s original 
account.  
We conclude that with Kumm’s cosmopolitan constitutional theory the reversal of MacCormick’s 
constitutional pluralization is complete. While acknowledging that today’s postnational institutional 
landscape is splintered, Kumm reintroduces and universalizes legal sovereignty with a unified normative 
and jurisprudential model for the determination of ultimate legal authority. Kumm’s set of cosmopolitan 
principles that organize the multiplicity of national, international and transnational legal sources in a 
unified and hierarchical conception of legality, the paper demonstrates, is derived from a normative, 
Dworkinian concept of law. MacCormick’s ontological perspective on transnational law, his analytical 
abolishment of legal sovereignty, his theory on the political mediation of heterarchical constitutional 
conflicts and his positivist notion of moral equivalence, are all reversed by Kumm’s cosmopolitan 
paradigm, which ties together the loose ends of heterarchy in a universalist moral knot. This 
constitutionalization of pluralism, the paper demonstrates, is based on a normative understanding of law 
that reinstates legal sovereignty, conceptual unity and moral hierarchy in a monist constitutional 
paradigm. From a pluralization of constitutions, stressing the heterarchical and decentralized nature of 
transnational regulatory governance, the heuristic of CP has hereby become a project for the 
constitutionalization of pluralism. This radical shift in the constitutional approach to transnational law, 
I argue, can be traced back to the fundamental question of law’s ontology: is the existential fabric of law 
of an institutional or a moral quality? By linking the different strands of CP to this ontological question, 
the paper reveals that, within the constitutional approach to transnational regulatory governance, the 
classic jurisprudential schism between Hart’s positivism and Dworkin’s non-positivist normative theory 
revives. 
Framing the democratic deficit of Constitutional Pluralism 
In this section, I turn back to the three constitutional paradigms addressed above and assess their 
relationship with the concern for democracy. This democratic assessment is based on following 
question: is the legitimacy of a certain legal norms impacted by the question if the addressees of this 
norm – directly or indirectly – participated in its formulation347 or do other criteria determine this 
legitimacy? The core of the argument is that both major strands of CP – i.e. the ‘pluralization of 
constitutionalism’ and the ‘constitutionalization of pluralism’ – disconnect the legitimacy of legal norms 
from any democratic endorsement (i.e. procedural legitimacy). The origin of this democratic deficit lies 
in the extension of the respective ontological positions – respectively, law as an ‘institutional normative 
order’, a ‘discursive practice’ or a ‘rationally deduced set of principles’ – to the description and 
normative evaluation of contemporary global governance.  
As noted above, in MacCormick’s Hartian model, ‘law’ is generated by ‘official institutional practice’, 
while for Maduro ‘law’ is the result of an ‘inter-institutional dialogue’, i.e. a discursive practice. Though 
both theories result in different constitutional paradigms, they are both loyal to the positivist tradition in 
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Theory Working Papers, Paper 97, 2008, 20-21. 
Dimitri Van den Meerssche 
56 
the sense that they judge law’s existence and validity in the light of positive institutional practice. The 
claim of both writers with regards to CP is exactly that these sources of positive law, these institutional 
practices, can also auto-generate constitutional authority, which determines ultimate legal validity. With 
regards to this extension of the positivist concept of law to the constitutional level, Martin Loughlin 
argues that ‘since law can only be understood in terms of positive law, the ‘law’ that establishes the 
authority of government does not exist’348. Here, Loughlin points exactly to the oxymoronic question-
begging nature of MacCormick’s theory on the self-referential constitution of constitutional authority, 
which was exposed above349. The problematic character of this circular reasoning is only exacerbated 
by the fact that legal validity, for MacCormick, stands equal to substantive and procedural legitimacy350. 
Both law’s internal validity and external legitimacy, for MacCormick, are determined by the institutional 
practice of ‘legal officials’, outside the reach of any democratic participation or contestation351.  
For Maduro, on the other hand, law’s validity and normative legitimacy are disconnected. While internal 
validity is merely determined by institutional praxis, external legitimacy is determined by law’s 
conformity with the meta-methodological principles of contrapunctual law, which resonate strongly 
with Kumm cosmopolitan constitutional principles. For both authors, the determination of legitimacy is 
not dependent on positivist sources but on either rationally induced principles belonging to the 
‘European legal system’ or rationally deduced principles originating in universal moral reason. Similar 
to MacCormick, however, there is no role for any constituent power in the determination of 
legitimacy352. Both Maduro’s principles of contrapunctual law and Kumm cosmopolitan constitutional 
principles are located on an esoteric level beyond social contestation or democratic evaluation and are 
given substantive shape on the level of constitutional adjudication. The central actors in the 
determination of normative legitimacy in the transnational legal space seem to be judges rather than 
citizens. By grounding legitimacy in sources that exist independent of positive enactment or political 
contestation, the ‘constitutionalization of pluralism’ lost sight of the demos.  
Kumm defends the democratic merits of his constitutional paradigm by pointing out that his 
cosmopolitan principles serve the ‘general will’ of ‘free and equal citizens’ through the protection of 
human and constitutional rights i.e. substantive legitimacy353. To this requirement of substantive 
‘cosmopolitan legitimacy’, Kumm argues, procedural democratic legitimacy is subordinate354. The 
substantive structure of Kumm’s cosmopolitan paradigm, however, is remarkably open-ended (e.g. as a 
result of its reliance on the notion of ‘public reason’) and relies entirely on the judiciary (on the national 
or international level) for its concretization. In sum, the absence of democratic participation in Kumm’s 
paradigm is justified by reference to abstract substantive principles, which rely on adjudicative 
interpretation. This subordination of democratic input-legitimacy to normative abstraction is 
exemplified by Kumm’s argument that the notion of ‘constituent power’ should not be understood as a 
sociopolitical-, but as a normative concept355. In other words, in Kumm’s model of CP, it is not the 
material, political expression of values and beliefs by the demos that normatively delineates the political 
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350 See MacCormick 1999, cit. supra n. 17; See also, Loughlin on the ‘fallacy of equivalence’ in MacCormick; Loughlin 2014, 
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354 Ibid. 301. 
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space356, but a doctrinally deduced set of substantive principles grounded in an abstract normative 
concept of ‘constituent power’. Consequently, the material expression of constituent power is 
ontologically impossible: Kumm’s constitutional space is void of actors and outside historical 
contingency357. Surely, actors move around in the political space, but they are not constitutive of it in 
any way358. Moral reason, not social interaction, shapes Kumm’s political space. 
Following a similar logic, Maduro asserts the normative superiority of the ‘ideals of constitutionalism’ 
over any conception of democracy that relies on direct or indirect participation of contestation359. For 
both authors, substantive legitimacy – which is determined by the practice of constitutional adjudication 
– overrules the procedural input-legitimacy provided by democratic control over law-making and 
constitutional authority. 
Ultimately, we notice how both MacCormick’s radical pluralism and the principle-based accounts of 
Maduro and Kumm connect law’s legitimacy to institutional or adjudicative practice rather than any 
participatory democratic model. While the paradigm of CP might provide a good descriptive account of 
the current phenomenon of transnational law, it falls short of offering a template for democratic 
legitimacy in the sphere of global governance. The contribution of this paper is to root this democratic 
deficit in the ontological presumptions that underlie the different strands of CP, i.e. the concept of law 
as an ‘institutional normative order’, a ‘discursive practice’ or ‘a rationally deduced set of principles’. 
The demos is ontologically banned from the realm of global constitutional pluralism. 
Conclusion 
This paper started by rooting the origins of CP in the contemporary proliferation of modes and venues 
of law-making that substantively overlap with the regulatory competences of the nation state. CP, the 
paper underlines, emerged as a jurisprudential heuristic aimed at analytically grasping and normatively 
guiding this phenomenon of transnational law. More specifically, I argue, the constitutional language 
was employed to express that in the era of transnational governance, the question of ultimate legal 
authority between different venues of law-making is at stake.  
The very nature of this question, the paper points out, implies the necessity of a meta-legal framework, 
i.e. a holistic theory of general jurisprudence that assesses the ultimate validity of ‘law’ from an 
ontological perspective, beyond the jurisprudential or epistemic boundaries of any specific legal 
tradition or system of thought. The first (and often unarticulated) step of CP, which contends to answer 
the question of ultimate legal authority360, is therefore to ontologically recognize and frame the 
contemporary sources of transnational regulatory governance, and their vertical and horizontal 
interactions with other transnational venues or national legal systems, in an innovative holistic theory 
on legal validity that fits the contemporary practice of global governance361. While pivotal in 
understanding the normative and analytical tenets of CP, an inquiry into this ontological dimension of 
the model is absent in the literature. It is this abyss the paper aims to bridge. 
                                                     
356 This reflects the notion that the constituent power generates ‘political right’, as argued by Loughlin 2014, cit. supra n. 56. 
357 I am heavily indebted to Dennis Patterson for this insight.  
358 It should be noted that this insight reflects the metaphysical approach to morality at the heart of Kumm’s cosmopolitan 
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360 Even though the distinct answers might leave space for heterarchy, i.e. indeterminacy. 
361 In other words, the questions asked and answered by the heuristic of CP do not primarily belong to the realm of international 
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Based on an analysis of the jurisprudential assumptions of CP’s main proponents, the paper provided an 
innovative conceptual roadmap that traces different ontological approaches to (transnational) law to 
radically divergent analytical schemes and normative agendas under the umbrella of CP. Three different 
ontological foundations were explored in the writings of MacCormick, Maduro and Kumm. While 
MacCormick employs the concept of law as an ‘institutional normative order’ to grasp with transnational 
law, Maduro considers law as an ‘inter-institutional discursive practice’ and Kumm provides a natural 
law-account in which legal validity is derived from a set of rationally deduced normative principles. The 
relevance of these different approaches was measured with regards to the debates on (i) ultimate legal 
authority (i.e. legal sovereignty); (ii) legality in global governance; and (iii) the substantive legal 
constraints of transnational law; in which different strands of CP put forward radically different 
arguments. 
Informed by these insights, the paper describes a general trend in CP from a focus on pluralism and 
heterarchical interaction362 to a rationalist renaissance of legal monism under constitutional principles. 
This was described as the shift from a ‘pluralization of constitutionalism’ to a ‘constitutionalization of 
pluralism’ in the theory and discourse of CP. These two templates of CP, the paper pointed out, translate 
the traditional dichotomy in general jurisprudence between legal positivism and normative legal theory 
to the realm of transnational law. This translation provides for two distinct models of CP, the former 
being characterized by radical heterarchy, the end of sovereignty, moral relativism and political conflict-
mediation, while the latter reinstalls legal hierarchy under a normatively thick set of principles, 
substantively shaped on the level of (international) constitutional adjudication. Between both 
jurisprudential models, Maduro’s discursive theory provides hermeneutic tools for translation and 
convergence, which manage the interface of pluralism without formally reinstalling legal hierarchy.  
The transposition of these different jurisprudential paradigms to the transnational level, however, raises 
profound analytical and normative questions. Regarding MacCormick’s interpretation of Hart, the 
following concerns arise: how can the radical pluralist constitutional model – based on the inherent 
validity of self-referential transnational institutional practice – be morally contained, once all bridges 
with orthodox constitutional ordering are burned? How can the concept of legality prevail in the 
transnational realm when multiple rules of recognition internally overlap in a state of constitutional 
heterarchy? In other words, can the systemic nature of Hart’s positivist theory survive MacCormick’s 
transnational dynamism? Or, more rhetorically, is a jurisprudential theory based on self-referential 
institutional practice justifiable in the jungle of global governance363? While the ‘constitutionalization 
of pluralism’ addresses several of these concerns by overarching heterarchy in a monist constitutional 
frame, it gives rise to entirely new questions: how can the Dworkian interpretative ‘best fit’ approach 
be applied in the transnational era, where legal conflicts are disconnected from the moral fabric of any 
specific social ordering? How can legality prevail when abstract substantive principles, which function 
as Grundnorm of the revived monist structure, are able to invalidity any act of public authority through 
any adjudicative venue at any time? And how can the doctrinally deduced set of universal principles 
legitimately reflect the demands for ‘conversation, heterogeneity, interaction [and] ethical pluralism’364 
in the face of ever-increasing integration and substantive overlap between diverse and asymmetric sites 
of national, regional and transnational governance? Finally, and fundamentally, the paper demonstrated 
how the underlying jurisprudential structures of the different branches of CP disconnect transnational 
law’s legality and legitimacy from the demos.  
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It has not been the aim of the paper to answer these myriad different and fundamental questions that 
flow from the paradigm of CP. By exploring the different and opposing ontological underpinnings of 
the paradigm, however, the paper has added focus and analysis to the jurisprudential gap inside CP; to 
the analytical, epistemic and normative arguments articulated by its different strands; and to the 
questions that remain unresolved in the ongoing and ever-expanding debate on legality and legitimacy 
in transnational regulatory governance. To understand the merits and pitfalls of the constitutional 
hermeneutic, the paper fundamentally argues, requires us first and foremost to consider it as an answer 
to Socrates’ ancient question: ‘What is the law for us?’.  
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SECTION II. DEMOCRATIC OR CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY? 
 
Tyranny and the anxieties of law beyond the state 
 
Aoife O'Donoghue*
 
Of late, a constitutional ethic has gained momentum amongst international legal academics.366 This 
movement seeks to go beyond traditional international law tropes such as Westphalian sovereignty, state 
equality and subsidiarity to an understanding of the global legal order as incorporating public law 
components into its operation. A potential role both normative and organisational for a constitutional 
ethic that has traditionally been associated with the internal workings of a state is either recognised as 
pre-existing or declared as emergent. Whilst this ethic is furthermost established amongst EU scholars, 
with increasing frequency it also forms part of international scholarship.367 This article asks what has 
compelled international scholarship toward constitutionalism and what can be deduced about the nature 
of this scholarship from an analysis of its genesis. 
Unquestionably public international law always contained a quality of ‘publicness.’ International law 
possesses foundational myths and legitimating language that is not contingent upon appropriating tropes 
from other systems. Albeit this is not to suggest an isolated legal system immune from cross-pollination 
but rather that the international legal order always possessed a separate publicness in its discourse and 
governance. These public elements comprise, amongst many others, the formation of international law, 
the structures of international organisations and the operation of international courts and tribunals. 
Nonetheless, most obviously displayed in the constitutionalisation debate but clearly demonstrable 
elsewhere, is a move to adopt domestic constitutional characteristics. This chapter seeks to ask why this 
has occurred, why lawyers whose concerns were not bound to questions of the rule of law, division of 
power, checks and balances, the incorporation of human rights, or democratic legitimacy have become 
engrossed in such debates. 
The underlying rationales for choosing what traditionally were and are domestic constitutional and 
public law tools may range from a number of anxieties with the global legal order. These anxieties 
include; a perceived need to divest constituted power from a narrow set of global actors, a role in 
underpinning both individual and collective rights, a provision to check both the legitimacy and legalism 
of power, the possibility of recognising diverse points of governance within the global order, a perceived 
move beyond the state-consent based order to something new but as yet unarticulated and, critically, to 
locate a global rule of law. While legal theory has been concerned with questions of legitimacy and 
power, whether this is a concern with regard to public international law was often dismissed as 
unnecessary in a contractual consent based legal order.368 Yet, clearly an inner anxiety exists that has 
pushed scholars into considering whether public international law may gain in legitimacy from either 
                                                     
* Thanks to Ruth Houghton, Máiréad Enright and Colin Murray for their comments on earlier drafts. A version of this article 
will be published in an upcoming volume Robert Schütze and Markus Gehring Governance and Globalization (CUP, 2016) 
366 This includes global constitutionalism/constitutionalisation, global administrative law, global legal pluralism, global public 
goods and EU constitutional law amongst several others.  
367 N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, (2002) 65 MLR 317-359, P. S. Berman, ‘A Pluralist Approach to 
International Law’ (2007) 32 Yale Journal of International Law 301, G. Teubner Constitutional Fragments: Societal 
Constitutionalism and Globalization (OUP, 2012), N. Krisch and B. Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global Governance and 
Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’ (2006) 17 EJIL 1 
368 H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 1961) 227 
Aoife O'Donoghue 
62 
recognising pre-existing constitutional accounts of existing formations, both institutional and legal, or 
from pushing the global order to adopt these structures onto itself. 
One potential explanation for the move toward public law is an underlying dread amongst international 
lawyers that law beyond the state underpins a system of tyrannical power. That global 
constitutionalisation alongside global legal pluralism, global administrative law and the concern for 
global public goods is a response to disquiet amongst scholars that international law would fail to meet 
the minimum standards of governance inculcated within domestic legal orders when they adopted 
modern constitutionalism. That rather international law currently forms an a-constitutional order. The 
global legal system has moved beyond the state-consent based order of the 19th and 20th centuries but 
the accumulation of power beyond the state has yet to be entrenched with forms of legitimacy that would 
be expected when constituted power is exercised across a number of governance points. Global 
constitutionalism, in this scenario, provides a basis to make an argument that what is expected of a 
constitutional order such as the rule of law, checks and balances, democratic legitimacy and human 
rights, are present or are likely to be in the near future beyond the state.369 Conversely, if a-
constitutionality is the correct description of the current state of international law than tyranny may be 
the more appropriate term by which to describe its operation. 
Other accounts also attempt to answer this question and this piece is not intended to challenge these but 
rather aims to sit alongside their explanations.370 For example, Schwöbel considers that hegemony has 
long been a concern of international law but argues that ‘the language of constitutionalism enshrines a 
hegemonic potential but also an alternative aspect of making visible and giving voice to those who 
would not be heard if it were exclusively for power politics,’ and argues this is a partial explanation for 
the choice of constitutionalism.371 On the other hand, Buchanan discusses whether constitutionalism acts 
a supplement to fill in what is absent from global governance.372 The apprehensions raised by Hart’s 
assessment of international law, the formalist versus natural law debate, or the purely statist view of 
international law are not intended as the basis for this discussion of the global legal order but rather a 
wish to understand what lies behind the choice of a constitutional ethic. The piece asks whether global 
constitutionalism is a response to a disquiet amongst scholars that international law would meet the 
standards of governance that took domestic legal orders toward constitutionalism. Nor is this article 
suggesting that there is any inevitability to the evolution of international law and that 
constitutionalisation is an inexorable process rather it examines the potential rationales for choosing this 
path. 
Describing the order as tyrannical neither proposes that there is no global legal order nor makes a claim 
toward anarchy. Rather, this article will develop a taxonomy of tyranny based in both classical Greek 
philosophy and the work of Hannah Arendt both of whom presuppose a form of governance which is a-
constitutional. These two models of tyranny move beyond its contemporary use instead focusing on it 
as a form of governance order. Of course tyranny is not unknown to scholarship beyond the state, for 
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example, as a riposte to Kant’s global government nonetheless both the classical and Arendtian view 
add an additional layer of understanding by asking what such governance consists of in its operation. 
The form of tyranny at the core of the anxieties pushing scholars toward constitutionalism is as Finnis 
describes it ‘the co-optation of law as a mask for fundamentally lawless decisions cloaked in the forms 
of law and legality’,373 where using the language of law is a tool of governance rather than forming part 
of a legal governance order. For public international law the reliance on law as the basis of a legitimate 
governance order opens this trap in which rule by law cloaks the exercise of political power that within 
a domestic order would be considered illegitimate and contrary to the rule of law. Georgiev notes the 
strong symbolic value of the ideal of the rule of law but suggests that, ‘[t]he ideal itself cannot bring 
about international order but without it the concept of international order loses its attractive force.’374 
As such, this article is proposing wariness toward the claims to an existent constitutionalism where such 
claims ignore the possibility of rule by law in favour of the ideal of a rule of law order and the 
legitimisation it brings.  
There are also several theories of tyranny that are omitted here including Machiavelli, Erasmus, Kant, 
Schmitt and Montesquieu.375 Further this piece does not engage in the debate as to whether there was 
break in the ancient and modern articulations of tyranny but rather acknowledges that there is no single 
all-embracing idea of its governance form. The focus here is on whether a conception of tyranny is of 
relevance in considering the origins of the global constitutionalism debate. Tyranny is not necessarily a 
precursor to constitutionalism and stands as its own form of governance order. This article examines 
tyranny and its relationship with governance by establishing a taxonomy of tyranny by which it is 
possible to consider whether elements of the global legal order resemble its form. In doing so, the article 
considers whether it is possible to argue that it is the response to a perceived, but undeclared, tyranny 
within international law that has pushed scholarship to cloak itself with a constitutional ethic.  
Classical Greek tyranny 
Whilst the classical Greek tradition often contains contradictory or, at the very least, unhelpfully vague 
definitions of the term typically tyranny is associated with the coming to power of a force, either a single 
actor or group, by other than constitutional means.376 Tyranny is an exceptional form of governance 
rather than a permanent order and thus it is separate to monarchy, oligarchy or democracy though for 
some it may be extrinsically linked to the weaknesses in each of these forms of governance. Critically, 
for the classical tradition it is not necessarily always a negative state of affairs.377 Indeed, Lane argues 
that within some classical approaches tyrants may be viewed as benevolent. 378 Tyrannies offered justice, 
order and protection from the wealthy in contrast to dictators placed at the pinnacle of a particular 
regime. This section will not present a unified idea of tyranny from the classical tradition but rather 
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attempts to bring together several strands of thought to suggest some common attributes in how it was 
understood. 
Tyranny forms the starting point of Plato’s Republic.379 Here, tyranny is antithetical to the constitutional 
structures within other forms of governance that possess the attributes of justice necessary to resolve 
conflicting tensions.380 For Plato tyranny forms the end point of collapsed governance systems, for 
example, tyranny springs from failed democracy but unlike democracy, the tyrant gains obedience by 
threat of violence. This link to democracy was contested by Aristotle who argued that Plato was unable 
to provide any historic examples for his claim.381 For Plato, tyranny was connected to the human 
tyrannical form. Those who are tyrannical are ruled by lawless appetitive attitudes that are also displayed 
in democracy in its most inclusive operation. Within tyranny there is little differentiation between the 
tyrant(s) and their subjects as both reflect and create the political order in which they live a life without 
reason.382 Preferring rule through the educated class, albeit he does acknowledge the ongoing tensions 
in choosing an elitist governance form perhaps a form of bureaucracy or technocracy in contemporary 
systems, for Plato neither democracy nor tyranny form good governance orders.383 It is from reason that 
the perfect form of governance emerges but one that is restricted in who takes part in governance. Indeed, 
whilst rejecting tyranny Popper argues that Plato is adopting a form of totalitarianism.384 Certainly Plato 
regarded hierarchy, even amongst citizens, as important in creating a common good and constitutional 
governance structure.385 But even where good governance orders were established there is no guarantee 
of tyranny’s absence. For instance, states which domestically would be considered democratic and 
constitutional can operate in their imperial conquests in a manner considered tyrannical. This was 
particularly significant in considering Athens’s imperial governance of conquered territories in 
comparison to its domestic arrangements.386 
Boesche argues that Aristotle’s view of tyranny, above other Greek iterations, has had the most enduring 
effect on the development of the philosophical concept.387 For Aristotle, tyranny came in three forms, 
within barbarian countries in accordance with established law and practice, within Greece on an elective 
basis and, third, an entirely self-serving form that stands alongside oligarchy as an unjust or harmful 
system.388 It is the third form which was the basis of his critique.  
For there is by nature both a justice and an advantage appropriate to the rule of a master, another to 
kingly rule, another to constitutional rule; but there is none naturally appropriate to tyranny, or to any 
other perverted form of government; for these come into being contrary to nature389 
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The impact of the ‘Thirty Tyrants’ in Athens on Aristotle together with his uneasiness regarding 
democracy’s potential under mob rule to descend into tyranny extends tyranny’s structure beyond the 
lone figure.390 Thus, while Aristotle regarded tyranny as government by one in their own interest the 
wish for power, pleasure and wealth which forms its driving force could also be held by a group. 
Aristotle also acknowledged that tyranny may come about due to the recognition by a group that their 
current form of governance is not what they wished. This draws them to look to an individual or group 
to provide an alternate which is, at times, is tyranny.391 There are also examples of elected tyrants or 
kings who became tyrannical by overreaching.392 As such while tyranny may personally be for the 
tyrant’s own ends its emergence can be for other reasons. 
In its Aristotelian form tyrannies create ‘economic incentives to depoliticize their subjects’ and create a 
form of governance that resembles the relationship between craftsman and tool.393 It creates a system 
which establishes an unnatural political order which prohibits the development of humanity.394 
Tyrannies return governance to a pre-political state of dispersal which keeps individuals away from 
collective discussion or engagement with the rest of the polity that even a limited democracy allows. 
For Aristotle citizens meeting as equals and forming constitutional rule based on a limited number of 
actors much smaller than the broader polity but one that would serve the common good rather than the 
base purposes of tyranny was preferred.395 Whilst Aristotle’s democracy included deliberation it 
certainly was not the modern idea of constitutional democracy. It specifically excluded women, slaves 
and anyone involved with trade thus tending toward an elite that while not as extreme in its exclusion 
as the Platonic model but creates a rather thin line between who is considered able for governance and 
who is not.  
Boesche categorises Aristotle’s guidance to tyrants who wished to maintain power into five strands. 
First de-politicize the population, second, divide citizens to prevent them from organizing politically 
against the tyranny, third, tyrants must know how to use and be effective with violence as well as 
maintaining a monopoly over it, fourth, they must be adept at deception including inventing terrors and 
bringing distant dangers near and finally they must appear to rule constitutionally even if in reality their 
rule is arbitrary.396 This advice provides an intriguing insight into the maintenance of tyranny albeit 
arguably it is of utility to anyone who wishes to maintain governance control no matter their system of 
governance even liberal constitutional democracies.397 Most importantly however is, as Boesche 
suggests, that ‘tyrants must make bows towards legality.’398 That while it remains an a-constitutional 
structure, it is important to retain the pretence of legality and critically constitutional legality. Donning 
the cloak of constitutional law is thus an essential characteristic for an Aristotelian tyranny. 
Five core elements may be gleaned from this brief overview of classical tyranny; the single or collective 
figure, tyranny’s emergence outside of a constitutional structure, its relationship with imperialism, the 
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benefit accrued to the tyrant(s) and finally the need to de-politicise governance. First, whilst the single 
tyrant is by far the most common form this is by no means definitive. The firm link to democracy as 
mob rule or the Thirty Tyrants in Athens suggests that the form tyranny can take is myriad thus enabling 
a much broader idea of a plurality of tyrants to co-exist with single iterations and, as such, allows for 
the integration of more modern ideas of tyranny which will be discussed later such as bureaucracies, 
technocracies or class.399  
Second, gaining power outside of a constitutional structure is a common thread in classical discourse on 
tyranny, indeed tyrants are not regarded as constitutional bodies. Albeit the lack of constitutionality 
appears to be a matter of gradation rather than a specific historical attribution to any particular tyrant. 
As such, whether a particular governance structure is a tyranny can appear to be in the eye of the 
beholder. Nonetheless, its a-constitutional structure establishes an idea of law and power being 
intertwined in understanding tyranny even if that tyranny creates an unjust system that merely has the 
attributes of a constitution rather than embodying constitutionalism.400  
Third tyranny’s relationship with the exercise of imperial power. States can be considered tyrannical in 
their exercise of power beyond the state whilst maintaining a constitutional order at home. This of 
particular consequence when considering whether democratic states acting beyond their state boundaries 
can claim to be less tyrannical in their actions because of their domestic structure. 
Fourth, tyranny is generally to the advantage of tyrant. As Aristotle argued, 
tyranny is just that arbitrary power of an individual which is responsible to no one, and governs all alike, 
whether equals or better, with a view to its own advantage, not to that of its subjects, and therefore 
against their will. No freeman willingly endures such a government. 
Yet, as Lane also suggests tyrants can also be regarded as benevolent and for Plato were an inevitable 
reaction to the failures of governance that emerge from democracy. The advantage gained by being a 
tyrant may be material or political but is never regarded as purely altruistic on the part of the instigator(s) 
of tyrannical governance. Fifth, tyranny seeks to de-politicise governance. In creating an order that 
denies humanity and natural democratic discussion it must operate in a space where deliberation and 
debate are denied. 
What can be gleaned about the nature of tyrannies from this summation, first tyranny does not mean the 
absence of legality. Whilst it is a-constitutional it operates within a surround of law and indeed may lean 
toward couching decisions that ought to be political in their character as purely legal and technocratic 
in its attempts to de-politicise. Systems of governance which may be regarded as legitimate may be 
tyrannical or have traits in that direction, for Plato that included democracy for others it is not democracy 
but it may be democracies acting beyond the state. The tyrannical system is to the benefit of the tyrant, 
what this advantage may be varies but there is a significant advantage to being a tyrant. When this 
advantage aligns with the interests of the population the benefits shared by the tyranny may be regarded 
as benevolent. Tyranny can emerge from other systems operating inefficiently and the intent can be 
benign or positive and have more generalised support but tyranny remains the tool of the power holders. 
Indeed, in looking toward pre-constitutional systems as tyrannical or alternately as occasional moments 
where constitutional structures lapsed due to bad governance, thus including elected tyrants, there is a 
wider understanding of how tyranny operates. Whilst for Plato the focus was on the extra-legal character 
and Aristotle upon the pursuit of a particular interest, what is evident is that for both tyranny was a-
constitutional. 
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Arendt and tyranny 
Arendt’s view of tyranny is very much tied to her consideration of totalitarianism and in particular the 
latter’s emergence in the 20th Century as a form of governance. Although not adhering to all of its 
precepts her conception is also situated within the historical development of tyranny since the classical 
period. According to Canovan, Arendt is attempting to move away from imposed notions of governance 
dating from Plato by accounting for human plurality in her work.401 In doing so, Arendt develops a 
particular view of tyranny which is both classical in its origins but very much contemporary in its 
understanding of governance in the modern era. 
The role of law and its relationship with power and violence is particularly significant in Arendt’s break 
from classical conceptions of tyranny. Power, violence and law are three distinct elements and tyranny 
must be understood in that frame. Arendt argues that the relationship between law and power has been 
overshadowed by classical clichés suggesting that eighteenth-century philosophy and more modern 
conceptions of government have erroneously relied upon classical categorisations of law, power and 
interest and variations therein.402 Arendt contends that there are two sides to law; law as a limitation on 
power and contemporaneously power’s enforcement of law.403 Arendt argues that what the 
Enlightenment incorrectly took from antiquity’s creation of republics was the supremacy of the rule of 
law. In doing so obedience to law simply replaced obedience to men and the dichotomy between law 
and power, and in particular, how to bring about lawfulness became largely absent from consideration.404 
As a result of this error Arendt argues tyranny mistakenly became a term of art used to describe any 
lawless government or more particularly the difference between a lawful or constitutional government 
and a lawless or tyrannical government, or perhaps to put it in constitutional terms, the absence or 
presence of the rule of law.405 For Arendt this entirely misses how power and law interact. Arendt argues 
that tyranny raises the boundaries of law leaving behind a system which is not based on liberty. Though 
unlike totalitarianism is still leaves room for action and in doing so it remains egalitarian in that it is the 
tyrant(s) against all others.406 
 
Benhabib argues that Arendt regards constitutional government as a system where law acts as a hedge 
allowing people to orientate themselves whereas tyranny is more akin to a desert.407 For Arendt the work 
of Montesquieu is of particular import in breaking from the Platonic view of law and power. In 
recognising that power could be divided between the making of law, the executing of decisions and 
judging Montesquieu by recognising action and change was able to depart from Plato’s view of the 
inevitability of failure in all forms of governance and their ultimate dissent into tyranny.408 Critically it 
was this introduction of what was to become a constitutional norm, the division of power, which was 
essential. For Montesquieu danger lies where the only protection from tyranny is custom. Law, and what 
would become modern liberal constitutionalism, is required to prevent the emergence of tyranny. For 
Montesquieu the separation of powers stood as a safeguard against tyranny as it prevented power from 
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settling into one set of constituted power holders and gave each point of governance the ability to curtail 
the action of the others if such activity was deemed ultra vires. Montesquieu brought about a break in 
democracy as potentially tyrannical with the introduction of a new form of constitution, a ‘legally 
unrestricted majority rule, that is, a democracy without a constitution’ suffocates dissent but new 
constitutionalism which renovates the classical form prevents this occurrence.409  
Arendt divides power from violence and this is critical in her understanding of tyranny, in that it can 
(occasionally) exist without violence.410 Power is all against one whereas violence is one against all, 
power doesn’t need to be justifiable as it inherent within political action but needs to be legitimate 
whereas violence may be justifiable but not legitimate.411 For Arendt, violence can destroy power but 
cannot substitute for it, the combination of force and powerlessness creates ‘impotent forces’ which 
leave very little behind.412 She argues that this combination in classical theory is understood as tyranny. 
But, the fear of tyranny comes not from cruelty, which she argues can be countered by benevolent tyrants 
and enlightened despots, more exactly it is the impotence and futility which condemns both rulers and 
ruled that establishes our discontent with it as a form of governance.413 
Powerlessness is key to understanding tyranny because it isolates the ruler from the ruled. The drive 
toward the establishment of a political community is absent in tyranny, no matter its benevolence and 
the absence of the public realm removes power.414 Yet, for Arendt, tyranny’s short-term advantages, 
stability, security and productivity in themselves pave the way toward its own end as these gains lead to 
participation and from this political action which in turn creates power beyond the tyrannical form brings 
about its demise. 
As was discussed in the previous section tyranny need not necessarily be a negative attribute of 
governance and indeed as Arendt suggests some have advocated it as a form of good governance.415 For 
example, according to Arendt, Hobbes is proud to admit that the Leviathan amounted to a permanent 
government of tyranny, ‘the name of Tyranny signifieth nothing more nor lesse than the name of 
Soveraignty’.416 Arendt suggests that Hobbes was in actuality attempting to justify tyranny which she 
argues had not, up to that point, been honoured with a philosophical foundation.417 By taking account of 
the rise of the bourgeois class, a property owning elite where the acquisition of wealth can only be 
guaranteed by the seizure of power, Hobbes was advocating the creation of a form of tyranny.418 Arendt 
regards Hobbes’ commonwealth as leaving each individual powerless as they are without the right to 
rise against tyranny leaving space only for the submission of power to the tyrannical body politic.419 
Arendt’s historic view of tyranny typically stands alongside three modern forms of domination; 
imperialism, bureaucracy and totalitarianism. Totalitarianism is a system of rule which is for nobody’s 
interest, not even the rulers and has no concern for individuals. Arendt clearly distinguishes between 
tyranny and totalitarianism, the latter insists on establishing each individual in a lonely state whilst the 
former leads to mere impotence. This makes totalitarianism far more dangerous and destructive. Unlike 
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tyranny which is lawless, totalitarianism operates in accordance with what it presupposes to be the law 
of nature or history.420 Tyrants never identify themselves with subordinates whereas the totalitarian 
leader must be all encompassing and be responsible for all thus no criticism of any element of 
governance can be countenanced as it would be a censure of the leader and the system in its entirety.421 
For Arendt the fundamental difference between modern dictatorships and tyrannies is that terror is no 
longer aimed at opponents but in ruling the masses, it has turned inward.422 As such a rights discourse 
can remain in tyranny, particularly the right to resist the tyrannical power as it tends away from 
consistent arbitrariness, as such, one has to oppose it to be punished by it.423 The tyrant takes away the 
right to possess rights whereas the totalitarian regime operates on the basis that none exist.424 Arendt 
views totalitarianism as the absolute and most destructive form of governance that moves beyond all 
previous forms of negative regime. 
Echoed in antiquity is Arendt’s consideration of imperialism and its relationship with tyranny. For 
Arendt ‘tyranny, because it needs no consent, may successfully rule over foreign peoples, it can stay in 
power only if it destroys first of all the national institutions of its own people.’425 Using both the French 
and British imperial structures, with the former attempting to spread its values and cultures and the latter 
staying aloof from this enterprise, Arendt builds a picture of imperial tyranny in operation. Arendt argues 
that imperialism can only result in the destruction of the nation state when the flag becomes a 
commercial asset and patriotism loses its value in its use for money making purposes and centres this 
critique in a historical analysis of imperialism in the 19th Century.426 The British imperial structure being 
the exemplar in that it attempted to keep national institutions separate with administrators consistently 
resisting any attempts to export justice or liberty from home.427 In contrast to Roman imperialism in 
which all became bound by a common law in modern imperialism this is absent. Consent is enforced 
and tyranny prevails no matter the domestic arrangement of the home nation-state.428 Thus, 
constitutional states acting outside their state boundaries may, much as in antiquity, be tyrannical. 
Arendt suggests that rule by nobody, bureaucracy, may be one of the cruellest and most tyrannical forms 
of governance.429  
We ought to add the latest and perhaps most formidable form of such domination: bureaucracy or the 
rule of an intricate system of bureaus in which no men, neither one nor the best, neither the few nor the 
many, can be held responsible, and which could be properly call rule by Nobody. (If, in accord with 
traditional political thought, we identify tyranny as government that is not held to give account of itself, 
rule by Nobody is clearly the most tyrannical of all, since there is no one left who could even be asked 
to answer for what is being done.) 
Bureaucracy establishes haphazard universal settlements and procedures from which there is no appeal. 
There is nobody behind the will out of which decisions emerge and because of this bureaucracy is more 
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dangerous than mere arbitrary tyranny.430 The creation of vast systems of faceless decisions from which 
no answers emerge creates a new form of tyranny that has become ever more present in the contemporary 
era. 
For Arendt, tyranny is not of the kings and despots of history but has contemporary character. Not in 
totalitarian regimes but in other authoritarian forms, including bureaucracy and imperialism. Law is 
central to Arendtian tyranny as it is situated within lawlessness. Constitutional tyranny is not a 
possibility, not only due tyranny’s existence only in the absence of law but also because constitutional 
norms such as division of power and the rule of law provide bulwarks against the dissent of some forms 
of governance, such as democracy, into tyranny. It is the limitations to what tyranny can achieve that 
underlies the wish to have alternate forms of governance. Arendt points to the fear of tyranny coming 
from impotence and futility of action rather than a terror of cruelty. This limitation emerges from the 
absence of a public realm within tyranny and the push toward a plurality or political community that 
often signals the end of tyrannical governance. Constitutionalism is an agent against tyranny in that the 
division of power, its limits on majoritarian democracy, and the rule of law provide the lawful space in 
which plurality can occur, an anathema to tyrannical governance. As with antiquity, tyranny can be 
benevolent but this benevolence is caged by the need to keep the public realm from emerging, as such, 
it is inadequate. Arendt suggests that constitutional democracies states can, particularly through 
imperialism but not just in that instance, be tyrannical in their dealings beyond the state. In combination, 
this understanding of tyranny means that it has a modern form and may be identifiable in contemporary 
governance. 
Understanding tyranny? 
Whilst this was not a comprehensive overview of either classical or Arendtian tyranny the purpose was 
to draw together some of the essential themes which underlie our understanding of tyranny and to 
suggest why there may be an underlying fear of being engaged in a system which has all or some of its 
traits. Both the classical and Arendtian notions of tyranny clearly have contemporary resonances but 
perhaps more critically overlap in some of their articulations of its governance form. This article 
suggests that it is within this intersection between the two forms in which we may find a common 
understanding of tyranny from which a taxonomy of tyranny maybe adduced.  
First, tyranny remains relevant. Some of its characteristics may evolve, as it did, for instance, during the 
Greek classical period, but there remains a common core to how it is understood. Second, tyranny is 
consistently a-constitutional. For Arendt this includes a lawlessness that goes beyond the Greek 
construction, but, critically, such lawlessness does not suggest chaos or anarchy. Rather, it is the manner 
and form in how law emerges which is of import. For the Greeks law exists but as a form to de-politicise 
the public realm and with technocracy taking its place. So too for Arendt where the emergence of 
bureaucracy as a new form of tyranny demonstrates the de-politicisation and the creation of rule by 
Nobody, not in the complete absence of law but in a lawless realm where the public realm removes the 
legitimate creation of law and the politics to which it ought to adhere. 
Third, constitutionalism plays a key role in understanding what tyranny is not. Constitutional systems, 
for Arendt, stand as a bulwark against tyranny. The rule of law, the division of power and the limits 
upon majoritarian politics are critical constitutional norms that prevent democracies in particular from 
dissent into tyranny. For the Greek tyrannical form this is not as straightforward in that democracy was 
for Plato itself tyrannical or would ultimately descend towards it and so too for Aristotle when 
democracy moved beyond a limited class. But critically tyranny lacks the legitimacy that is associated 
with the other forms of constitutionalism identified in the Greek period. Thus, constitutionalism stands 
to defeat tyranny either by its creation out of a tyrannical system or its restoration after an interregnum. 
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Fourth, in both its emergence and its practice tyranny may be benevolent. Nonetheless, there are limits 
to what its benevolence can achieve. For the Greeks tyranny can emergence from bad or malfunctioning 
systems but its limitations is based on it being the tool of the power holders. Similarly, for Arendt but 
its limitations emerge from the absence of a public realm. Indeed, the more benevolent the tyranny the 
more likely it is to sow the seeds of its own ends as the push toward a public community and politics 
will become ever more pressing. The benevolence of a tyranny thus limits what can be achieved by that 
governance order.  
Tyranny, whilst it may be benevolent is generally to the benefit of the tyrant(s). As such, its fifth 
characteristic is that those holding power benefit most from the system. This does not necessarily mean 
avarice or cruelty but it does imply a governance order which inculcates a system of benefits to the 
holders of power within that system ensuring that the monopoly over power will always accrue a profit. 
Sixth, and finally, a domestically constitutional state may be tyrannical in actions beyond its borders. 
Imperialism is the key example for the both the Greeks and Arendt, but the underlying thesis for both is 
important. Domestic constitutionalism is no bulwark against tyrannically action beyond the state and 
indeed both were able to point to clear examples where this was the case. Both considerations of tyranny 
regard such external tyranny as ultimately having a detrimental impact on whom such action is pointed 
toward but also upon the tyrannical actors themselves. 
These six characteristics establish a taxonomy of tyranny under which a core understanding of its form 
may be uncovered. The resonances with some elements of contemporary governance is evident and in 
the next section this taxonomy will be utilised to grasp whether the current global legal order could be 
said to be in part or in sum tyrannical in nature and if this is the case whether this is the anxiety that 
pushes academic discourse toward constitutionalism beyond the state. 
Rule of law and global constitutionalism 
Generally considered to be a desirable element of any governance system the rule of law forms a core 
element of any order pertaining toward constitutionalism albeit its presence does not of itself establish 
the existence or a trajectory toward a constitutional order.431 Focusing on instances where it is 
questionable whether it is rule of law or rule by law that subsists within international law this section 
asks whether there are resonances between attempts to identify the presence of the rule of law and the 
possibility of international law being regarded as possessing some elements of a tyrannical order. At 
times, what is tantamount to complacency regarding the presence of the rule of law within international 
law permeates debates on constitutionalism and beyond this to wider discussions on global governance. 
This tendency relies on an almost unquestioning belief in the rule of law’s presence that arguably 
suggests that its absence may hint at something unpalatable about the legal order. Raz is correct in 
cautioning against using the rule of law to describe all the positive elements of a legal order while 
Waldron’s warning against regarding it as nothing more than the assertion that our side is great are 
perhaps the most critical in considering international law.432 At its core the rule of law requires law to 
be applied equally, created openly and administered fairly and it is from this basis that it is understood 
here.433 The taxonomy of tyranny put forward, whilst not directly concerned with the rule of law as such, 
requires that aspects of these three elements of the rule of law be absent for tyranny to flourish.  
The extension of governance alongside the creation, administration and adjudication of law beyond the 
state raises questions regarding why power is wielded at certain points, who the constituted power 
holders are and from where they gain their legitimacy. From a more traditional perspective, some proffer 
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that states make the law and thus whilst it is imperfect governance anxieties with its operation are not 
as seriously compromising as what may be imagined.434 Alternatively, states are the constituted power 
holders, they are internally legitimate and thus they legitimately create law beyond the state.435 Yet, 
there is a disjuncture between the constituent power holders who choose the constituted power holders 
within their state and their interests and the global interests for which public international law and global 
public law operate in response to.436 Within a domestic constitutionalised system constituted power 
holders act in the interests of constituent actors not, as in this instance, for global or other interests. 
Dyzenhaus argues for a distinction between rule of law and rule by law, the latter meaning compliance 
with whatever laws have been positively enacted no matter their content whereas rule of law also 
requires adherence to the principles of legality. This legality being in line with Fuller’s list of generality, 
publicity, non-retroactivity, clarity, non-contradiction, possibility of compliance, constancy and 
congruence, the majority of which must be complied with most of the time for a system to be in 
conformity with the rule of law.437 Both also argue that rule by law is to some degree legitimate as it 
implies some degree of rule of law. However, what the tipping point from one to the other is remains 
obscure. Dyzenhaus goes on to argue that ‘not only is the choice to abide by the rule of law a matter of 
political incentives, the same is true of the choice to use rule by law to achieve one’s own ends... [o]ne 
who is in a very powerful position will submit to ruling at various points away from the rule by law end 
of that continuum only when it is expedient to do so.’438 As such, it is possible to have pockets of rule 
of law.439 Nonetheless, having pockets or elements of legality may be on a continuum toward rule of 
law, they do not necessarily comport with a public law ethic that could be described as constitutional. 
Yet, can it be described as tyrannical and is this what is pushing scholars toward proclaiming global 
governance as constitutional law. 
Identification of the rule of law beyond the state comes in several forms. For instance there is Henkin’s 
oft quoted statement that ‘almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost 
all of their obligations almost all the time’ with some considering such compliance as a satisfactory 
demonstration of a rule of law ethic.440 There is also much reliance on the UN Charter as a core 
constitutional document in an international rule of law based on the UN as an organisation whose status 
emerges from its common place amongst members. For Fassbender this means that the ‘United Nations 
is an organization based on the concept of the rule of law. The organs of the UN are bound to comply 
with the rules of the UN Charter, which is the constitution of the United Nations.’441 For Brownlie the 
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‘moral purpose of the United Nations was the promotion of the rule of law.’ 442 Albeit not arguing that 
the Charter established an international rule of law rather he suggests that the concept is not unfamiliar 
to law beyond the state. A political willingness to employ the term certainly appears to exist with UN 
Member states in 2005 affirming that ‘an international order based on the rule of law and international 
law’ was the ideal. But what is telling about this last statement is the notion that this was the ideal 
perhaps acknowledging that it is not as firmly established as some commentators such as Fassbender 
might suggest. The premise of an institution focused on the rule of law extends beyond the UN to other 
organisations such as the WTO, where the focus tends to be on its Dispute Settlement arm but has a 
similar ethos that, without really defining its content, there is a rule of law beyond the state we just have 
to identify it.443  
Yet, contemporaneously disquiet regarding increased governance beyond the state has become more 
consistent with questions of whether a rule of law or, perhaps in reality, rule by law endures. There are 
several examples of this angst. Some are based on the historical role law played in creating a global 
governance order that continues to favour the Global North.444 Others focus on the actual operation of 
the legal order. Bianchi questions whether the ad hoc nature of international law suggests an absence of 
the rule of law arguing that the exceptionalism in the period running up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
demonstrates a reliance on hard cases rather than rule of law in decision making. This, he argues, 
undermines any constitutionalisation process.445  
The multitude of international bodies, NGOs and corporations engaged in the administration of post-
conflict territories poses questions as to what oversight and regulation they are subject to in their exercise 
of constituted power.446 Critically such transitional governance raises issues around the open creation, 
equal implementation and fair administration of law with regard to the individuals living within their 
power.447 Whilst bodies established beyond the state are often engaged with the implantation of human 
rights, criminal law, constitutionalism and economic transformation of the transitional states this is only 
rarely reflected back on their own operation to hold them more fully accountable for their exercise of 
constituted power.448 
Emerging first as a legislative body and second as a body with direct engagement with individual lives 
the actions of the Security Council have caused much debate.449 The Security Council’s role as a 
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legislative body has taken hold since the beginning of this century.450 The creation of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the questioning of the Security Council’s ability to create an 
adjudicative body was one of the first such actions and remains hotly debated.451 The decision to pass 
Chapter VII resolutions requiring states to undertake legislative actions regarding but not confined to 
terrorism coupled with the creation of Terror Lists which includes over 200 individuals and the 
Committee designed to oversee this list have added to these discussions. This has brought the UN body 
into a new governance position where the manner in which law is created and implemented is brought 
to the fore and is central in questioning whether the Security Council is acting intra vires.452 
Fassbender’s Report on the Security Council and due process found that it did comply with all its 
obligations under the Charter, including several references to the rule of law but this conclusion has 
been much contested.453 Whilst this report led to the creation of an ombudsperson to review the terror 
listing process this was a very limited step in a situation where the listing process itself and the system 
of appeal remains opaque.454 In particular, the ombudsperson’s remit still leaves many questions best 
exemplified by the cases taken by those fortunate to live within the jurisdiction of the ECJ and thus 
possessing an avenue to question their inclusion on the list.455  
These examples may be added to by many others. For instance, the role of principally non-public actors 
in judicial activities within international economic law where hearings are most often heard in private 
and where the appeal processes are limited.456 Or, the role of economic institutions such as the World 
Bank Group, the IMF or a supranational body such as the EU in setting both micro and macroeconomic 
policies within states and the potential lack of ownership of global constitutionalism by constituent 
actors who may be subject to a pre-ordained hegemonic constitutionalism.457 Each of these suggest that 
international law has moved well beyond it sovereign equality base, if that ever existed, to a scenario 
where individual lives are now directly affected by decisions and actors which operate beyond the state. 
In such a scenario the presence of the rule of law becomes a significant factor and allows us to question 
whether law is made openly, administered fairly and applied equally. If the conclusion is in the negative 
is it more honest to describe the system as rule by law and to question what the constitutionalisation 
process says about an order which on this brief summation appears to be entirely absent an ensconced 
rule of law.  
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These instances are not intended to create an apocalyptic or overly negative image of international law. 
Rather, they are to be set against the very positive outlook of an operational rule of law that is at times 
presented in the constitutionalisation debate. It also demonstrates the types of anxieties that exist as 
constituted governance extends beyond the state. As such this discussion is not about considering a 
domestic analysis of the rule of law, a Hartian approach or other bastions such as Hobbes to find that 
international law is not up to scratch or is not a legal order thus coming to the conclusion that such 
constitutional questions are unnecessary. Rather, it considers whether the public law ethic and the 
adoption of the rule of law as in situe is a response to an entirely different issue, not the absence of law 
but the global governance order’s creation of law, its adjudication and administration and whether this 
could be considered to presently be a form of tyrannical governance. This discussion is not to be 
confused with foundational discussions of how we perceive law within the global order when the 
traditional tropes of commander and force have such little purchase. In particular, a traditional form 
executive, legislature and judiciary cannot be relied upon to necessarily fill the roles that a domestic 
system requires and indeed where qualms regarding the form that global democracy may take have led 
some to argue that it will, as Plato feared, descend into tyranny.458 
The underlying rationales for choosing what traditionally are domestic governance tools could have 
emerged from a number of anxieties including: the divesting of power from a narrow set of global actors, 
a role in underpinning both individual and collective rights, a provision to check both the legitimacy and 
legalism of power and the possibility of recognising diverse points of governance within the global order 
and, critically, to locate a global rule of law. These brief examples demonstrate that these anxieties are 
real. The question is what has global constitutionalism done in response to them. This is not a discussion 
of the existence of law beyond the state but rather whether there is a concern that there is a rule by law 
system rather than rule of law and whether this anxiety has its roots in a tyrannical view and to consider 
whether in a legal order that has few, if any, democratic underpinnings or a division of power infused 
with checks or balances, the requirement of a strong rule of law becomes greater. In differentiated system 
with a weak judicial arm it would be inadvisable to simply rely upon those with the law-making authority 
or constituted power to both establish and maintain the rule of law.  
Raz argues that the rule of law ought not to be used to merely describe all the positive attributes of a 
particular legal system yet this appears to be the form in which the rule of law has been accepted by 
some international scholars. 459 In such instances legalisation, institutionalisation and rule by law are 
confused with the rule of law and questions regarding international law's evolution. Koskenniemi 
contends that ‘the rule of law hopes to fix the universal in a particular, positive space (a law, a moral or 
procedural principal or institution).460 Too often its employment within global constitutionalism instead 
hides insufficiencies in global governance where perhaps more positively it could be used to critique the 
system. Critically, is it possible to call the anxieties and the push toward identifying a rule of law a wish 
to leave behind what could be described as a tyrannical order. 
An assurance of democratic legitimacy within the global legal structure would militate towards simply 
accepting Fuller’s procedural rule of law as satisfactory however the global order operates with very 
weak constraints thus requiring a more substantive approach.461 Even if Fuller’s formation were 
accepted the basic substantive structure would have to set the parameters of both legal and political 
action to prevent the development of a 'wicked system.'462 This problem may be remedied by a 
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substantive rule of law capable of acting as a safety valve albeit presently this appears absent from law 
beyond the state. While Fuller’s arguments against a substantive rule of law are not without import 
within the global order the lack of judicial positioning, strong democratic systems or other forms of 
restraint suggests rule of law in its substantive form would be necessary. If the argument is that the rule 
of law, either substantive or procedural is absent or at the very least is weak within the global legal order 
does this automatically imply that the governance order is tyrannical? This section has certainly not 
argued for an absence of law, there is plenty of law, but potentially this could be better described as rule 
by law. 
Tyranny, international rule of law 
Coming back to tyranny and its six characteristics; it continued relevance, its a-constitutional content 
and lawlessness, constitutionalism as a bulwark against tyranny, its potential benevolence, the benefit 
accrued to tyrant(s), and finally that domestic constitutionalism does not necessarily prevent states from 
acting tyrannically beyond the state. From the foregoing discussion it is certainly not obvious that 
international law contributes to a purely tyrannical governance order yet some of the issues raised in the 
previous discussion certainly suggest some of tyranny’s attributes may be present.  
Leaving its first element, its continued relevance to the end, tyranny’s a-constitutional character and 
Arendt’s argument for lawlessness proffer some interesting insights. If we follow Fuller and Dyzenhaus 
than rule by law requires rule of law and as such there is lawfulness. Thus, if international law remains, 
on the whole, a rule by law system, it does not quite meet the threshold of tyrannical power that Arendt 
would recognise. Yet, Greek tyranny remains relevant particularly the notion that tyranny de-politicises 
and tends toward the technocratic. Certainly the law may be instrumentalised and Bianchi’s warning 
against ad hocism may suggest that replacing political with legal arguments can result in the political 
context being replaced. This is also linked to Arendt’s view of bureaucracy, or the rule of Nobody, as 
the modern era’s worst form of tyranny. The Security Council’s Terror List or the creation of 
micro/macro-economic policies beyond the state could be interpreted as falling into this category. This 
bureaucratic or technocratic turn toward expertise is not specific to law beyond the state but perhaps 
adds to the unease felt with regard to these actions and indeed the rise of global administrative law 
suggests that, at the very least, administration and, as such, bureaucracy, is a live issue. 
Constitutionalism’s role as a bulwark against tyranny is very close to this last argument and could be 
considered to be the biggest trigger for the turn to constitutionalism. If there is an acceptance that 
constitutionalism and tyranny cannot co-exist than a push toward constitutionalism ought to resolve the 
issues identified in the last section. Indeed, it suggests that the real benefit of a constitutional ethic 
beyond the state is that it gives tools to scholars to offer critique when the continuum between rule by 
law and rule of law tends toward the former. Of course beyond the rule of law constitutionalism also 
requires division of power combined with checks and balances, democracy and limits upon majoritarian 
politics but the potential to both push for reforms and be critical of areas that they do not reach what 
would be considered legitimate minimum standards of governance within states provides the global 
constitutional ethic with a platform to push against any tyrannical tendencies within international law. 
The potential for benevolence is also critical in understanding law beyond the state as examples such as 
UN Sanctions Committee or the administration of states in transition demonstrate the positive tasks that 
international law contributes toward. It forms part and parcel of the governance system that creates the 
processes by which these are set up, administered and are held account. Yet, the very lack of fulfilment 
of very basic levels of accountability and oversight taints this benevolence with tyrannical form and as 
previously discussed limits what it can achieve. Both Arendt and the classical tradition agreed that 
tyranny included the seeds of its own end as benevolence created the groundwork and drive toward a 
public realm. This may also be part of the trigger toward the constitutional ethic, in that the existing 
benevolence is in itself fuelling a wish for the system to more fully engage and go further perhaps toward 
constitutionalism but also other governance possibilities.  
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In many ways, within the global governance order, the fifth characteristic is directly related to the sixth, 
that domestic constitutional structures do not necessarily mean that states acting beyond the state will 
not behave as tyrants. The rise of imperialism was concomitant with the rise of modern international 
law and both remain deeply intertwined.463 Albeit authors such as Tully argue that the constitutional 
language can accommodated anti-imperial undertakings through its flexibility this has not prevented 
states from taking on the role of imperial actors.464 This imperialism was largely led by states that had 
full domestic constitutional orders. In the contemporary era Third World Approaches to International 
Law clearly demonstrate ongoing acts of imperialism suggesting that the spread of constitutionalism at 
the domestic level has not impeded this tendency.465 Other authors also question whether it is possible 
to consider democracy at the domestic level as offering compensation for its absence beyond the state.466 
To return to the first characteristic, the continued relevance of tyranny. Whilst it is arguable whether the 
global governance order is fully or partially tyrannical and this article certainly cannot claim to 
sufficiently cover the constitutional ethic beyond the state to make such a claim probing this possibility 
is critical. The relevance of tyranny is that it both questions the motivations for the push toward 
constitutionalisation and other public law forms but also adds an additional purpose to these debates in 
suggesting that even if they are incorrect in their claims they can usefully point to insufficiencies in 
global governance beyond the state. Perhaps this last element is the most important, that 
constitutionalism offers a basis to shine a spotlight on international law’s tyrannical tendencies. It is thus 
essential that scholars in this field take the opportunity to offer critique rather than an ever purposeful 
utopian view of the future of law beyond the state.  
Conclusion 
This piece is not intended to question the utility of the move toward a constitutional ethic within 
international, regional and supra national law nor is it envisioned as an assault on the existence of law 
beyond the state. Rather, it is intended to add to the debate on constitutionalisation at the supranational 
and global levels by asking whether in making the claims toward an already realised or in train 
constitutional process ought we ask what the impetus for identifying these processes is, why has it 
resulted in a turn to constitutionalism and what it means for law’s place within global governance. 
Further if we find that a fear of tyrannical power, and this article is certainly suggesting this, is a partial 
explanation for the turn to constitutionalism we can usefully engage the tools provided by it and a public 
law ethic more broadly, to expose where gaps in global governance exist and advise where this tends 
toward the tyrannical. What is evident from this overview of tyranny is that ultimately it is always a-
constitutional and it is this characteristic which this article suggests is the core rationale for the turn to 
constitutionalism. Tyranny and constitutionalism are not concomitant thus if there is an existent 
constitution international law and governance cannot be tyrannical.  
Thus, rather than relying on positive examples of where the rule of law is in situe to ignore where rule 
by law prevails, this new constitutional ethic could be utilised as a critique of existing fissures within 
law beyond the state. Instead of relying on an ever positive account of the process of constitutionalisation 
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to make a case for its existence by adding a tyranny based understanding to the debate an account of the 
failure to fully engage with the entire panoply of rule of law or other public law elements such a 
democratic legitimacy, checks and balances or a rights based discourse would be required. Further it 
would make it necessary to consider what form constitutionalism must take if it is to leave behind all 
elements of tyranny. 
Global public law will need to take up the challenge of moving from tyrannical to constituted power. 
The incidences within global public law where tyranny’s rudimentary elements may be found are far 
too frequent. Yet the political and legal question is whether we wish to undertake fundamental reform 
based within constitutionalism or are we content with tyranny beyond the state and satisfied that the 
constitutional narrative may be used to cover the fissures that exist in the system rather than highlighting 
them. The existing ambiguities should not be used to enable an otherwise questionable 
constitutionalisation, or other public law process, to pass muster simply because it assuages our concerns 
that international law contributes to tyranny in law beyond the state.  
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The theoretical debate on pluralism in law has only indirectly overlapped with the debate on global 
justice. It has often seemed that the former appears as a merely institutional concern of experts in law, 
whereas the second as a moral preoccupation for philosophers, economists and activists. In my view the 
two issues are closely related. They both turn on a view of the legitimacy of international institutions. It 
is wrong for philosophers to ignore institutions of law and it is equally wrong for lawyers to ignore 
global justice. In order to see this we will need to set aside the artificial distinction that is often drawn 
between legal and political obligation. This is the epicentre of the ‘positivist’ theory of law, which is 
currently popular among legal philosophers. Legal positivism is an attractive theory because it simplifies 
law and legal reasoning. It is nevertheless misleading because it fails to capture both our basic common 
sense assumptions about law and the content of technical legal doctrine. Under the legal positivist dogma 
legal obligations and rights become inscrutable. They come to mysteriously occupy a space occupying 
both the world of fact and the world of value. Legal positivism is incoherent because law is another area 
of practical reason, a series of arguments that run parallel to morality and ethics. In my own earlier work 
I offered a theory of law as practical reason, which is constructivist in method and egalitarian in 
inspiration, based on the work of Kant and Rawls.468 I believe that the same theory can illuminate 
international institutions. In this essay I argue that once we understand the law as a body of rules, 
practices and institutions with moral standing, the question of pluralism and the question of global justice 
are seen as two sides of the same coin. Lawyers and philosophers have a common task, to understand 
and interpret the moral nature of the division of the world into states.  
Global justice 
The debate on global justice has arisen out of the question of whether or to what extent the affluent 
peoples of the world have a duty of justice to assist poorer countries and peoples. Some philosophers 
argue that the duty is as strong as the duty of distributive justice that wealthy citizens have to assist their 
fellow citizens within the same society.469 Other philosophers disagree.470 Although they start from the 
same universalist premises, they argue that state borders create a morally significant distinction between 
fellow citizens, to whom a duty of social justice is owed, and all others, to whom such a duty is not 
owed. For this view outsiders have only a weaker – although real and demanding - duty of humanitarian 
assistance, if and when essential human needs vital to survival are at risk. These theorists give different 
reasons why this is the case, but all of them consider that a special and distinctive political relationship 
that ties citizens together is a necessary requirement if any bonds of social justice are to arise.  
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This debate, important though it is, covers only part of the relevant ground. It has not dealt with the 
question of the legitimacy of existing institutions. In my view, an account of the legitimacy of 
international institutions is a prerequisite for all theories of global justice. The distinction between 
legitimacy and full justice is generally accepted for the domestic case.471 Legitimacy is normally the 
result of a set of standards of justice that protect the standing of citizens as free and equal in the normal 
operation of institutions and procedures, but do not constitute a full social ideal. How this basic idea 
applies to international institutions is a relatively new area of political and legal theory.472 But the 
question is highly relevant to global justice. If a certain distribution of wealth were to be delivered 
through unjust processes, for example through colonial conquest or some other type of violent 
imposition, it would be for that reason alone unjust and unacceptable. Lesser forms of violations of 
legitimacy, through non-violent electoral fraud, for example, would also have the effect of rendering 
outcomes unjust, even if they meet substantive tests of distribution.  
I will address these issues by discussing three cases of action across borders. Assume that motivated by 
a desire to be the best moral person he can be, one of my postgraduate students, let us call him Karl, sets 
out to act on global inequalities.473 He collects money and provisions through donations from affluent 
well-wishers in Oxford and sets off on a cargo ship for Freetown in Sierra Leone. Karl chooses this 
place over others because of the stories of great suffering that have reached him about it.  
Here are three scenarios of how Karl’s venture may end up: 
1. Benevolent Harm: When Karl arrives in Freetown, he sees a large group of women and children. 
They look desperate, so he gives them what he can and returns to his ship. On the way back a 
passer-by tells him that these people were part of a rebel group that has terrorised the countryside. 
They recruited child soldiers and forced them to commit atrocities. Their armed friends were out 
rampaging, so he did not see them. To his horror, Karl realises that he has assisted a group of 
criminals. 
2. Helpless Delegation: Karl chooses to delegate his choice of recipients of aid to Ernest, a local 
politician who seems powerful and knowledgeable enough. Ernest knows about the local needs 
and could – potentially - enforce a fair distribution, if he wanted to. He is educated and sounds 
serious. But Karl has no way of controlling Ernest. He cannot guarantee that Ernest’s decisions 
will be the right ones, or that his actions will be overseen by an independent judge. Ernest could, 
conceivably, use the money and provisions for his own ends, for example to favour his clan or 
his allies. Karl has no mechanism at his disposal for preventing this or for holding Ernest to 
account after the fact. 
3. Benevolent Good. Before he ventures out on the field Karl sends representatives with the task of 
establishing patterns of a desired distribution according to an acceptable social model for Sierra 
Leone. When he arrives in Freetown, he has already identified those in need on account of 
demographic data. He gives the required provisions only to those charities working in the relevant 
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areas. He cannot monitor the charities but he is optimistic that they will do what he asked them 
to. They also have some internal processes of accountability.  
Has Karl helped the people he wanted to help in each one of these cases? In the first case of ‘benevolent 
harm’ it is clear that he has not. His motives were good, but the outcome was obviously disastrous. In 
the second case of ‘helpless delegation’ it is impossible to know the outcome. There is no guarantee that 
the provisions will end up in the right hands. These are the risks of a personal crusade. The problems 
raised by this example have been well documented by development economists who raise the spectre of 
unintended consequences of aid. William Easterly, for example, has argued extensively that aid has been 
ineffective, through lack of local knowledge or through such unintended consequences as assisting 
corruption, creating the wrong incentives etc.474 So there are reasons to doubt the effectiveness of Karl’s 
giving.475 Peter Singer acknowledges these difficulties by saying that ‘in the past, a lot of official aid 
has been misconceived and misdirected and has done little good’. He still concludes with optimism that 
if more money were available, it would be spent more wisely: ‘But it scarcely seems possible that, if we 
truly set out to reduce poverty, and put resources into doing so that match the size of the problem – 
including resources to evaluate past failures and learn from our mistakes – we will be unable to find 
ways of making a positive impact’.476 I am not sure this is an adequate response in general. In any event 
does not assist Karl.  
What about the third case, that of ‘benevolent good’? We may say that Karl has done some good. He 
has delivered provisions to people in need. But is this enough to meet the tests of social justice? The 
problem is that Karl has no overall account or idea of the pattern of distribution he intends to achieve. 
Surely distributive justice is about a pattern of distribution, not indiscriminate giving. But Karl does not 
seem to have an overview of the distribution of resources among the people of Sierra Leone. He does 
not seem to have a pattern of desired distribution among this people and all the other peoples of the 
world. Nor is it possible that his small contribution will do anything to remedy any overall pattern. His 
involvement, we have assumed, is time limited and does is not being assisted by established institutions. 
He acts on his own out of a sense of personal duty, having perhaps read the books of Peter Singer. He 
cannot correct any errors with a second or third shipment of aid, in case his first shipment went wrong. 
There is a great deal of uncertainty about the longer terms effects of this attempt.  
I believe that in this case Karl has violated the requirements of distributive justice, irrespective of the 
outcome. Many cosmopolitan theorists, Peter Singer being one of them, fail to distinguish between 
alleviating destitution and distributive justice which means narrowing the gap between rich and poor. 
But these are distinct moral aims that require different actions. Destitution is, for Rawls, the subject of 
a ‘duty of assistance’ in favour of ‘burdened societies’.477 It is a true moral duty, but it is something that 
is very different from ordinary social justice. Such a duty has a cut-off point, namely the point where a 
society becomes ‘well ordered’. This is not a principle of ‘distributive justice’ because it is not about 
inequality, i.e. relative wealth. The aim of the duty of assistance is not adjusting inequality, but providing 
relief for absolute destitution. Similarly, when Thomas Nagel discusses global justice he is concerned 
with differences of wealth, not absolute levels of poverty that call for a humanitarian response. Nagel 
says quite clearly that humanitarian duties ‘hold in virtue of the absolute rather than the relative level of 
need of the people we are in a position to help’.478 He contrasts these duties to the duties of social justice, 
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which are ‘concerned with the relations between the conditions of different classes of people, and the 
causes of inequality between them’.479  
By mixing the two questions together, Karl has failed to provide any reason or plan or strategy as a 
response to the challenges of inequality. By not providing any overall such plan or desired end Karl has 
not even started promoting his cause. Giving money or resources to the poor is not the same thing as 
achieving social justice. What if Karl’s continuous giving made the people of Freetown unusually well-
off compared to their countrymen? Karl does not take social justice seriously.  
This, however, is not the most important failure of Karl’s venture. In the view that I wish to defend, 
there is a deeper moral failure and all three cases are examples of it. In all of them Karl has violated his 
duties of justice to the persons that share the world with him. In each case his actions were illegitimate. 
This is so even though in the last case, he may have caused no harm. Karl acted unjustly because in each 
case he ignored the self-governing institutions of the citizens in Sierra Leone. These institutions may 
not be perfect, but they are delivering a multi-party democracy with free and fair elections. For example, 
the current President of Sierra Leone is Ernest Bai Koroma, a former insurance executive, who won the 
presidential election of 2007 and was re-elected in 2012. By treating the national institutions of 
government as non-existent or irrelevant, and by seeking in each case to impose his own account of 
social ideal on Sierra Leone, Karl has treated the citizens that set them up as inferior to himself. 
Irrespective of whether he had good intentions – which he did – and irrespective of whether he produced 
any good results – which he also did in the third case – Karl’s actions did not promote the cause of 
justice. Justice in political matters requires respect for the equality of persons as free and equal citizens. 
This equality of persons is the most important principle of any political community and it is only possible 
through the creation of political institutions. This is true both for the domestic case and for the 
international case. This is not a formality or a detail. If one undermines these institutions one undermines 
equality. And the duties to respect them are prior to any duties of social justice. This is the point I wish 
to develop in the next three sections. 
Illegitimacy as injustice  
Thomas Nagel argued for a ‘political conception’ of social justice, according to which only those sharing 
a state are subject to the requirements of social justice. His interest, as we have seen, was not in 
humanitarian assistance alone, but on the requirement of justice that arises out of relative poverty. He 
wrote that whereas ‘humanitarian duties’ bind us in virtue of the absolute rather than the relative level 
of need of the people we are in a position to help, justice by contrast is relative. It is concerned with ‘the 
relations between the conditions of different classes of people, and the causes of inequality between 
them’. He then set out to answer the question of ‘how to respond to world inequality in general from the 
point of view of justice and injustice rather than humanity alone.’480 Nagel argued that when we share 
a state with others we are subject to the same coercive rules and involuntary terms of association. Such 
terms of association are imposed on all of us ‘in the name’ of each member, so that we are all considered 
‘joint authors’ because our will is actively ‘engaged’ in their production.481 These facts create a certain 
social relation with other citizens, Nagel claims, which creates on us an obligation that our relations are 
guided by the principles of egalitarian social justice. But when this social relation is absent, the duties 
are absent too. Outside these political relations we are only bound by weaker ties of humanitarian moral 
concern. Nagel’s conclusion is that social justice is the exclusive domain of sovereign states and cannot 
be extended to the domain of global society. For his political conception ‘states are not merely instru-
ments for realizing the preinstitutional value of justice among human beings. Instead, their existence is 
precisely what gives the value of justice its application, by putting the fellow citizens of a sovereign 
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state into a relation that they do not have with the rest of humanity, an institutional relation which must 
then be evaluated by the special standards of fairness and equality that fill out the content of justice’.482  
One group of Nagel’s critics have responded by challenging his major premise. They challenge the idea 
that social justice requires a ‘political relationship’ and argued that membership had no serious moral 
significance. Simon Caney argues, for example, that for the cosmopolitan outlook there is no 
fundamental difference between the domestic and global realms ‘such that the values that are 
appropriate in the former realm are inappropriate in the latter’ and that the principles to be applied in 
the global realm should be ‘continuous’ with those we think appropriate in the domestic realm.483 For 
cosmopolitan arguments of this type, borders make little difference.  
Another group of critics challenge the minor premise, namely the position that modern international 
institutions and transactions have not created a sufficiently robust relationship among distant strangers. 
Cohen and Sabel, for example, argue that in contemporary global politics ‘we have a mix of precisely 
the conditions of interdependence, cooperation and institutions that have justice-generating 
implications’ according to Nagel’s theory.484 In their view international regimes and institutions entail 
justice-generating conditions of collective normative engagement, similar to that which exists in the 
domestic case. The appropriate response to these interactions, of course, is not a world republic, but 
institutions of rule-making that ought to be flexible and creative under what they call a ‘pluralist’ view. 
For their position, these new forms of international interrelations should create novel institutional moral 
responses. These, however, are a matter of social justice, not a matter of mere humanitarian concern. I 
shall call this view ‘institutional cosmopolitanism’ and will contrast it to the ‘global cosmopolitanism’ 
of Caney and Singer.  
How do these positions respond to the scenarios of direct aid I outlined above? The facts of Karl’s 
expedition concern a strictly bilateral relationship. They link a citizen of one state with the citizens of 
another. It follows that under Nagel’s ‘political conception’ no issue of social justice arises between 
them. Since givers and recipients are not part of the same political community and belong to different 
states, their relations are outside the framework of social justice. Karl was under no duty of social justice 
to assist in adjusting inequalities (although he well have had a duty of humanitarian assistance in extreme 
cases). Of course, this is only part of the assessment of the overall situation.  
I believe that under ‘institutional cosmopolitanism’ the answer with regard to the applicability of social 
justice would have been the same. For the view defended by Cohen and Sabel there is no relevant 
institutional relation connecting the agents and the recipients of aid in such a way as to create obligations 
of social justice. This is true even though the UK and Sierra Leone may have had strong connections 
and interactions via the United Nations, the Commonwealth of Nations, the IMF or other international 
institutions. If this is the case, the resulting duties will not be bilateral, however, but international. Just 
like the ‘political conception’ the ‘institutional cosmopolitan’ theory will most likely interpret Karl’s 
expedition as a private event among unconnected persons. No issues of social justice arise between 
them. What Karl did was, at most, an act of supererogation.  
For the ‘global cosmopolitan view’, however, the answer will be different. It must follow from Singer 
and Caney’s arguments that a moral relationship already exists between Karl and the citizens of Sierra 
Leone, irrespective of national borders and membership. A basic human relationship connects Karl to 
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the residents of Freetown and creates duties of social justice. For this view, whatever happened in the 
three cases or Karl’s adventures, it happened under a framework of duties of social justice. The real 
contrast therefore is between this view and the other two.  
These issues, however, not the most important moral questions raised by Karl’s actions. The three 
theories of global justice just surveyed make no difference at all to the justice or injustice of the situation 
Karl finds himself in. Whatever view one takes of social justice, Karl’s actions exhibit a violation of a 
more fundamental problem of political morality. All three examples are cases of a violation of political 
or constitutional justice as it applies to international institutions. They are all examples of illegitimate 
action. The cases are interestingly complex because they record what appears to be a failure of the 
attempted offer of aid. The degrees of failure are clearly relevant to our moral response to them, but they 
do not exhaust the morally relevant considerations. Far from it, they are actually secondary to a deeper 
moral concern. The injustice of these actions in these cases is not on account of their outcome but in the 
very attempt. Karl acted wrongly merely by setting out to achieve his benevolent aims. Even under 
‘global cosmopolitanism’ his actions were unjust. 
First, he ignored Sierra Leone’s local institutions, because he did not seek to cooperate with them. He 
bypassed all domestic authority, local or national. He behaved as if those authorities did not exist, or if 
they were morally irrelevant. But by doing this he failed to show equal respect to the citizens of Sierra 
Leone. These citizens made their country’s institutions possible, for example, by voting in elections and 
holding office. He treated them as if these institutions did not matter. He treated them as if they were 
his social inferiors. 
Second, he acted unilaterally in seeking to impose a social ideal with the force of his money. His actions 
sought to bring about a benevolent ideal, but an ideal that was strictly a unilateral imposition. The 
recipients of his aid had no opportunity to contribute to the formulation of a social ideal as a public 
political project. He acted simply on his own conception of Sierra Leone and the world. By setting out 
to impose a social ideal unilaterally and without engaging with local institutions, Karl usurped the 
legitimate political functions of legislation and policy-making. These functions, however, the citizens 
of Sierra Leone have entrusted to their own political institutions of self-government.  
His actions are wrong in a further sense. He provides no account of a process or method for ensuring 
that his project of social justice could succeed. Every aspect of his plan to bring social justice in Sierra 
Leone was based on chance. He hoped that his agents would be reliable, but has no method of assessing 
them or holding them to account. He hoped that they had the ability to deliver, but he did not train them. 
Finally, his project of bringing about a fair distribution was hopelessly incomplete, since the means he 
had chosen were entirely inadequate for achieving the aims. In all such respects, delivering effective 
social justice requires institutions that only a state possesses: it requires a democratic legislature and a 
process of legislation, a mechanism of administration through an effective government and the oversight 
of courts through a fair judicial process. These are not just matters of instrumental value. They are 
matters of justice.  
One does not need to settle on a view regarding the political conception, institutional cosmopolitanism 
or global cosmopolitanism to see this point. One of our most basic moral duties, one that is a universal, 
general and comprehensive moral duty, is the duty to respect the legitimate political institutions that 
were set up by our fellow human beings. This duty, which I shall call the duty of jurisdiction, exists 
whenever these institutions meet the basic tests of legitimacy for political institutions.485 Karl was 
misled by his failure to take into account that domestic legitimacy entails a cosmopolitan duty of respect 
for other people’s institutions.  
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Cosmopolitan legitimacy  
What do we learn from these examples? A constitutionally legitimate state does not guarantee social 
justice. This is the key to the distinction between legitimacy and justice. The so called paradox of 
democracy is that I may consider the government just and unjust at the same time: just, because it was 
elected and unjust because of what it does to inequality. The position appears to be a paradox because 
the government’s actions are both just and unjust at the same time.  
An ideal of legitimacy is the only way out of the paradox and it explains our common sense judgments. 
Processes, elections and governments can be just in themselves. Whether their outcomes is just is a 
separate issue. Legitimacy is thus a matter of institutions and procedures.486 This type of justice 
determines the acceptability of political processes, the scope of the separation of powers, the powers of 
courts and the like. Whether a legitimate political process delivers a social ideal is another question 
entirely. This is also a common view among the social contract tradition. Rousseau outlined this view 
when he wrote that it ‘in order… that the social compact not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the 
undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall 
be compelled to do so by the whole body…. In this lies the key to the working of the political machine; 
this alone legitimizes civil undertakings, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical and liable to the 
most frightful abuses’.487 Rousseau in effect says that the institutional enforcement of the general 
principles that come with the social contract is key for legitimising civil offices. Without such 
enforcement mechanisms, a civil association would be tyrannical and open to abuse. The whole range 
of civil offices the ‘political machine’ is relevant to this issue, however: legislature, executive and 
judiciary. Institutions make justice possible. There are constitutional and procedural rules about how to 
set up these institutions fairly. Kant and Rawls have said similar things in vindicating the constitutional 
state.488 
But this answer, even if true in the national domain, is not enough to answer the international question. 
Why not set domestic legitimacy aside when the international problems require it? After all, the problem 
of global poverty is a humanitarian disaster of extreme urgency. For this reason Simon Caney dismisses 
Rawls’ argument regarding self-government out of hand. Rawls had argued that it would be unfair to 
seek to equalise conditions among two societies, where one of the had chosen to industrialise and the 
other had not.489 He assumed that it would be unfair to seek to reverse decisions they took freely. Caney 
considers Rawls’ argument ‘extremely unjust toward individuals’.490 He asks: ‘Why should a member 
of a Third World country be economically disadvantaged because of a decision that the political elite in 
that country made and with which they disagreed?’491 Caney mistakenly thinks that Rawls’ argument 
derives its force from the consent of those disadvantaged. But Rawls’ argument is entirely different. It 
derives its force from the need for legitimate constitutional institutions, which of course may not be 
consented to by many, and the fact that in the absence of a world state, legitimate states must have a 
‘democratic peace’ between them built on the basis of international law.492 The answer is the same both 
for developed and developing countries: without constitutional institutions, there can be no justice.  
Caney rejects this argument because his way of thinking is entirely instrumental. Caney sees all 
institutions as the means to a higher end, namely the satisfaction of people’s interests. He derives, for 
example, a ‘human right’ not to suffer from poverty, from the fact that ‘persons have an interest in 
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having the opportunity not to suffer from poverty’.493 He dismisses arguments from the legitimacy of 
institutions or the self-government of states by claiming that such arguments ‘penalize’ those born into 
an impoverished system and ‘depriving them of the very means to live, simply because of their ‘place 
of birth’.494 On this basis Caney concludes that there is an overwhelming duty of justice to ‘eradicate 
poverty’.495 But this argument fails to see that nobody is ‘penalizing’ the poor by respecting their 
legitimate institutions. Poverty is not caused by our inaction to relieve it. As Karl’s examples show, no 
individual persons has the power to alleviate poverty around the world or to bring about justice single-
handedly. We should alleviate suffering whenever we can. But the questions raised by the demand social 
justice are entirely different and far more comprehensive. No individual can answer them.  
A similar but more sustained argument for the relative insignificance of institutions is made by John 
Tasioulas, who argues that as a matter of principle an institution, national or international makes little 
difference to our moral position. Tasioulas postulates that an authority is legitimate when its outcomes 
are correct, or ‘when its putative subjects would likely better conform with the reasons that apply to 
them by treating the putative authority’s directives as content-independent and exclusionary reasons for 
action than if they adopted some other guide’.496 Tasioulas adopts here Joseph Raz’s view of authority 
and concludes that what matters for legitimacy is ‘enhanced conformity with reason’, even if it is not 
‘perfect conformity’.497 Nevertheless, as I have argued elsewhere,498 this is no theory of legitimacy at 
all. Under such a theory the structures of law have no priority. It is a theory of outcomes, not processes. 
But this comes at a cost. The instrumental view would perhaps see nothing wrong in Karl’s usurpation 
of state authority, it would produce the desired outcomes. For if global poverty could be addressed 
through a new colonialism, then colonialism becomes a duty of justice. Caney and Tasioulas provide 
little argument to deflect this unattractive conclusion.499  
Most philosophers would wish to retain legitimacy as a standard feature of all international law and 
politics. They would wish to maintain just processes. One such attempt to show that legitimacy is prior 
to outcomes is offered by Allen Buchanan, who specifies, contrary to Tasioulas, that ‘the rules of a 
legitimate institution have a privileged status vis a vis our reasons for acting’ and that ‘their having this 
privileged status is not dependent on their content’.500 In his view legitimacy is less demanding that 
justice and it is for that reason much easier to reach.501 Buchanan argues that for what he considers the 
‘dominant’ philosophical view legitimacy justifies a ‘right to rule’ and requires six elements, namely 
that a) the institution’s agents are morally justified in engaging in governance functions, b) use morally 
justified coercion, c) are exclusively justified in exercising coercion, d) are justified in excluding others 
from exercising governance activities, e) those whom the institution attempts to govern have a content-
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independent moral obligation to comply with all the rules the institution impose and f) citizens have a 
duty not to interfere with the institution’s effort to secure compliance. Buchanan considers these 
requirements to be too strong to apply to anything except states. A different set of requirements should 
apply, he thinks, to international institutions which would not include, for example, the exercise of 
coercion.  
His argument is that in the international context political power is legitimate if it does a credible job of 
protecting at least the most basic human rights of those over whom it wields power, as long as it provides 
this protection through processes, policies and actions that themselves respect the most basic human 
rights and is not a usurper.502 On the basis of these premises Buchanan postulates a ‘robust natural duty 
of justice, which is related to a ‘moral equality’ principle.503 Buchanan’s overall argument is very rich 
in detail and suggestive. However, it lacks clarity on one question. Why should anyone be concerned 
only with the most basic human rights and not the full range of human rights and justice? Why not 
consider that an situation is only legitimate if it protects all available human rights, basic or not? The 
problem is that if legitimacy is less than full justice then the paradox emerges in another form. For why 
should we prefer less justice than more? I don’t think Buchanan’s effort to elevate legitimacy on the 
basis of ‘basic rights’ can therefore succeed. His argument, however, points to the correct answer, which 
is in my view is an argument for the moral distinctness and priority of constitutional justice. This is the 
argument we find, I believe, in Kant and Rawls. 
Legitimacy, for this view, concerns the way in which citizens are related to one another as free and 
equal. Legitimacy depends on a foundational constitutional principle of equal citizenship which protects 
everyone’s rights to participate in a democratic process and to have equal standing before the law. The 
argument has been outlined in great detail by Kant, who explains that the creation of a legal order (or a 
‘civil condition’) according to the principles of constitutional justice (or ‘public right’) is a natural duty 
of justice that binds everyone.504 Kant writes that the ‘civil condition’ is not simply a union for some 
common end, but a union which is ‘in itself an end’ and which is the ‘unconditional and first duty in any 
external relation of people in general, who cannot help mutually affecting one another’.505 Setting up a 
constitutional order that complies with the principles of equality and reciprocity is thus the ‘supreme 
formal condition’ (conditio sine qua non) of all other external duties, without which no external duty is 
possible. The principle is necessary and formal because no empirical end can be the focus of a similar 
agreement: ‘for, since people differ in their thinking about happiness and how each would have it 
constituted, their wills with respect to it cannot be brought under any common principle and so under 
any external law harmonizing with everyone’s freedom’.506 As I read him Kant make a simple point 
about the priority of legitimate institutions. An effective and egalitarian legal order is a pre-condition 
for any other form of social justice.507  
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Rawls makes a very similar point. He tells us that the natural duty of justice to support legitimate 
institutions is separate but on a par with other natural duties, such as the duty of mutual aid, i.e. ‘the 
duty of helping another when he is in need or jeopardy, provided that one can do so without excessive 
risk or loss to oneself’, the duty ‘not to harm or injure another’; and ‘the duty not to cause unnecessary 
suffering’.508 These are horizontal relations to other persons with whom we come into contact, without 
having any special relationship with them. These natural duties are moral duties that apply irrespective 
of one’s relationship to a given state. In that sense they are ‘natural’: ‘A further feature of natural duties 
is that they hold between persons irrespective of their institutional relationships; they obtain between all 
as equal moral persons. In this sense the natural duties are owed not only to definite individuals, say to 
those cooperating together in a particular social arrangement, but to persons generally’.509 These duties, 
Rawls tells us, are owed to every person.  
The cosmopolitan dimension is inherent in the argument for legitimacy. All social institutions, ours and 
the institutions of others, are human creations. This is why different nations and peoples are responsible 
for the basic structure of their own societies (and should feel a measure of shame for their failures). 
Success in setting up a legitimate constitutional structure is, conversely, something of value because it 
recognises and respects our creative and moral potential as agents. A legitimate state is, thus, not a set 
of ephemeral encounters, nor is it a series of agreements. Its value lies not in the goodness of the results 
it secures, but in that it is an attempt at securing equal respect for everyone through institutions of justice. 
As Rawls and Kant explain, this kind of excellence derives from justice, not goodness and it is a kind 
of performance, not a pursuit of any particular end.510 I can show respect to people as free and equal 
agents, even if they are living very far away from me.  
Everyone can understand the difficulties and challenges of creating and sustaining legitimate 
institutions. Michael Walzer, for example, has explained that the moral standing of states depends on 
the political communities that underpin them and on an idea of a ‘communal integrity’ which ‘derives 
its moral and political force from the rights of contemporary men and women to live as members of a 
historic community and to express their inherited culture through political forms worked out among 
themselves’.511 We do not need to accept this picture in its entirely. The moral standing of political 
communities has been explained by Kant somewhat more austerely with the metaphor of a tree with its 
own trunk and roots:  
‘for a state is not (like the land on which it resides) a belonging (patrimonium). It is a society of human 
beings that no one other than itself can command or dispose of. Like a trunk, it has its own roots; and to 
annex it to another state as a graft is to do away with its existence as a moral person and to make a moral 
person into a thing, and so to contradict the idea for the original contract, apart from which no right over 
a people can be thought’.512 
 Whenever constitutional justice has been achieved I shall call the resulting set of institutions a 
‘jurisdiction’. The personal duty of respect to any legitimate state that exists, however far away from us, 
I shall call the duty of jurisdiction. The duty of jurisdiction requires us to respect appointed officers in 
the host state and recognise in them the moral standing of all the co-legislating citizens and their success 
in setting up just or nearly just institutions. It is a natural duty that binds everyone, irrespective of their 
actions or the particular way in which they relate to a state. The moral basis of jurisdiction, however, 
has a reciprocal effect.  
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Jurisdiction entails the recognition of reciprocal duties owed by all sates to all persons, citizens or non-
citizens. Kant refers to this as the cosmopolitan right to ‘conditions of universal hospitality’. Any 
foreigner can claim before any state official that they be treated with respect and without violence or 
mistreatment:  
‘What he can claim is not the right to be a guest (for this a special beneficent pact would be required, 
making him a member of the household for a certain time), but the right to visit; this right, to present 
oneself for society, belongs to all human beings by virtue of the right of possession in common of the 
earth’s surface on which, as a sphere, they cannot disperse infinitely, but must finally put up with being 
near one another; but originally no one had more right than another to be on a place on the earth.513 
It is obvious that such a cosmopolitan duty cannot derive from a relation of citizenship. The duties are 
moral duties to all human beings. Our duties are to each other.  
Legitimacy and international law 
What does this mean for our examples? I conclude that in all cases, Karl violated his duty of jurisdiction. 
By usurping the functions of the political institutions of Sierra Leone he failed to show equal respect to 
the citizens he was trying to help. His failure was not one of outcome, but one of attitude. His very 
intentions failed to respect the citizens of Freetown as equals, as persons whose joint efforts create 
legitimate institutions with cosmopolitan moral standing. By using one’s money to impose a social ideal 
on them, whether they want it or not, one treats them as inferiors or as persons whose political rights 
can be bought or sold. What can be done about this? Does it follow that in the absence of a world state 
the only avenue for the legitimate pursuit of social justice is that of bilateral state relations? Is foreign 
policy the only option? I do not think so. International law and institutions may also enjoy legitimacy, 
even though it will be based on different grounds to the legitimacy of states. But to see how this is 
possible we need to have a new account of the legitimacy of multilateral international action and 
international organisations. This includes Security Council resolutions, European Union regulations and 
directives, International Court of Justice judgments, law-making mechanisms such as treaties, 
customary international law and even jus cogens create law. When are they legitimate? 
It is obvious that there cannot be a duty of jurisdiction to international entities, since by definition 
jurisdiction is exclusive to a state. So the account of the legitimacy of international institutions cannot 
be the same one as that offered by Kant and Rousseau for the emergence of states since there is no 
attempt here to set up a legitimate ‘civil condition’. International bodies do note exercise the same 
comprehensive political powers that states do, nor do they embody the creative moral work of equal 
citizens. So there is no duty of jurisdiction to them. This means that the legal institutions of international 
law and those of a constitutional law do not compete. They have different moral purposes. The key here 
is again to see this again as a problem of the required respect for persons. We saw that a legitimate state 
has special moral standing because and to the extent to which it sets up institutions guided by just and 
equal moral concern. But if a state is to recognise the equal moral standing of all persons, it must also 
at the same time recognise the moral standing of all those outside it. They too must at least receive 
recognition for their efforts to set up legitimate political institutions. This is not an external duty, 
imposed from outside, after such foreign political entities have been formed, so to speak. It follows that 
our state ought to endorse a principle of the mutual recognition of states and the recognition of 
international organisations that states bring about. This is what Rawls calls the requirement of 
‘democratic peace’, which applies to the mutual relations of peoples and which leads to the basic 
principles of international law.514 These establish, among others, the principles that peoples are to be 
free and independent, that treaties are to be respected and that human rights are to be protected. Rawls 
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says that ‘peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by 
other peoples’.515  
Kant, like Rawls, concludes that democratic peace among nations (or as he calls it ‘perpetual peace’) 
does not need a world state, but the ‘federalism of free states’ that come together voluntarily in creating 
a league of nations under international law.516 Having such principles of international law is, thus, 
required by the natural duty of justice because domestic institutions are incomplete without them.517 
Respecting institutions of public international law, international organisations and treaties is a domestic 
duty of justice, a duty we owe to each other.518 These are very general principles, whose details of course 
will have to be filled out, just like the details of a constitution need to be filled out by constitution-
making, legislation and adjudication.519 But they show how the justice of the domestic constitution and 
the framework of international law are elements of the same project of justice. We cannot achieve one 
without the other.520  
The continuity of international law with the natural duty of justice shows that the legal obligations of 
international law are not dissimilar to legal obligations in domestic law. They both derive from the same 
argument for legitimacy. But the argument also shows that international law is not a new legal system 
for the world as, for example, Kelsen assumed. It is the basis for the mutual respect of all the various 
different legal systems, properly understood as jurisdictions, and of ever closer and deeper coordination 
among states, from international trade to intellectual property and environmental protection. Understood 
as a legitimate basis for the self-government of all peoples at the same time, international law creates a 
duty of justice.  
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Pluralism and legitimacy  
I will now turn, very briefly, to theories of pluralism. Recent arguments have made the case for seeing 
the relations between national law, international law and transnational law in terms of a new theoretical 
framework of pluralism.521 These theories respond to the emergence of a significant body of 
transnational or international legal rules and scholarship. They tend to say very different things, 
however. One type of theory sees the problem that pluralism addresses as that of overlapping and 
therefore conflicting ‘legal systems’. The problem they address is effectively one of a turf war fought 
by the various legal systems that claim exclusive effect or authority over a territory. Such theories are 
implicitly or explicitly inspired by the legal positivist view of law according to which law is a hierarchy 
of norms or rules, the ground of which is some significant event or fact, for example a ‘rule of 
recognition’, as Hart argued in the Concept of Law.522 For law to exist, Hart argued, a special structure 
is necessary, which he called the ‘union’ of primary and secondary norms under a rule of recognition. 
The emergence of law depended, he thought, on the convergence in attitude and belief of officials and 
other relevant persons. The unity of the law depended on the clarity of the rule of recognition. If two 
rules of recognition existed at the same time they would create a constitutional crisis. A crisis 
occasionally happens but it is a ‘substandard, abnormal case containing with it the threat that the legal 
system will dissolve’.523 Hart’s view on international law was that it does not meet these factual tests 
because ‘there is no basic rule providing general criteria of validity for the rules of international law, 
and that the rules which are in fact operative constitute not a system but a set of rules, among which are 
the rules providing for the binding force of treaties’.524 A similar position is offered by Joseph Raz.525 
Raz takes the same view as Hart that states have legal systems, because a legal system requires a rule of 
recognition and consistent practices of officials, features that are evidently absent from international 
relations.526 In a discussion of the institutional nature of law Raz leaves it open that international law 
may not be a proper legal system.527  
Starting from these or similar premises, some pluralist theories identify a conflict between the 
overlapping systems or their ‘rules of recognition’.528 They conclude that transnational law has upset 
the unity or order or rules assumed by legal positivism and has created radical uncertainty about what 
law is and where its borders lie. Some theorists welcome such uncertainty as something positive. Nico 
                                                     
521 See for example Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth 
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Juris (2008) 1, Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) and Nicole Roughan, Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation and Transnational Legal Theory (Oxford: 
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522 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, second edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
523 Hart, The Concept of Law, 123. 
524 Hart, The Concept of Law 236. 
525 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 98-99. 
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527 Raz, The Authority of Law 105. See also Joseph Raz, ‘Human Rights Without Foundations’ in John Tasioulas and Samantha 
Besson (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 321, where Raz recognises 
that human rights are valid reasons for the limitation of state sovereignty but leaves it open whether the limitation is also 
legally valid, as well as morally so. 
528 This is well explained by Neil MacCormick who speaks of a risk of ‘constitutional conflict’ in MacCormick Questioning 
Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 102-121. 
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Krisch for example, relying explicitly on Hart’s theory, interprets recent developments towards the 
strengthening of international and transnational legal structures as a challenge to law’s unity or 
‘anchor’.529 He advocates an alternative ‘pluralist’ theory which explicitly ‘eschews the hope of building 
one common, overarching legal framework that would integrate postnational governance, distribute 
powers, and provide for means of solving disputes between the various layers of law and politics’.530 
He believes that the division of labour between the different domains should be set by each domain by 
itself, without a ‘common legal point of reference to appeal to for resolving disagreement’.531 It is very 
hard to place these arguments against any political theory of global justice. These arguments entail, for 
example, that a stronger state could lawfully force a constitutional position on another state or a stronger 
court on a weaker court, without any legal redress. All such things contradict establish ideas about 
international law. More generally, I cannot see how ‘fragmentation’ or, more appropriately, incoherence 
is to be welcomed and reconciled with legitimate institution. Without a coherent institutional structure 
to speak of, every argument about the merits of any institutions will be futile. Even the debate on global 
justice would become impossible, because no institutional structure would available to guide us.  
But perhaps the most obvious flaw in Krisch’s arguments is his narrowness of scope. He sees only two 
options for accounting for postnational or transnational law, one being the appropriation of 
constitutional architecture for the globe and the other the abandonment of any attempt at coherence. 
These are the two sets of theories that Krisch discusses in his book as respectively the ‘constitutional’ 
view and the ‘pluralist’ view.532 The mistake is forced, in my view, by the theoretical framework he 
adopts form Hart and Raz. If you believe in a rule of recognition, it either exists or it does not. But as I 
have argued in this chapter a more sophisticated account of law can account for international legal 
structures with a moral dimension. This is how we sought to explain the legitimacy of international and 
therefore global law.  
Some theories of pluralism have indeed departed from the Hartian paradigm and have been much more 
successful. Although not explicitly about pluralism, Ronald Dworkin’s view of international law, 
searched for the grounds of international law not in any kind of ‘rule of recognition’, but in arguments 
of political morality.533 It therefore offered a glimpse of a much righter idea of ‘democratic peace’. 
Other theories addressed pluralism directly. Nicole Roughan, for example, begins by rejecting the legal 
positivist analysis of Raz (and Tasioulas).534 She proposes the idea of ‘relative authority’ or relative 
claims to legitimacy, according to which ‘when there are multiple prima facie legitimate authorities in 
interacting or overlapping domains, and there is no outweighing reason to have just one singular 
authority, then those prima facie legitimate authorities can have only relative authority and must 
coordinate or cooperate or tolerate one another in order to be legitimate for their subjects’.535 The 
distinctness of this argument is that it seeks the unity of law and the legal order not in a ‘rule of 
recognition’ or the creation of a positive ‘authority’ by some kind of fact, but in considerations of 
substantive practical reasoning, including the questions of legitimacy and authority. On the basis of this 
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practical view of law she can explains how relative authority ‘is simply a claim to have legitimate 
authority through appropriate relationships with other authorities’.536 Her argument is not about legal 
systems, but about the substantive content of law as an attempt to meet the tests of justice and legitimacy 
while regulating social life.  
It must be evident now that a theory of legitimacy of international law depends partly on having a clear 
view of the practical nature of law and of the way in which states and international institutions create 
parallel structures of legitimacy. For the positivist point of view, by contrast, an overlap or a pluralism 
of ‘legal systems’ is always an anomaly because it undermines the hierarchy and exclusivity that all law 
requires. The problem arises because in their zeal to present law as a content-independent order of rules, 
legal positivists close their eyes to the specific moral aims of the international legal order. As I argued 
above, the tasks of the international legal order are entirely different to those of the domestic legal order. 
International institutions never seek to approximate those of a state. Because international law and state 
law have different aims they can come together as a mutually supportive system of reasons.  
We can therefore say that pluralism is correct in this sense. International law is a legal order, meaning 
it provides standards of conduct for international actors and individuals within a systematic intellectual 
framework. State law, however, is more than a legal order. It is also a jurisdiction, which creates a 
system of offices and institutions securing the comprehensive determination and enforcement of 
standards of conduct. Only jurisdictions claim sovereignty or ‘dominion’ in this way. International law 
does not. This also means that the relationship between international laws and domestic claw can be 
understood as one of ‘dualism’, not monism. How they are to fit in a singular case is just another 
interpretive problem for legal reasoning.537 It is to be resolved according to the internal principles of 
constitutional law, international law and transnational law. The answer is not to be found in an extra-
legal search for foundational but not legal events or patterns of power. The task of reconciling domestic 
and international law is just another doctrinal puzzle, whose answer is to be found through the ordinary 
toil of legal reasoning.  
Conclusion 
The debate on legal pluralism and the legitimacy of domestic and international law is the same debate. 
And it is also a debate that, as I argued above, is crucial for global justice. A theory of legitimate political 
institutions is prior to any theory of global distributive justice. This is because a fair distribution needs 
a legitimate agent of distribution in the form of a complete set of executive, legislative and adjudicative 
institutions. I defended such a theory of legitimacy on the basis of a Kantian natural duty of justice to 
set up an egalitarian civil condition, where the equal status of all persons is recognised and protected. In 
the argument that I defended, the priority of the equal moral standing of all persons as citizens, leads to 
a basic theory of constitutional justice for the domestic state, but also to the first principles of 
international law as the law bringing together different jurisdictions under terms of reciprocity and 
mutual respect. A just distribution of resources for the peoples of the world is not therefore a 
constitutional principle of international law. It ought to become, I believe, a chosen end of international 
law, through the adoption of appropriate agreements and measures within international law, starting 
perhaps from the ‘millennium goals’ for global development and the climate change agreements as 
appropriate starting points and continuing with even more ambitious multilateral treaties. We must not, 
even if we could, take an illegitimate shortcut to arrive at a desired result, even if this is about social 
justice. The legitimacy of law and institutions takes priority over any social ideal. 
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SECTION III. WHAT ROLE FOR GLOBAL ACTORS? 
Global Constitutionalism and the Challenge of China’s Exceptionalism 
 
Maria Adele Carrai 
 
Scholarship on Global Constitutionalism is often grounded in a normative monism and in a teleological 
vision of history that perceives the Chinese approach to the global legal order and its underlying 
normative assumptions as exceptional. In this paper, I argue that thinking Chinese experience simply in 
terms of exceptionalism or deviance limits our understanding of the assumptions that underpin some of 
the theories on the current international legal order as well as the Chinese conception of normativity. In 
the paper, I first look at the Chinese approach towards the elements that constitute the so-called 
Trinitarian mantra promoted by Global Constitutionalism (human rights, rule of law, democracy). Next, 
I examine the limits of adopting the notion of ‘exceptionality’ in characterizing Chinese international 
behaviour. In conclusion, I call for a more pluralistic approach. 
This paper was originally presented at the Workshop ‘Global Constitutionalism without Global 
Democracy,’ held at the European University Institute of Florence in January 2016. I am extremely 
grateful to Claudio Corradetti, Andreas Kulick, Prof. Matthias Kumm, Monika Leszczyńska and 
Thomas Streinz, for their valuable and insightful comments on the early draft of the paper. 
Introduction 
The process of globalization and the ‘crisis’ of international law brought about by the War on Terror 
has prompted many debates about the future of the international legal order and the necessity of its 
reconceptualization.538 Recent developments in international law, in particular the rising importance 
attributed to human right law, the consequent expansion of the legal personality of individuals and the 
judicialization of international law produced by the multiplication of international courts, have 
encouraged scholars to talk about a ‘constitutionalization’ of international law.539 This scholarly 
discourse has been labelled as ‘Global Constitutionalism,’ and its supporters argue that international law 
is developing in accordance with the principles of constitutionalism.540 According to it, international 
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540 What they share in common is the belief that the profound changes in the international legal order and its seemingly 
constitutionalization are having a deep impact on the way people started to imagine the legal and political world, and the 
institutions for the future global legal order. Matthias Kumm, ‘The Best of Times and the Worst ofTimes,’ in P. Dobner, 
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society and international law, are undergoing a process through which the traditional horizontal order 
based on states sovereignty is gradually being replaced by a more vertical one, in which the 
judicialization of international law allows individuals and other non-state actors to take a more direct 
role in the development of international law.541 In this vision, the sovereign state system should be 
gradually surmounted, leading to a paradigmatic shift in which the statist conception of 
constitutionalism will be replaced by a new more cosmopolitan and globalist one.542  
Global Constitutionalism, as it will be further discussed below, tends to be grounded on a normative 
monism and on a fundamentally progressive vision of history that often perceives experiences that do 
not conform to its constitutional norms and predictions as exceptional or deviant. This is certainly the 
case of China, which is considered an exception in the development of a global constitutional order. 
Human rights, democracy, and the RoL seem in fact to serve the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
rather than its people, and this is clearly in conflict with Global Constitutionalism dicta. What does 
Chinese exceptionalism tell us about the existence and the development of Global Constitutionalism? 
The objective of this paper is to highlights some of the assumptions beyond Global Constitutionalism, 
and contrast some of its claims with Chinese normative and political reality. The People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) is still the largest country in the world in terms of population, and it is the largest world 
economy. It is here taken as a case study to reflect upon the possible development of Global 
Constitutionalism and its legitimacy in the absence of a ‘global demos.’ In this paper after having 
identified as key characteristics of Global Constitutionalism its normative monism and its progressive 
narrative of history, I will proceed by looking at how China is considered exceptional with regard to the 
key elements of Global Constitutionalism, focusing on the notion of the so-called ‘Trinitarian mantra.’ 
I will then discuss the limits of treating it as an exception, pointing out some of the assumptions of 
Global Constitutionalism. In the last section of the article, in which I adopt, John Rawls’ theory of 
‘decent people,’ I will call for a more pluralistic model, in order to take into account other non-liberal 
and non-Western experiences that diverge from the normative universality advocated by Global 
Constitutionalism.  
Qualifying Global Constitutionalism and Chinese Exceptionalism 
There are various political and legal projects that strive to describe the current world order, in an attempt 
to predict its future development.543 Global Constitutionalism is one of these competing projects. 
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Although it is not the most prominent discourse, it is interesting to look at its claims, in that some of the 
challenges it encounters are equally faced by other theories. But what it is exactly Global 
Constitutionalism, or at least what do I mean here with Global Constitutionalism? As Christine 
Schwöbel pointed out, there is no common understanding of ‘Global Constitutionalism.'544 This is not 
surprising as the very term constitution is itself quite ambiguous and polysemous; constitutionalism as 
well can be interpreted in many different ways. Qualifying it as ‘global’ adds even more to the 
complexity of this term. The risk of referring to ‘Global Constitutionalism’ in fact, is to mischaracterize 
it, and start a straw man attack against something that does not exist. Its characterization, as described 
in the following paragraphs, is a simplification of the complex and articulated discourse of Global 
Constitutionalism. Nevertheless, I hope to have captured some of its key elements that determine 
Chinese exceptionalism. I will particularly focus on its normativism grounded on the Trinitarian Mantra 
and its progressive narrative of history. Here I am not considering the debate on the constitutionalization 
of international law, in which the main question is whether international law have constitutional 
elements and if for instance the UN could be considered as a world constitution, but rather to the political 
and normative project of Global Constitutionalism, which looks for specific common elements across 
jurisdictions in an attempt to define the criteria for the legitimate power of state at the international level. 
It might be useful to refer to the different stages of constitutionalism as described by Alexander Somek. 
In his Cosmopolitan Constitution, he argues that constitutionalism is a project that belongs to our modern 
time, and that is characterized by a particular understanding of law as constraining the exercise of public 
power. Somek claims that there were two key transformations in the history of constitutionalism, and 
these gave rise to three stages of constitutionalism. Without going into details, the last stage, called 
‘constitutionalism 3.0,’ or ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ expands the value order reached by 
‘constitutionalism 2.0’ after the second World War, beyond national boundaries.545 What is interesting, 
leaving aside the cosmopolitan justification and rationale, is that a set of normative values of Western 
constitutionalist tradition are now promoted globally, beyond the sovereign border. But what is the 
content of these normative values promoted by Global Constitutionalism? I think that to answer this 
question one should go back in time, and look at the peculiar history of constitutionalism, as it emerged 
in the West.  
Constitutionalism is about limiting the exercise of public power through designated structures, 
institutions, processes and values of a constitution, a formal contract drafted in the name of the people.546 
The origins of this idea can be found in the transformation of the relationship between government and 
the people that took place after the American Revolution (1776) and French Revolution (1789), as 
articulated in the Declaration of Independence of the United States and in the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizens.547 As expressed in these founding texts, there was a belief that the 
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government had to serve the people, and that its legitimacy had to be based on their consent. As Martin 
Loughlin suggested, the idea of constitution is grounded on the promotion ‘of a particular theory of 
government: based on contract, enumeration of powers, and protection of the individuals’ basic rights, 
they were founded on a theory of limited government.’548 Despite the fact that constitutions evolved, the 
principles enucleated above, remained the pillars on which the greatest number of theories of 
constitutionalism, including Global Constitutionalism, developed. Current constitutionalist principles 
continue to be grounded on the independence of the judiciary, the separation of powers, the respect of 
individual rights, and the role of the judiciary as guardian and interpreter of constitutional norms.549  
The idea that there is a process of constitutionalization is what gives constitutionalism its legs, and that 
makes it assume a progressive narrative of history. Such process is ‘a political theory that was developed 
as part of a liberal philosophy to guide the formation of modern constitutions,’ and that establishes ‘the 
authoritative standards of legitimacy for the exercise of public power wherever it is located.’550 Global 
Constitutionalism is about a constitutionalisation of international law beyond the borders of states. Not 
only it sees this process happening in the current international legal order, and in this sense Global 
Constitutionalism is descriptive, but it also expand it beyond its borders and beyond the present, into the 
future, and in this sense it is normative. In both cases (descriptive and normative), this implies a 
separation of the process of constitutionalisation from the governing traditions of specific ‘we the 
people’ and an elevation of constitutionalism to an autonomous set of norms that have a broader 
validity.551 In particular, as Matthias Kumm pointed out, there are three types of constitutional norms: 
‘basic institutions and their respective powers; procedures that allow for the appropriate forms of 
participation and deliberation; and norms – which generally take the form of rights – for assessing 
whether outcomes are justifiable to those burdened by them as free and equal.’552 These constitutional 
norms roughly correspond to the so called Trinitarian Mantra, namely human rights, democracy and the 
RoL, and any state authority in order to be legitimate should respect them.553  
This liberal ‘legimatory trinity’ is, some global constitutionalists have argued, a contingent phenomenon 
and the meaning of its elements and their relationship is contested and it changed through time.554 In 
this sense it is pluralistic and open to different interpretations and perspectives.555 However, the 
scholarship of Global Constitutionalism I considered in this paper, seems to be grounded more on a 
normative monism that tends to promote a unitary global legal order.556 Progress, although it might be 
never reached in reality, is possible if certain specific ethical principles are shared by all human beings 
and if these are enforced by strong supranational powers that transcend the ‘polytheism’ of the ethical 
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beliefs of other normative traditions.557 The Trinitarian mantra in fact would become the criterion to 
judge more broadly the legitimacy of states. It seems thus to be committed fundamentally to a single 
moral and normative orientation as defined by the Trinitarian mantra, which is itself very much related 
to particular countries histories and their specificities. 
Another aspect that I would like to address before qualifying Chinese exceptionalism is the teleological 
and progressive narratives embraced by constitutionalism. Some scholars, in particular legal historians 
that have a long-term perspective on the development of international law, like Martti Koskenniemi, 
supported the idea that scholarship such as Global Constitutionalism is grounded on a progressive vision 
of history. Chinese exceptionalism would fit perfectly with Koskenniemi’s thesis: it is precisely the 
belief that international law is somehow progressing toward its constitutionalisation, that makes perceive 
China as exceptional or deviant from the ideal constitutional order. This vision has been associated to 
the Whig interpretation of history, and for Koskenniemi such optimism dates to Kant’s philosophy as it 
was formulated in his 1784’s essay The Idea for Universal history with a Cosmopolitan Purpose.558 
Koskenniemi was not alone in criticizing the Global Constitutionalism project as a new form of 
imperialism that used this progressive narrative. To answer these criticisms and to clarify the 
relationship between Global Constitutionalism and the progressive narrative of history, an editorial in 
the journal Global Constitutionalism was dedicated to this theme. For the authors of the editorial, the 
progressive narrative of history can be summarized as ‘the slow and steady progress of law against 
power, reason against ideology, international against national, order against chaos in international 
affairs.’559 In the editorial the authors opposed the idea that Global Constitutionalism embraces a Whig 
conception of history, according to which Global Constitutionalism is a history of ‘triumph of 
constitutionalism, rights and the rule of law over a series of foes, including monarchy, despotism, 
corruption, ignorance and religious dogma.’560 Whenever ‘progress tropes’ are invoked in Global 
Constitutionalism, the authors argue, they are far from embracing a linear, unidirectional and 
progressive vision of history that exhaust all the different constitutional experiences and visions. Global 
Constitutionalism then would be contingent and it could be open to decline, progress and regress.561  
However, in the light of what has been discussed above, and the normative nature of global 
constitutionalist project, here it is argued that there is at least in part a progressive narrative. This is not 
wrong per se, as long as there is an awareness of it and ideally its final goal becomes gradually more 
inclusive of other experiences. Progress is in fact an axiological and normative concept, and it is different 
from a simply descriptive concept such as ‘development’ or ‘transformation.’ For example, there is a 
difference if I say that A changed into B, or if I say A progressed into B, in that in the second case B is 
an improvement from A.562 Global Constitutionalism for its very nature is a political project and has an 
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axiological and normative value as reflected in the idea of the Trinitarian mantra.563 Various authors 
have already criticized, from different angles, the excessive idealization of Global Constitutionalism. 
They pointed out that some global constitutionalists, seeing that the world was not changing as they had 
hoped, started instead to re-describe social realities in the way they wished and hoped for, pretending 
that the work of their imagination corresponded to the reality of things.564  
Global Constitutionalism not only is not value neutral; it is also goal oriented. Progress is itself a ‘goal-
oriented concept,’ and in the specific case of Global Constitutionalism its tacit ideal is the 
constitutionalisation of international law. Contrary to what the authors argued in the same editorial, the 
goal of progress does not have to be accessed: it can be accessible, but it can also be utopian or simply 
unreachable. Even if it is unreachable, it can still function as a regulative principle that guide people or 
in this case states and their behaviours so that they can progress toward their development according to 
their goal. This, for instance, would be the case of sanctity, which is an unreachable goal, but it 
nevertheless serves as a guiding principle for action.565 The progress in this sense is not deterministic, 
in that the ideal, whatever it is, not necessarily becomes actual, and thus it does not clash with the 
freedom of people are left free to follow it or not. As Global Constitutionalism is not only descriptive, 
its underlying goal seems to be the promotion of constitutional values beyond national borders.566 One 
of the issues in the arguments of the authors is to confuse the different layers of to be and ought to be, 
which characterizes the very notion of ‘law,’ in that it has always an aspirational normative element to 
which the to be should conform to; law by nature is teleological.567 
One of the consequences of Global Constitutionalism embracing liberal normative monism and a 
progressive idea of history, is that the terms, values and conditions that are supposed to define the global 
legal order are largely decided by only one side. Today, in the face of the emergence of China as a great 
economic power, the international relevance of the global constitutionalist debates depends in fact on 
the economic and cultural hegemony of the liberal West. Recent international events, such as the Wars 
on Terror in the Middle East, and the inability of the international community to find common responses 
to international issues, like Syria, seem however to contradict the optimism of the supporters of legal 
globalism, for whom the emergence of a constitutionalized global legal order would already be in the 
making as discussed above.568 There is considerable political divergence and a growing multi-polarity 
that reflects the existence of different value systems. Interestingly, given the goal of Global 
Constitutionalism to promote democratic institutions, it is itself not democratic in terms of 
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representation.569 There are in fact countries like China that seem to be important exceptions to this 
global trend.570 If the very word ‘constitution’ evokes the idea of legitimacy (if it is not legitimate is not 
constitutional), then such a political project, by excluding or dismissing as ‘exceptional’ some crucial 
international actors, risks to become itself illegitimate.  
Against this backdrop, China runs counter to the normative unity endorsed by the cosmopolitan and 
globalist agenda: it has an authoritarian government that rejects democratic principles; it promotes a 
different understanding of human rights on the grounds of Asian values, and it supports an idea of the 
RoL with Chinese characteristics that appears more like a rule by law. Moreover, despite the general 
belief in the erosion of state sovereignty promoted by Global Constitutionalism, China is considered the 
last bastion of Westphalian sovereignty, and tends to oppose certain forms of global governance, seen 
by many Chinese intellectuals as a new form of Western imperialism aimed at continuing the century of 
humiliations that characterized its modern history.571 The PRC, in other words, imposes the global 
constitutionalist project to face the international social reality.  
Not surprisingly, China’s approach to and practice of international law has often been perceived as 
‘exceptional’ or deviant because it does not comply with the set of rules or with the morality that should 
allegedly inform the emerging global legal order. Here the term exceptional is not chosen at random, it 
echoes the history of international law, and the categorization and the treatment of non-Western nations 
as ‘exceptional,’ which would consequently justify their exclusion and different derogatory treatment.572 
‘Exceptional’ etymologically derives from the Latin excipere, which means the act of excluding or the 
effect of the act of excluding, it is a limitation or a restriction.573 The use of the term ‘exception’ is here 
instrumental for my argument. Despite China is perceived as exceptional, and it is excluded from the 
making of the rules and norms that should define global constitutionalism, paradoxically there is a tacit 
presumption that these rules and normative elements must apply to it. Moreover, China has also been 
described as a deviation, and not necessarily as exceptional. But here, I refer more generally to China as 
an exception, in that its experience constitutes a more profound challenge to Global Constitutionalism 
than simply a deviation, which can be at a certain point re-incorporated within Global Constitutionalism 
paradigm. The effects of the strategy of exceptionality applied to international law can be seen 
throughout its history, both in the attempts of Western powers to exclude other parties from the system, 
or as a way to exclude and to exempt themselves from its laws, like the case of American exceptionalism. 
Even China today is using the strategy of ‘exceptionalism’ to exclude itself from some of the new trends 
of international law, by promoting Chinese characteristics or Chinese models, which, as it will be further 
discussed in later section, are readily explainable with other paradigms. 
If exceptionalism is a conceptual construct of Global Constitutionalism for excluding those who do not 
conform to its dicta, isn’t this hampering its legitimacy, by limiting the democratic representation of the 
global demos? China and its perceived exceptionalism not only contradict the ideal democratic world 
described by Global Constitutionalism, but it also poses a problem to the legitimacy of the legal order 
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envisioned by it. The structural economic reforms of the PRC of the past three decades have allowed it 
to re-establish itself as the second largest economy in the world and as a credible and legitimate actor in 
global governance. China is a crucial international player today, and its ascendency can contribute to 
shaping and setting the trend for the future development of the global order. As such, it is argued, 
thinking China simply in terms of exceptionalism or divergence reduces in the context of Global 
Constitutionalism, both the possibility of a better understanding of the current international legal order 
and the possibility of finding a proper basis for envisioning new more legitimate ones. It also does not 
allow to ‘normalize’ Chinese characteristics within a more inclusive normative and descriptive 
framework of reference.  
Chinese ‘exceptionalism’ looked at from the perspective of the Trinitarian mantra  
Global Constitutionalism is characterized by a shift in focus from the state to individuals, in that 
sovereign states are no longer unaccountable, and in order to be legitimate they have to respond to the 
individuals demands for human rights protection, RoL and democracy.574 It is also characterized by a 
universalizing tendency, realized through a constitutionalist vocabulary that promotes a moral consensus 
over the global order. This becomes a sort of normative model for dealing with, if not erasing, political 
conflicts. The Trinitarian mantra is part of this universalized vocabulary, and its promotion promises to 
minimize arbitrary rule, enhance the efficiency of institutions, transparency, and accountability while 
increasing the participation of people in global governance and global lawmaking.  
The vision of the US international law scholar Louis Henkin, who argued in 1990 that the notion of 
rights was achieving a greater acceptance than others, becoming universal and challenging the principle 
of non-intervention, seems recently to have become a reality.575 The Japanese internationalist Yasuaki 
Onuma also observed that, at the end of the Cold War, the principle of non-intervention increasingly 
deteriorated because of the growing power of the idea of human rights and the desire to protect the 
environment on a global level.576 As a matter of fact, a key feature of the past two decades has been the 
promotion of a rule of international law in which human rights became the paramount ideal of a new 
modality of civilization that defined sovereignty.577 The new emerging normative discourse of human 
rights favoured by the liberal internationalism of the American School prompted a great scrutiny of the 
practices and violations of human rights by China, entering the agenda of the UN Human Rights 
Commission.578 The crackdown on the pacific protests in Tiananmen in 1989 was certainly shocking 
and despicable, but it would probably not have raised the same international concern if it had happened 
a few decades before, when the debate on human rights was not yet that globalized. For the historian 
Samuel Moyn this new millennial appeal to human rights, which coincided with the end of the Cold 
War, has to do with the felt arrival of a post-American era, in which liberalism and the US hegemony 
might no longer coincide because of the emergence in the international arena of new important actors, 
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above all China.579 Without going much into the merits of the Moyn’s work, his historical approach to 
rights enables us to see how, from the Cold War, there was a rise in the use of the term that coincided 
with their augmented normative relevance. In China, such a debate on human rights took off from the 
1990s, probably also as a reaction to the international criticisms following Tiananmen, and it was very 
much related to the issue of sovereignty, because of the new interventionist theories that were based on 
human rights protection.580  
China signed both Covenants of human rights, but it has not yet ratified the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and its human rights record and its repressive regime still seem quite 
unpromising according to many NGOs. 581 It promotes a different vision of human rights, in which, 
according to the general CCP’s rhetoric, the primacy is not of the individual understood as a separate 
monad, but of society, and its ultimate expression in the state, which in China corresponds to the CCP. 
Many Chinese authors have been critical of the human rights regime promoted by Western powers, and 
they see it as an instrument of the US new-imperialistic expansion and as a way to interfere and exert 
undue influence in domestic affairs.582 As some studies have demonstrated there was an increasing 
number of cases when states recurred to economic sanctions to condemn human rights violations in the 
1980s and 1990s. This was driven by the belief that fundamental human rights violations were not 
simply a concern of the single state, but had already acquired the status of Jus Cogens, providing a legal 
basis for international intervention in the offending states.583 
One of the main Chinese theoretical challenges to the universality of human rights and humanitarian 
intervention was the relativization of human rights through the notion of Asian values, together with the 
claim that the difference in economic development could justify the preference for a particular set of 
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rights, privileging economic and social rights over political and civil rights.584 This would be justified 
by the appeal to the developing status of China. Recently, the Chinese judge on the International Court 
of Justice Xue Hanqin remarked how ‘the promotion of human rights and democracy has to be founded 
on a balanced economic and social development of each state.’585 For other scholars economic 
development, and the differences in the political and cultural background, make it inevitable that each 
country has its own understanding of human rights.586 This is the reason that justifies the superiority of 
the principle of sovereignty over human rights and why, whenever Chinese leaders claim Chinese 
international sovereignty, there is not much regard for popular sovereignty, or the rights of their own 
people. Chinese scholars have often supported the idea that China’s sovereignty is above human rights, 
and that these can be protected only through a strong sovereign state. Moreover, faced with the various 
critiques of the human rights situation in China, and to further justify its practices, the Chinese 
government has started to issue White Papers on human rights to contrast the poor international 
perception of China and human rights by, for instance, emphasizing the US violation of human rights.587  
The Chinese legal system is articulated within a socialist legal framework with Chinese 
characteristics.588 Its logic and development are guided by values and principles interpreted by the Party. 
Recently the notion of the RoL started to be promoted strongly, becoming a theme of the Plenary session 
of the Party Central Committee of 2014, and one of the prerogatives of the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-
2020).589 The Reforms toward an enhanced RoL and constitutionalism aim to make public 
administration more impermeable to corruption. However, through these reforms, which seemed to 
leave some hope open for China’s transformation in a more liberal sense, CCP’s authority is asserted.590 
The CCP’s activity is controlled by legislation that is itself produced by the Party. Among the values 
promoted are popular sovereignty, peoples’ rights and social welfare; again under CCP leadership. The 
judicial system of China also lacks independence, and its courts seem to be only one among the many 
different possible ways for solving disputes. This is certainly far from the Western constitutional model, 
according to which there should be an independent judiciary, whose role is to supervise over the 
administrative and political organs.591 The current legal reforms promote the unity of the legal and moral 
norm, and the coherence of the legal system with the specific Chinese reality, thus promoting the 
‘fundamental values of socialism’ that reflect the specific historical reality of China. In a nutshell, it 
seems that the biggest incentive to promote the RoL in China is the preservation of the stability of the 
One-party state. Thus many scholars have defined the use of the RoL in China as a rule by law, as law 
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is understood more as a tool to rule by the CCP.592 At the international level, the rule of international 
law envisioned by China is grounded on the primacy of the sovereignty of the state.593 
With regard to the third element of the Trinitarian Mantra, China is an autocracy, there is only one party, 
opposition parties are outlawed, and in the village elections the candidates are selected and approved by 
the CCP.594 For many Chinese leaders, Western style democracy is incompatible with Chinese political 
culture, and a government is legitimate not necessarily when people influence directly its formation and 
its decision making, but when it represents the higher interests of the people. In this sense the recent 
work by the sinologist and political theorist Daniel Bell, The China Model, Political Meritocracy and 
the Limits of Democracy, is interesting. In it the author adopts a ‘contextual political theory’, according 
to which political theorists should made the leading political ideas of a particular society coherent and 
rationally defensible; he identifies in China the model that he calls ‘vertical democratic meritocracy.’595 
This is the model that, despite the huge gap with China’s reality, has informed its political and legal 
system for the past 30 years. This model is proposed for China as an alternative to Western liberal 
democracies: while democracy is appropriate at lower, local, levels of society, at higher levels 
meritocracy is required, particularly in countries as large as China, in which direct representation would 
be so much diluted as to become meaningless. This is certainly a simplification of both the Chinese and 
Western systems, as there are elements of meritocracy in Western democracies, but for the sake of a 
systemic and theoretical analysis and with the due considerations, such divide is helpful for 
differentiating at a more abstract level the Chinese and the Western models. 
The Chinese approach to human rights, democracy, and the RoL ultimately reflects a particular attitude 
toward sovereignty. In recent years China has been accused of being the stronghold of sovereignty and 
sovereign statism, where sovereignty has become more of a static concept rather than an idea in flux: 
for various Western authors the Chinese idea of sovereignty is absolute and non-compromising, because, 
as Allen Carlson summarizes it, ‘Chinese policies preserved a static interpretation of territorial 
sovereignty, [and] promoted an unyielding and increasingly combative stance on jurisdictional 
sovereignty.’596 This of course should be contextualized, as in some areas, like economic sovereignty, 
China seems less assertive.597 In any case, strict adherence to the notion of sovereignty – as it can be 
seen in China’s attitude toward human rights, and in its opposition to the principle of the reasonability 
to protect and humanitarian intervention –, ultimately reflects a more Westphalian approach to the 
international legal order, which has to do with Chinese modern history, the Opium Wars and China’s 
forced introduction into the Western family of nations. Sovereignty became one of the guiding principles 
of Chinese foreign policy; it has been the cardinal principles of the five principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence enshrined in the Constitution, considered by many Chinese scholars to be the greatest 
Chinese contribution to the development of international law.598 
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From the descriptions above, Chinese experience does not seem to be even close to the constitutional 
paradigm of democratic statism criticized by Kumm.599 This position, called also ‘nostalgic position,’ is 
characterized by three propositions: ‘constitutional law, paradigmatically codified in the form of a 
written constitution, establishes the supreme law of a sovereign state; the authority of the Constitution 
is based on the idea that it can be fairly attributed to ‘We the People’ as the constituent power; and this 
constituent power is tied to the existence of a genuine political community that is the prerequisite for 
meaningful democratic politics.’600 China is an authoritarian government, and at best it can follow a 
constitutional paradigm of ‘authoritarian statism.’ Moreover, there is nothing ‘constitutional’ in China 
to be nostalgic about, as the introduction of the first written constitution and constitutionalist thought is 
something related to its most recent modern history, in particular the history that followed the First Sino-
Japanese War (1894-1895).601 Despite the fact that there is a number of scholars that debate about 
constitutionalism in China and some of them even associated the China dream to the realization of 
constitutionalism, the CCP is quite sensitive to the word, and in the most official sources 
constitutionalism is dismissed as a Western imperial concept that can play the role of a Troy Horse if 
brought into China.602  
The limits of ‘exceptionalism’ 
In the eyes of global constitutionalists, China, from what has been described above, is considered 
‘exceptional’ or deviant; because of this, it has been harshly criticised by the international community. 
For instance it has been defined as the least-likely case of compliance.603 According to Ann Kent the 
reason for such behaviour is rooted in Chinese history, cultural tradition and power: ‘It has historically 
considered itself to be the ‘Middle Kingdom,’ unconstrained by international society; it lacks a tradition 
of the RoL; and it is powerful enough to ignore its international obligations. Therefore it is less likely to 
comply with the norms, principles, and rules of international organizations and their associated 
treaties.’604 China is often perceived as a country that cheats with the rules of international civilized 
society; the way Chinese tradition is described and characterized transforms China into a country inept 
at international law, which, because of its very nature, is almost incapable of complying and respecting 
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international standards.605 There are also various IR authors that have discussed Chinese exceptionalism 
and Chinese divergence from the current world order.606 
However, if we look at the international society, the practice and the understanding of public 
international law, China is not that exceptional; ultimately, and quite unoriginally, any great power is 
exceptional in the way it understands, uses or promotes international law for the sake of affirming its 
own interests and values. There is a vast literature that discusses, for instance, American 
exceptionalism.607 After the Second World War, the United States, which had the largest percentage of 
the world GPD at the time, was the major contributor to the formation of the new institutions and rules 
of international law.608 At the same time, it has also greatly disobeyed these rules: its refusal to ratify 
most of the human rights treaties while committing itself serious human rights violations, its adoption 
of protective measures in the international economy, and its occasional disregard for the rules of 
international law when waging war on other states, has meant the US becoming perceived as 
exceptional.609 Europe as well has often been considered exceptional; its exceptionality rests in its 
pacifist social welfare model which strongly promotes human rights.610 If we look at the behaviour of 
any major power, its interpretation and application of the rules of international law is always somehow 
exceptional. In a way exceptionalism is the rule in the international arena. Apart from a set of 
international legal rules and values that have been agreed upon by states, the remaining areas are open 
to the ‘exceptionalism’ of the interpretations of the contending actors of international society.611 This 
can also be partly related to what Stephen D. Krasner defined as ‘organized hypocrisy,’ in which 
institutional norms endure but they are frequently ignored.612 It is, in other words, a straw-man attack 
on Chinese deviation or exceptionalism in the practice of public international law. But what is interesting 
here is to see how China is exceptionally challenging not in its not respecting in practice public 
international law, but in its challenging the very normative core of Global Constitutional political 
project. As Anu Bradford and Eric Posner suggested, instead of looking at whether a particular vision 
or position is exceptional, it would be much more interesting to see whether that vision of international 
law is appealing in terms of a country’s foreign policy and morality.613  
The idea that China is exceptional or deviating in reality betrays a particular set of assumptions: states 
should comply with the rules of a particular juridical system and a legal and political culture, predicated 
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on global terms, beyond the state. Constitutional principles, however, are grounded in the European 
Enlightenment, its intellectual history and in the French and American Revolution that promoted the 
formation of the liberal democratic state. There is a tendency to apply a positive content to the rules that 
should be globally valid, as reflected in the formulation of a content specific/positive Trinitarian mantra. 
This was expressed, as Larry Catá Backer pointed out, in the shift in the way constitutions were 
understood in the twentieth century. The new form of constitutionalism that emerged from this shift is 
grounded on the belief that not all constitutions are legitimate and thus not every political form is 
acceptable. This new current of thought is rooted in the belief that legitimate constitutions share a set of 
positive universal common characteristics. Specifically, legitimate constitutions obey the higher laws of 
the community of nations that should reflect a global consensus. From a procedural point of view such 
law should be against the arbitrary use of state power, and from a substantive point of view it should 
limit the type of political decisions that states could make when forming their government and exercising 
their governance power.614 This constitutionalist language and the tacit positive universals contained in 
it, are increasingly becoming a common language among some Western international law scholars when 
describing the international legal order. 
To ground the values that should define the current and future global legal order on positive universals, 
could lead to a possible hegemonic instrumentalization of such values and also to a potential 
marginalization of particular realities and experiences that do not fully conform to such universals. This 
fear echoes the critiques of globalization of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, for whom 
globalization is the most complete form of imperialism, which consists in the attempt of a particular 
society to universalize its own particularity. He sees globalization as an ideology; besides its descriptive 
value it has a prescriptive one that aims to legitimize the liberal cosmopolitan project.615 A strategy of 
exclusion that goes hand in hand with it, is that which labels other countries experiences as exceptional. 
These kind of critiques, including mine, namely accusing liberal legal globalism for being a false 
universalism, are well known and probably trite as Howse and Teitel suggested.616 The issue in the end 
is how to reach a critical normativity capable of coordinating in a globalized world the experiences of 
countries with very different histories and traditions. But a first step is also to detect the aporia contained 
in the current doctrines, so that one can redirect general efforts toward better results.  
I do not intend here either to be dismissive of the important role that invoking some constitutional 
principles in name of humanity and universal values had, or to be apologetic about China and its 
authoritarian government.617 I simply want to argue that if we think of China in terms of exceptionalism 
we are incapable of understanding the current international legal order. Moreover, the adhesion of China 
is crucial for the overall legitimacy of the Global Constitutionalist project, and its behaviour cannot 
simply be marginalized. I also criticize China’s promotion of its own exceptionalism. In fact, as 
mentioned above, the strategy of exclusion of exceptionalism, functions in two opposite ways: it has 
been used by great powers to exclude other actors from international law, but also to justify their lack 
of compliance with the general rules. Chinese scholars and leading political figures oppose the way 
China is portrayed as ‘exceptional,’ while promoting ‘Chinese characteristics.’ Not only they want to 
avoid international sanctions for their lack of compliance with certain international rules but they also 
want to emphasize Chinese cultural and historical diversity. While implicitly accepting the universality 
of some values, they assert the difference of the Chinese approach to those values. This approach helped 
Chinese scholars to emphasize the historical and cultural difference of China, to avoid being swallowed 
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up by the value-homogenizing force of global constitutionalism. However, recently some scholarship 
has tried to deconstruct Chinese model and Chinese exceptionalism, arguing that in many respects, in 
the fields such as tax, property and corporate law, Chinese behaviour ‘is not esoterically peculiar but 
readily explainable.’618 
There are a series of issues related to the global projection of the liberal Trinitarian mantra. One of them 
is the use of the domestic analogy. Most of Global Constitutionalism supporters have developed their 
theories on the grounds of an analogy with their domestic systems, and very often with the constitutions 
of their own countries.619 For instance Kumm, recalling the domestic system, argues that also at the 
international level there should be a structured constitutional procedure that authoritatively and 
impartially determines what is just, in order to address the disagreement over questions about justice. 
To this end, the various actors of international society, including states, should establish a constitutional 
authority and subject themselves to it.620 But such analogy cannot be used to transpose things that happen 
at the domestic level to the international level. This was a warning given also by one of the fathers of 
the idea of sovereignty, Hobbes: if there are common elements in the domestic and international system, 
while at the national level the state of nature among men is limited by the Leviathan, at the international 
level the sovereign states have not yet delegated their power to a world Leviathan and there are different 
elements that come into play, related to the profound differences that exist between the individuals and 
the state.621 If one brings to the extremes the domestic analogy, then this would lead the formation of a 
world sovereign, which is something that Global Constitutionalism generally do not support. Despite 
the fact that constitutionalism tends to support centralization, global constitutionalists do not endorse 
the formation of a world state, believing that state sovereignty will continue to play an important role. 
Some rather share an optimistic vision about the possible emergence of a system of global governance 
in which it will become more difficult to wage wars or to commit genocide without being punished by 
an international police force or prosecuted by an international court of justice.622 Moreover, one should 
notice a paradox related to the use of the domestic analogy in this context: while democracy domestically 
plays a major role in judging other states and potentially intervening in their domestic affairs, the 
democratization of global governance and the international lawmaking process play a less prominent 
role in the minds of global constitutionalists. As some of them have noticed, this is because democracy 
corresponds to electoral accountability, which would obviously be impractical at the global level. The 
general incapacity to consider a political opposition that radically differs from the liberal democratic 
model, as Christian Volk noticed, can be attributed to a liberal bias, in which contestation is not 
necessarily seen as an autonomous quality of political-democratic settings, and as such should be 
limited.623  
Another issue is the projection of positive universals into international law and into the formulations of 
the global legal order. As the Japanese internationalist Yasuaki Onuma has discussed, ‘international law 
scholars of major powers and hegemons unconsciously and unknowingly inject the thinking and theories 
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of their own countries’ domestic laws into the discipline of international law.’624 This limits the possible 
meanings of the terms that should constitute the Trinitarian mantra. Despite the aspirations of global 
constitutionalists to be more pluralistic – recognizing accordingly other histories and traditions –, the 
meaning attributed to each single element of the Trinitarian Mantra leave little space to other 
interpretations.625 It is as though there is only one definition that corresponds to one experience of 
constitutionalism, or democracy, or human rights. This, however, means we lose sight of the complexity 
of the different experiences in the international social reality. There are many meanings and many types 
of constitutionalism that work differently according to the particular cultural and historical context of a 
specific country. There are different types of political systems, and liberal democracy is not necessarily 
the best system for all the various political realities. In this sense it is interesting the empirical study of 
David Law and Mila Versteeg that shows how besides an increased global constitutionalization 
determined by a general trend of ‘right creep,’ there is a polarization of the constitutional ideologies: on 
the one hand there is a conglomerate of state that support the more liberal paradigm of constitutionalism; 
on the other hand, there is another group of states, including China, that is opting for the more statist 
conception of constitutionalism. As the authors argued, for now there is very little evidence that these 
two paradigm are converging any time soon.626 It seems thus that actors like China are characterized as 
exceptional at least in part because we are incapable of understanding the diversity of context and the 
diversity of meaning that one concept can acquire in such a different context. We seem ultimately 
incapable of seeing and understanding the specificity of other historical, cultural and social realities, 
which I believe should be legitimately taken into account.  
Toward a more pluralistic model 
New ‘global’ issues have arisen out of the globalization process, and these need to be solved at a more 
global level. This, however, does not imply a homogenization what we value. If we do not find the 
answers in the more traditional Westphalian perspective, Global Constitutionalism might seem at least 
partly an option, as long as it takes a more pluralistic outlook, otherwise the risk is to become another 
form of Western hegemony, in which its deemed universality becomes, as Danilo Zolo argued, a Holy 
Alliance of the 21st century.627 Given the implicit assumptions that underpin the globalist agenda, what 
is called for is a more pluralistic model of Global Constitutionalism, if not a more pluralistic 
‘international’ legal order, which looks at the leading political ideals within a particular society rather 
than applying a set of values and norms defined univocally as positive universals. China indeed poses a 
challenge, and possibly an exceptional one, to Global Constitutionalism. The question then is, can 
Chinese authoritarian statism be ‘normalized’ within a broader understanding of Global 
Constitutionalism, or it is doomed to be an ‘exception’? There are certainly moral and normative limits 
implied in any order, but where and how to place them? In this sense it is interesting to look at how one 
of the leading liberal thinkers, John Rawls, has attempted to reconcile his liberal theory and its high 
requirements in terms of human rights, freedoms and political standards, with different non-liberal 
experiences.  
John Rawls is famous in particular for his theory of a just liberal society, known as justice as fairness.628 
Without going into the merits of his theory and political thinking, here it is interesting to look at how he 
applied his theory of the decent peoples to international society, in an attempt to reconcile liberal 
standards with an international reality made up also of non-liberal states. His liberal theory of foreign 
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relations and the international legal order is grounded on his ‘domestic’ theory of political liberalism, as 
described in his Political Liberalism.629 The liberal peoples or liberal society he describes are 
characterized by their being pluralistic but stable, and by their pursuance of a desirable deliberative 
democracy in which the government is chosen by the people, is under popular control, and is ruled under 
a legitimate constitution.630 In such a liberal society the people who support non-liberal political 
doctrines are tolerated, as long as these doctrines respect a reasonable political conception of justice and 
what he calls, its ‘public reason.’631 They are defined as ‘decent,’ and they are not only tolerated but, 
together with the liberals, belong to the ‘well-ordered peoples,’ who are the sole peoples capable of 
adopting and promoting the law of the people, which corresponds to Rawls’ ideal for a liberal, pluralistic 
and stable domestic regime.632 
Such a regime is extended to the international level, and the toleration of non-liberal ‘decent’ peoples at 
the domestic level is valid also in international society.633 For Rawls the actors of international society 
are neither single individuals, nor states, but societies or peoples. The peoples are ruled by one common 
government and they share a common conception of justice and right. Not all states qualify as ‘peoples,’ 
and states usually differ from people in that the former seek to enlarge their territory, trying to convert 
other people to their beliefs or to gain more economic strength. Reasonable people value freedom, 
equality, and respect other people with different political and social ideals. Despite being non-liberal, 
decent people, in order to be such, should be non-aggressive and should respect other people’s rights. 
Moreover, they should respect the human rights of their people and impose bona fide moral duties and 
obligations on all persons within the people’s territory; there should be a sincere and not unreasonable 
belief on the part of the judges and other officials who administer the legal system that the law is indeed 
guided by a common good idea of justice.634  
Once peoples are ordered enough to qualify as decent, they are also treated as equal in international 
society. It seems thus that Rawls’s theory is open to a certain degree of diversity both at the domestic 
and the international level. This is the reason why he promotes an ‘international’ rather than a 
‘cosmopolitan’ international legal order, in which, as long as the peoples are ‘decent’, they are tolerated 
and considered equal. Rawls is aware in fact that the pluralism and diversity within international society 
is even greater than in any domestic liberal society, and therefore international rules, which are an 
extension of domestic rules, should be more tolerant of difference.635 Liberal peoples for Rawls should 
not only tolerate decent peoples and acceptable ways of ordering society, but they should also avoid 
criticizing them or incentivizing them to become more liberal. In this sense Rawls departs partly from 
the Trinitarian mantra promoted by global legalism, in that the requirements for being decent, and thus 
treated as equal, are minimal. For instance, with regard to human rights, if it is important that human 
rights are respected by every people, the human rights he refers to are only core human rights; the right 
to subsistence, security, personal property, freedom from slavery, equality before the law, protection of 
ethnic minority against genocide and some liberty of conscience. There is no mention to a right to 
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democratic participation, which instead is taken for granted by the supporters of Global 
Constitutionalism. 
I have mentioned Rawls briefly because probably, as European liberals, we still have to make an effort 
to think of different futurabilities and make sense of divergence in today’s globalized world. By adopting 
Rawls’s theory and applying it to international relations, the exceptionalism of China is brought back if 
not to a ‘normality’ at least to a ‘decency’ that should be tolerated in its non-liberal being. The issue is 
whether China would qualify first of all as people, and then as decent hierarchical society. Who is going 
to decide on that, however, is still an open issue. Moreover, the very notion of ‘toleration’ betrays the 
idea that something is not legitimate, or at least not fully accepted. This word, which became popular in 
the course of the XVI and XVII century in the context of the Protestant reform in Europe, was not 
surprisingly an answer to the rupture of religious unity.636 Despite the limits of Rawls’s model in taking 
into account China, this could be a way for Western liberal people to make sense of, and to include 
within their theoretical framework and their universalistic normative account, other experiences that do 
not completely conform to their moral ideals. Another possible solution that comes from Rawls’ theory 
is the idea of overlapping consensus.637 According to it, different political conceptions of justice 
apparently incompatible and irreconcilable, can find a point of overlapping agreement, but I will not 
elaborate further on this here. Even the application of Rawls’s model to integrate China within the global 
constitutional order leaves a multitudes of issues. There is a fundamental incapacity to understand 
Chinese reality; rather there is a tendency to re-assimilate its experience into our own conceptual, 
normative and legal structures.  
In this sense an interesting intellectual exercise would be to broaden the Trinitarina mantra or the 
constitutional principles that inform an ‘appropriately structured international legal order.’ As Kumm 
argues, ‘the relationship between domestic and international law is neither one of derivation for of 
autonomy, but of mutual dependence. National and international law are mutually co-constitutive. The 
constitutional legitimacy of national law depends, in part, on being adequately integrated into an 
appropriately structured international legal system. And the legitimacy of the international legal system 
depends, in part, on states having an adequate constitutional structure.’638 In an editorial of Global 
Constitutionalism the authors argue that there are other elements beyond the Trinitarian mantra that 
might justify the political power that eventually inform and legitimizes an appropriate structured 
international legal order.639 These, for instance, include the economic development, the creation of a 
middle class of consumers, sovereignty, national identity, ethnic traditions or divine imperatives. For 
the authors the fact of simply acknowledging these possibilities make Global Constitutionalism’s 
Trinitarian mantra loose its universalist aura. However, if we read through the lines, as argued before, 
to recognize that there are other elements that might justify political power, is not enough to disprove 
the universalist tendencies of Global Constitutionalism, at least in its progressive ought to be. The 
elements outside of the Trinitarian mantra are acknowledged, but in the progressive narrative, they 
correspond more to A, than to the ideal B (the Trinitarian mantra). My suggestion would be, why not to 
expand the Trinitarian mantra, and with regard to China, considering also other normative elements, 
such as the stability of a society, meritocracy, or the importance of economic development? 
Constitutionalism is the result of a specific history, but given the fact that now it expanded beyond the 
borders, it is not unlikely that it opens up to other values, and that it evolves, to use Somek’s terms, into 
a ‘Constitutionalism 4.0.’ By going beyond the national borders of Western states, Global 
Constitutionalism is enriched also by other traditions, and for instance it could assume as part of its 
narrative and normativity, values and principles that comes from beyond its borders. In this sense, it is 
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interesting the work of the Chinese political theorist Bai Tongdong, who claimed that the Chinese 
tradition could produce its own hypothetical Confu-China model, which, he argues, is even more 
realistic as a utopia than the model supported and predicated by Rawls.640 This model promotes a more 
hierarchical political structure, based upon political considerations and on the presupposition that 
citizens need to be properly educated and informed before taking part in political activities. Bai, in a 
sense it broadens the scope of the domestic analogy that is at the core of Global Constitutionalism, so 
as to include the domestic experience of China and reflect it in the international or global normative 
domain. 
To conclude, to adopt a less dogmatic view of the values and rules that should underpin the international 
legal order I sustain that Global Constitutionalism should be regarded more as a forum in which not only 
various ideas of human rights, RoL, democracy, sovereignty and other normative sources, interact with 
each other and reach a communicatively rational output based on an account of what is good in different 
social, economic, and political contexts, but also in which other normative elements can come into play. 
In such a forum, different normative and political experiences and different expectations are channelled 
in order to construct a broader discourse of Global Constitutionalism, which might influence the 
formation of the future international legal order. Most importantly, Global Constitutionalism is not only 
a critical theory of law that attempts to describe the international law as it is. It is also an ambitious 
normative and political project that could inform particular sensibilities and that could guide the process 
of globalization, but its normative ideals are still far from the current and the near-future international 
social reality, which might well be polycentric and not unitary.
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EU leadership for ‘constitutional reforms’ of international trade and investment law? 
 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann* 
 
Free trade agreements (FTAs) protecting rights and remedies of citizens have been uniquely successful 
in European integration. Yet, the EU neglects its ‘cosmopolitan foreign policy mandate’ in FTA 
negotiations with non-European countries. European citizens increasingly criticize transatlantic FTAs 
for undermining fundamental rights and judicial remedies inside the EU. Rather than exercising 
leadership for reforming the ‘disconnected UN/WTO governance’ of transnational public goods (PGs) 
by designing FTAs among democracies as ‘cosmopolitan international law’, the EU institutions 
prioritize bureaucratic self-interests in reducing legal, democratic and judicial accountability vis-à-vis 
citizens, ushering in EU legitimacy- and rule-of-law-crises.  
This contribution elaborates three legal propositions: First, the ‘cosmopolitan foreign policy 
constitution’ of the Lisbon Treaty (e.g. Arts 3, 21 TEU) requires the EU to protect EU constitutional 
principles and fundamental rights in treaty negotiations with third countries even if third countries insists 
on maintaining their different constitutional traditions (section I).  
Second, recent EU FTAs (e.g. with NAFTA countries) risk undermining fundamental rights and judicial 
remedies of EU citizens (e.g. as protected in Arts 16, 17, 47, 52 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(EUCFR)) and unnecessarily discriminate against EU investors (section II). Third, EU law requires 
stronger EU leadership for protecting democratic, republican and ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ in 
multilevel governance of transnational PGs, for instance through transatlantic FTAs and other mega-
regional agreements (e.g. EU-India and EU-ASEAN FTAs) that could serve as models for reforming 
the ‘disconnected’ UN/WTO governance dominated by government executives. The more globalization 
transforms national into transnational ‘aggregate PGs’, the more citizens must insist on 
‘constitutionalizing’ multilevel governance of PGs so that citizens can hold multilevel governance 
institutions legally, democratically and judicially more accountable for failing to limit ‘market failures’ 
and ‘governance failures’ by protecting constitutional and cosmopolitan rights more effectively 
(sections III-IV). 
The EU's 'cosmopolitan foreign policy constitution' 
The EU Treaty provisions on ‘democratic principles’ (Articles 9 ff TEU) and on conferral of limited EU 
powers subject to constitutional restraints (e.g. also on EU foreign policy powers, cf Articles 3, 21 TEU) 
illustrate the need for supplementing national democracies for collective supply of national PGs by 
multilevel participatory, deliberative and representative, democratic governance, cosmopolitan rights 
and judicial remedies protecting transnational PGs with due respect for the constitutional principles of 
limited conferral of powers, subsidiarity, proportionality and rule of law (cf. Article 5 TEU).  
In order to protect rights of EU citizens and PGs across national frontiers, the ‘Union’s action on the 
international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development 
and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, 
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the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and 
international law’ (Article 21:1 TEU). Article 3:5 TEU specifies this ‘cosmopolitan foreign policy 
mandate’ by requiring, inter alia, that ‘(i)n its relations with the wider world, the Union shall … 
contribute to the protection of its citizens’ and to ‘strict observance and the development of international 
law’. The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) emphasizes that ‘respect for human rights is a condition of 
the lawfulness of Community acts’641 also in the external relations of the EU; EU law (e.g. the EUCFR) 
protects fundamental rights as constitutional restraints on the exercise of all public authority by EU 
institutions. Hence, the EU rules and principles constituting, limiting, regulating and justifying the 
conferral of limited EU foreign policy powers (e.g. in Articles 3, 21 TEU, Articles 205 ff TFEU, the 
EUCFR) for multilevel protection of transnational PGs can be construed as a ‘cosmopolitan foreign 
policy constitution’ based, inter alia, on the following principles for the EU external relations policies: 
1. The EU’s ‘multilevel rights constitutionalism’ – as illustrated by the inclusion of ‘human rights 
clauses’ into more than 130 EU agreements with third countries642 and the multilevel legal and 
judicial protection of rights of citizens inside the EU - reflects the EU Treaty commitments to 
‘protection of its citizens’ and of their human and constitutional rights in the EU’s external 
relations (cf Articles 3, 21 TEU). 
2. The multilevel legal commitments to the ‘rule of law’ (Article 2 TEU) and to effective judicial 
remedies at national and European levels of governance (cf Arts 47 EUCFR, 19 TEU) and beyond 
the EU in regional PGs treaties (e.g. by the European Court of Human Rights, the EFTA Court) 
and worldwide PGs treaties (e.g. by WTO dispute settlement bodies, the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea) aim at ‘strict observance of international law’ (Article 3 TEU) - without 
delegation of EU powers to violate international treaties approved by parliaments for the benefit 
of EU citizens. 
3. EU constitutional law provides for multilevel parliamentary, participatory and deliberative 
democracy in internal and external policy-making (cf Articles 9-12 TEU), as illustrated by 
parliamentary co-decision powers (e.g. of the directly elected European Parliament) and 
individual rights that go far beyond the more limited parliamentary and democratic principles in 
other multilateral treaties; the European Parliament has used its powers also to reject international 
draft agreements negotiated by EU executives without adequate involvement of the European 
Parliament.643  
4. EU membership in worldwide and regional organizations has led to the incorporation into EU 
law of related ‘PGs treaties’ (like the WTO Agreement, the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea) as ‘integrating parts of the Community legal system’, thereby justifying legal presumptions 
that precise and unconditional treaty obligations of the EU (e.g. under the EEA Agreement) can 
be invoked by citizens also in domestic courts as relevant legal context; such judicial protection 
of individual rights (e.g. based on EU trade agreements with EFTA countries, Russia and Turkey) 
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is, however, opposed by EU politicians in FTAs with non-European countries in order to limit 
legal and judicial restraints and accountability in external relations.644 
The explicit ‘foundation’ (Article 2 TEU) of both the internal and external EU law - and the legal 
definition of ‘the Union’s aims’ (Article 3 TEU) - in terms of protection of human rights, rule of law, 
democratic governance and specific PGs (like the common market, a monetary union) exclude path-
dependent claims that the EU external relations law ‘lacks a telos’ and sets no specific goals limiting the 
EU’s foreign policy discretion.645 For instance, EU constitutional law protects fundamental rights also 
in the external relations of the EU (e.g. ‘the freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union 
law’ pursuant to Article 16, private property rights pursuant to Article 17 EUCFR, rights to effective 
judicial remedies pursuant to Article 47 EUCFR); it permits limitations 'on the exercise of the rights and 
freedoms recognised by this Charter… only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of 
general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’ (Article 
52 EUCFR). The EU’s 'cosmopolitan’ and ‘republican constitutionalism' justifies not only legal and 
judicial review of foreign policy restrictions of rights and freedoms of citizens, as illustrated by the 
Kadi-jurisprudence. It also limits claims that ‘the EU’s external policy objectives are non-teleological, 
non-prioritised, open-ended, and concerned more with policy orientation than goal-setting’.646 
Disregard for fundamental rights in EU FTAs with non-European countries 
The EU Commission negotiated the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between 
the EU and Canada 2009-2014 with very little involvement by the European Parliament, national 
parliaments and civil society in Europe. As the draft treaty text published on-line on the EU 
Commission’s website in September 2014 gave rise to parliamentary and civil society challenges 
(notably of the CETA investor-state arbitration rules), parts of the text were re-negotiated in early 2016 
ushering in the on-line publication of a revised treaty text in February 2016.  
Are ‘anti-citizen clauses’ justifiable in terms of Article 52 EUCFR? 
The complexity of the more than 1600 pages of English treaty texts entailed that most EU citizens 
‘rationally ignored’ this kind of ‘international law-making’. Many treaty provisions and regulatory 
problems – such as the ‘anti-citizen clause’ in what is now Article 30.6 (‘(n)othing in this Agreement 
shall be construed as conferring rights or imposing obligations on persons other than those created 
between the Parties under public international law, nor as permitting this Agreement to be directly 
invoked in the domestic legal systems of the Parties’) – were hardly ever discussed in parliaments and 
civil society debates; they are not justifiable as ‘necessary’ (e.g. in terms of Article 52 EUCFR) for 
protecting fundamental rights and general interests of EU citizens, for instance because EU fundamental 
rights and judicial remedies offer much higher legal protection than CETA’s ‘disfranchisement’ of EU 
citizens. While FTAs with European countries protect citizens through multilevel judicial safeguards 
that citizens can invoke in national and European courts (like the CJEU and the EFTA Court), the recent 
EU FTAs with Asian and NAFTA countries exclude such rights and remedies; only foreign investors 
are granted privileged access to investor-state arbitration (Article 8.18 CETA) subject to procedural 
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conditions (e.g. withdrawal or discontinuance of existing proceedings before a domestic court, cf Article 
8.22) and to a narrow scope of applicable law excluding fundamental rights.647  
Arguably, these intergovernmental limitations of judicial remedies of non-governmental actors in 
national and European courts (e.g. non-applicability of FTA provisions) as well as in international 
courts (e.g. access only for foreign investors, non-applicability of EU law) fail to transform the EU’s 
‘cosmopolitan foreign policy mandate’ of ‘protection of citizens’ and ‘strict observance of international 
law’ (Article 3 TEU) into legislation, administration and adjudication. The ‘disempowerment’ of 
citizens through intergovernmental trade and investment rules, the lack of effective parliamentary and 
democratic control of FTA negotiation, the one-sided influence of ‘stakeholder interests’ in these FTA 
negotiations, and the lack of protection of fundamental rights (e.g. those in the EUCFR) and of effective 
judicial remedies justify popular fears that intergovernmental trade agreements – even among 
constitutional democracies – risk curtailing constitutional rights of EU citizens through non-transparent 
‘executive governance’. Such fears provoked increasing civil society opposition against the EU 
negotiations of CETA and of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the USA. 
Even if trade politicians claim that their intergovernmental agreements do not formally limit domestic 
legislative procedures, national and European parliaments have a record of only rarely challenging 
internationally agreed ‘expert texts’ and intergovernmental agreements resulting from many years of 
secretive, diplomatic negotiations.  
Is prioritization of rights of the EU over rights of citizens democratic? 
The 2016 CETA text ‘reaffirms’ and ‘recognizes’ human rights in two Preamble paragraphs; yet it 
makes no effort at complying with the human rights requirement that ‘everyone shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect 
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and 
the general welfare in a democratic society’ (Article 29 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR)). CETA does not refer to the fundamental rights protected by the EUCFR, for instance the 
constitutional requirement that ‘(a)ny limitation on the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter 
must (…) be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’ (Article 52 EUCFR). 
In contrast to claims by some EU officials, the Charter rights and related ‘proportionality principles’ 
also limit EU trade policy measures648; according to Article 21 TEU, they must guide the EU’s external 
market regulations and implementation of trade agreements. For example, Articles 16 (‘freedom to 
conduct a business in accordance with Union law’), 17 (right to property), 47 (right to an effective 
remedy and to a fair trial) and 52 (necessity and proportionality of restrictions) protect fundamental 
rights of ‘everyone’; they risk being violated by discriminatory restrictions without effective judicial 
remedies inside the EU, for instance when citizens can neither invoke FTA rules in domestic courts (as 
excluded by Article 30.6 CETA and similar provisions in other FTAs) nor their fundamental rights in 
the proposed CETA investment tribunal (whose 'applicable law' is limited to international law without 
EU law). Arguably, such ‘disempowerment’ of EU citizens through Article 30.6 CETA (no conferral of 
private rights, no direct applicability of CETA in domestic legal systems) and the narrow definition of 
the ‘applicable law’ in the CETA investment tribunal (cf Art. 8.31 CETA) limit the ‘right to an effective 
remedy’ and the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality (cf Article 18 TEU) beyond 
what is ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’ in violation of Articles 47, 52 EUCFR; as citizens and protection 
of their equal rights are the primary source of legitimacy in the EU, EU citizens must be entitled to 
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invoke democratic legislation – including FTA agreements approved by parliaments for the benefit of 
citizens – in domestic jurisdictions.  
CETA risks undermining rights of EU citizens 
The broad definition of the ‘applicable law’ in Article 42 of the World Bank Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States illustrates that investor-
state arbitration involves all three dimensions of international investment law, i.e. national laws, 
investor-state contracts, and international law rules applicable in the relations among the home and host 
states involved.649 The EU proposals for new FTA investment rules ‘re-fragment’ these complex 
interactions among the interdependent ‘three levels of investment regulation’ and related adjudication; 
this risks harming investors, other citizens and rule of law (including national law, EU law and 
international treaty obligations of the EU). EU law does not authorize trade negotiators and investment 
tribunals to use FTAs to circumvent national and European constitutional law and judicial remedies of 
citizens in order to limit the judicial accountability of EU institutions. 
In Opinions 1/2009 (European Patent Court) and 2/2013 (ECHR), the CJEU emphasized the 
constitutional prohibition of unnecessarily limiting the EU guarantees of interpreting and protecting 
fundamental rights within the particular structures and restraints of EU law (e.g. cooperation between 
national and EU Courts through preliminary rulings subject to multilevel constitutional restraints). A 
legal opinion by the German Association of Judges inferred from EU and German constitutional law 
that the CETA limitations of the jurisdiction of national and EU courts for investor-state disputes are 
neither necessary nor consistent with EU law in view of the alternative of more effective, and more 
comprehensive legal and judicial remedies in European courts.650 The legal admissibility of ‘negative 
discrimination’ of EU investors inside the EU remains likewise contested.651 The CETA provisions on 
the ‘right to regulate’ and on ‘exceptions’ do not secure that national and EU trade and investment 
measures remain consistent with EU law (e.g. fundamental rights). Nor does CETA secure that legally 
binding rulings of the investment tribunal do not adversely affect EU law (e.g. the autonomy of EU law 
and domestic implementation of FTAs as an ‘integral part’ of EU law)652; even though CETA will 
improve arbitration procedures and the composition of investment tribunals, CETA’s often vague 
investment rules are unlikely to meet the procedural and substantive standards of EU law (cf Articles 
47, 52 EUCFR) and of the ECHR (cf Articles 6(1), 13 ECHR). Rather than providing for legal and 
‘judicial privileges’ for foreign investors that discriminate against domestic investors and citizens inside 
the EU and risk circumventing EU constitutional law, Articles 3, 21 TEU and the EUCFR require EU 
trade negotiators to protect the fundamental rights of all EU citizens through – comparatively more 
effective and constitutionally more constrained - domestic and EU judicial remedies, even if foreign 
trading partners insists on maintaining their different legal and policy traditions (e.g. of providing for 
ICSID procedures for investment disputes in NAFTA countries). Alleged judicial deficiencies inside 
some EU member states must be corrected and brought into conformity with EU law; they cannot justify 
undermining fundamental rights and rule of law inside the EU through FTAs and foreign arbitrators that 
risk ignoring EU constitutional law. 
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‘Transformative’ transatlantic FTAs without rights and remedies of citizens? 
In 2006, the lack of progress in the WTO’s Doha Round negotiations prompted the EU to launch a new 
‘Global Europe’ trade and investment strategy aimed at concluding ‘deep and comprehensive’ FTAs 
with economically and strategically important partner countries in 
Asia (e.g. Korea, Singapore and Vietnam) and in the Americas. The CETA and TTIP negotiations aim 
at ‘transformative FTAs’ that – similar to other mega-regional FTAs like the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) agreement signed in February 2016 by 12 pacific trading countries producing more than 40% of 
global GDP653 - will liberalize and regulate trade in goods and services far beyond WTO rules; it shall 
assume ‘geo-political importance’ by setting new standards for multilateral trade, investment, 
environmental, labour and consumer protection regulation. TTIP focuses on the following four 
objectives that are progressively clarified in 24 joint EU-US working groups on TTIP, which aim at 
finalizing a draft agreement before the end of 2016: 
1. Ambitious, reciprocal liberalization of market access for goods, services, investments and public 
procurement at all levels of government; market access for goods and services aims at removing 
customs duties on goods and restrictions on services, gaining better access to public markets, and 
making it easier to invest; the exclusion of audio-visual services, of general free movement of 
workers and of other citizens illustrates that TTIP remains less ambitious than the EEA 
agreement. 
2. Reducing non-tariff trade barriers and enhancing the compatibility of regulatory regimes through 
a permanent system of regulatory cooperation; improved regulatory coherence and cooperation 
in dismantling unnecessary regulatory barriers (e.g. due to bureaucratic duplication of 
procedures) will go beyond the WTO Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), for instance by means of sectorial agreements for 
textiles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, medical devices, cars, electronics/ICT, 
machinery/engineering and pesticides. 
3. Developing common rules (e.g. for consumer, labour, investment, social and environmental 
protection, civil society involvement, parliamentary cooperation) to address shared, global trade 
challenges; the improved international cooperation in setting international standards (e.g. for 
energy and raw materials, labour and environment, trade and sustainable development, public 
procurement, intellectual property, competition policy, small and medium-sized enterprise, trade 
remedies, customs and trade facilitation) aims at making TTIP countries global ‘standard-setters’ 
rather than ‘standard-takers’.  
4. Institutional structures for progressively implementing the TTIP; while the proposed dispute 
settlement provisions remain less ambitious than the EEA agreement (e.g. its EFTA Court), the 
TTIP Regulatory Council could introduce innovative procedures for harmonisation, mutual 
recognition agreements and common minimum (equivalence) standards, yet with due respect for 
democratic legislation in Europe and in the USA.  
Evaluations of CETA and TTIP depend on their respective legal, economic and political methodologies 
for multilevel governance of PGs like a transatlantic market that could - in future - include all 3 NAFTA 
states, the 31 EEA member states and additional states (like Switzerland and Turkey). From utilitarian 
economic perspectives, transatlantic FTAs offer important economic welfare gains, for instance in terms 
of reducing the costs of production, trade and consumption and enhancing competitiveness of European 
industries and consumer welfare. They also offer geopolitical gains, e.g. in terms of  
 promoting energy security in Europe; 
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 setting global standards for regulation of the ‘interface’ between economic and non-economic PGs 
(like health protection, climate change prevention); and for 
 facilitating future reforms of WTO law, for instance by preparing a later 'multilateralization' of 
mega-regional FTAs which could ultimately replace the ineffective WTO system for consensus-
based, global trade liberalization by a more ambitious 'WTO II legal system' (similar to the 
replacement of GATT 1947 by the WTO Agreement).  
Yet, welfare gains, their social distribution and the democratic acceptability of legal reforms will depend 
largely on empowering citizens to protect transnational rule of law so that citizens can challenge, for 
instance, the long-standing market failures and governance failures in transatlantic relations which gave 
rise to numerous transatlantic economic disputes over the past decades.654 From the point of view of the 
‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ inside the EU and the EEA, transatlantic FTAs without rights and 
remedies of citizens risk undermining the constitutional rights of EU citizens, as illustrated by  
 the intergovernmental exclusion of rights and effective judicial remedies of citizens (e.g. in Article 
30.6 CETA); 
 the lack of transparency and of effective, parliamentary control of the EU negotiations of CETA 
(2009-2014) and of previous FTAs; 
 the provision of procedural and substantive judicial privileges to foreign investors and related 
‘negative discrimination’ against EU citizens in transatlantic economic cooperation; and  
 the intergovernmental disregard for the EU guarantees of rule of law, as illustrated by the US 
criticism that EU proposals of authorizing EU member states to restrict genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) without scientific evidence of their potential health risks run counter to WTO 
law and to the need to promote global food security, scientific progress and ‘public reason’ in 
conformity with rule of law.  
Need for limiting transatlantic ‘governance failures’ through rights and remedies of citizens 
Comparative institutionalism suggests that - while citizen-oriented protection of common market rules 
inside the EU and EEA evolved in response to the judicial remedies of citizens in European courts - the 
‘executive dominance’ of transatlantic rule-making is the main reason for the inadequate ‘democratic 
input legitimacy’, ‘democratic output legitimacy’ (e.g. in terms of undermining equal rights and 
remedies), and inadequate protection of PGs (like rule of law) in the 'Transatlantic Partnership' since the 
1990s. Empirical case-studies of the 'governance failures' in transatlantic relations - as illustrated by 
transatlantic economic and legal disputes over EU import restrictions on bananas, safeguard measures, 
antidumping and countervailing duties, industrial subsidies (e.g. for US ‘foreign sales corporations’), 
European agricultural subsidies, EU import restrictions on hormone-fed beef and GMOs, technical 
barriers to trade (e.g. on ‘hushkits’ for US airplanes), unilateral extraterritorial application of 
competition laws, US interferences with transatlantic data protection, discriminatory US practices in 
fields like government procurement and intellectual property rights, and inadequate cooperation in 
environmental policies, telecommunications, shipping- and air-transports655 - confirmed that – with 
regard to international law and policy cooperation – ‘Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from 
Venus’.656 For instance, the ‘constitutional nationalism’ and hegemonic power politics cultivated by US 
politicians favours ‘legal dualism’ and US scepticism towards international law (e.g. prompting the US 
Congress to exclude rights of citizens to invoke and enforce international treaty obligations in US 
courts). Internal European integration is built on greater trust in international law and in multilevel 
governance of international PGs (like multilevel legal and judicial protection of fundamental rights, 
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transnational rule of law, common markets and competition law systems). American and European 
approaches to external economic governance often differ, as illustrated by the comparatively lesser 
participation of US regulatory agencies in international standard-setting organizations and US reluctance 
to ratify international human rights, labour law, criminal law and environmental conventions. The 
stronger US preferences for science-based risk assessment procedures (as internationally agreed in the 
WTO Agreement on SPS Measures) are linked to the comparatively stronger parliamentary control of 
US regulatory agencies and their avoidance of some of the health and SPS crises (like mad cow diseases) 
that undermined consumer confidence in Europe regarding science-based risk assessments of product 
and production standards.657 
The EU Treaty requirements (e.g. in Articles 3 and 21 TEU) to base external FTAs on the constitutional 
'values’ and 'principles' that successfully govern market regulation and competition throughout Europe 
reflect the insight that - the more international treaties assume legislative functions for protecting 
transnational PGs which no single state can unilaterally protect without international law and 
institutions - democracies have reasonable self-interests in applying and protecting international treaties 
approved by parliaments for the benefit of citizens. Inside the EU and the EEA, citizens invoking and 
enforcing their rights in domestic jurisdictions - as ‘market citizens’ (e.g. producers, investors, traders, 
consumers), ‘social citizens’ (e.g. family members of workers moving across the EU), ‘democratic 
principals’ of multilevel governance agents (e.g. electing the European Parliament) and ‘agents of 
justice’ entitled to challenge abuses of public and private powers in national and European courts - have 
been the most important 'drivers' for democratic acceptance, progressive development and decentralized 
enforcement of economic integration law, as reflected in the case-law of European Courts protecting 
individual rights under EU law. The multilevel judicial protection by national and European courts of 
rights of private plaintiffs against violations of EU law – as in the leading EU case-law triggered by 
complaints from the Dutch transporter Van Gend en Loos, the Italian lawyer Costa, the German vine 
grower Hauser, or the Belgian stewardess Defrenne – illustrated how constitutional rights and judicial 
remedies often prompt citizens to use their ‘republican virtues’658 for enforcing multilevel compliance 
with treaties approved by parliaments for the benefit of citizens. For decades, similar disputes in 
transatlantic relations all too often gave rise to intergovernmental power politics rather than to 
decentralized conflict resolution through legal protection of equal rights of citizens and impartial third 
party adjudication.  
Transnational public goods (res publica) call for ‘republican’ and ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ 
This contribution has criticized the EU negotiations on transatlantic FTAs for their ‘executive 
dominance’ undermining the EU’s rights-based ‘cosmopolitan foreign policy constitution’ and 
democratic support by citizens for transatlantic FTAs. EU citizenship as a ‘republican duty’ calls for 
effective judicial remedies by domestic courts of justice – rather than only by inter-state or investor-
state adjudication without constitutional safeguards – in order to empower and protect democratic 
                                                     
657 Cf the numerous case-studies on American and European approaches to multilevel economic governance in: 
C.Joerges/E.U.Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and International Economic Law, 
Oxford: Hart 2011; D.Cardoso et alii (eds), The Transatlantic Colossus. Global Contributions to Broaden the Debate on 
the EU-US Free Trade Area (Bertelsmann e-book 2015). 
658 Cf J.G.A.Pocock, The Machivallian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, Princeton 
UP 1975 (emphasizing, eg on page 67, that the republican ideal of cultivating and exercising the four ‘cardinal virtues’ - 
prudence, justice, courage and temperance - for citizenship as a public office remains central to the collective supply of 
PGs as explained by Aristotle and Cicero). On the diverse legal traditions of republicanism and the disagreement on whether 
the core values of republicanism should be defined in terms of liberty (non-domination), republican virtues of active 
citizenry finding self-realization in political participation and collective supply of PGs, communitarianism, social and 
political equality, or deliberative democracy, see: S.Besson/J.Luis Marti (eds), Legal Republicanism: National and 
International Perspectives, OUP 2009.  
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‘compliance constituencies’ and transnational rule of law for the benefit of all citizens.659 Inside the 
EEA, the cosmopolitan rights codified in the EUCFR – such as ‘freedom to conduct a business in 
accordance with Union law’ (Article 16), property rights (Art. 17) and the ‘right to an effective remedy 
and to a fair trial’ (Article 47) – have empowered citizens and foreigners alike to rely on ‘strict 
observance of international law’ (Article 3 TEU) across national boundaries. The ‘emancipatory 
function’ of FTAs among democracies – e.g. for extending multilevel protection of equal rights of 
citizens against abuses of foreign policy powers - is unduly neglected by diplomatic insistence on 
excluding rights and effective remedies of citizens under FTAs with non-European countries. The 
increasing civil society protests against disempowering and discriminating citizens through FTAs 
succeeded in forcing the EU Commission to re-negotiate the CETA investment rules and to promote 
transparency of FTA negotiations. Yet, the EU institutions continue to exclude private rights and judicial 
remedies of citizens under the EU's external trade agreements on grounds of ‘political freedom of 
manoeuvre’660, notwithstanding the recognition of individual rights and judicial remedies in investment 
and trade agreements among European countries. Arguably, such ‘Hobbesian claims’ - even if they have 
been accepted by the CJEU in order to justify its judicial self-restraint to review the legality of EU acts 
in the light of WTO law and UN conventions (like UNCLOS, UN air transport and environmental 
conventions) - are inconsistent with  
 the EU’s constitutional requirements of ‘strict observance of international law’ (Article 3 TEU) 
and judicial protection of rule of law (Article 19 TEU);  
 the ‘coherence-’ and ‘consistent-interpretation’ requirements of domestic and international legal 
systems (e.g. in Articles 21 TEU, XVI:4 WTO Agreement);  
 the ‘network conception’ linking global trading communities (e.g. in order to reduce transaction 
costs for global supply chains and provide ‘security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system’ as prescribed in Article 3 WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding);  
 multilevel judicial comity among domestic and international courts committed to protecting rule 
of law and ‘administration of justice’;  
 the EU principles of ‘conferral’ of limited competences and of their ‘proportionate’ use (cf. Article 
5 TEU); and  
 the constitutional rights of EU citizens (e.g. under Articles 16, 47, 52 EUCFR).  
Promotion of ‘cosmopolitan public reason’ by the EU’s ‘transparency initiative’ in 2014  
EU and EEA law empirically confirm that empowerment of citizens by ‘cosmopolitan citizenship rights’ 
- as decentralized instruments for constituting, limiting, regulating, justifying and enforcing 
                                                     
659 The need for limiting power-oriented foreign policies (eg perceiving international treaties as breakable contracts between 
governments rather than as instruments for protecting transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens) by stronger rule-
of-law institutions reducing transaction costs and protecting equal rights of citizens and other transnational PGs is 
increasingly acknowledged also by American academics; cf. K.Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, 
Politics, Rights, Princeton UP 2014. Stronger judicial remedies can empower ‘compliance supporters’ (notably civil society 
actors) and ‘compliance partners’ (e.g. domestic and international institutions) to pressure governments to comply with 
treaty obligations ratified by parliaments for protecting transnational PGs.  
660 The term ‘freedom of manoeuvre’ continues to be used by both the political EU institutions and the CJEU (e.g. in Joined 
cases C-120 and C-121/06 P, FIAMM, ECR 2008 I-6513, para. 119) as the main justification for their disregard of legally 
binding UN conventions, WTO rules and WTO dispute settlement rulings. The most recent CJEU judgment (Case C-21/14 
P Rusal, judgment of 16 July 2015) justifies 'the settled case-law of the Court that, given their nature and purpose, those 
(WTO) agreements are not in principle among the rules in the light of which the Court is to review the legality of measures 
adopted by the EU institutions', essentially on utilitarian grounds such as the 'lack of reciprocity' by the EU's most important 
trading partners (paras. 38-39). Yet, as recognized by the CJEU in its Kupferberg-judgment of 1982, ‘the fact that the courts 
of one of the parties consider that certain of the stipulations in the agreement are of direct application whereas the courts 
of the other party do not recognize such direct application is not in itself such as to constitute a lack of reciprocity in the 
implementation of the agreement’ (ECJ, Case 104/81, ECR 1982, 3644, para. 18). 
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transnational PGs regimes and supplementing national citizenship - is a necessary part of ‘cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism’ so as to enable citizens to assume ‘republican responsibility’ for multilevel supply of 
aggregate PGs. Cosmopolitan rights pursue ‘emancipatory functions’ by protecting equal freedoms and 
responsibilities of ‘citizens of the world’ for institutionalizing ‘public reason’ as a precondition of 
democratic capabilities to protect transnational PGs. The democratic requirement of ‘transparent 
governance’ refers not only to public disclosure and accessibility of information; democracy also 
requires readability, comprehensibility and public debates of legislation at national and increasingly 
international levels of governance. Most EU citizens remained ‘rationally ignorant’ vis-à-vis the on-line 
publication of the draft CETA texts in September 2014 and February 2016) in English language with 
more than 1600 pages on complex legal issues (like thousands of product and production standards and 
market access commitments in diverse services sectors) that had been secretly negotiated by EU 
representatives invoking ‘diplomatic confidentiality’. If citizens – as suggested by Rawls, ‘think of 
themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons 
satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact’661, they have good 
reasons to insist on transparent, democratic elaboration of ‘PGs treaties’ with legislative functions and 
on explicit FTA rules on ‘protection of citizens’, as required by Articles 3 and 21 TEU, for instance by 
acknowledging in FTAs what is prescribed in Articles 1, 10 TEU and in the EUCFR for all activities of 
the EU: 
This Agreement places the individual at the heart of its activities by protection of his rights and by 
taking decisions as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizens.  
Lack of information on confidential treaty negotiations by the EU Commission prompted the European 
Parliament to veto twice international draft agreements (i.e. the SWIFT agreement in February 2010 and 
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement in July 2012). Following repeated complaints from the 
European Parliament, civil society and from the European Ombudsman over excessive confidentiality 
of TTIP negotiations and related documents, the European Commission launched - in March 2014 - a 
public consultation on investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) rules; it 
received almost 150.000 replies, mostly opposing the proposed investment protection and ISDS rules. 
In response to these democratic pressures, the EU Council finally disclosed its TTIP negotiations 
mandate of 2013 in October 2014. EU Trade Commissioner Malmström launched a new 'transparency 
strategy' in November 2014 aimed at helping 'to ensure greater access to trade documents by the general 
public and the European Parliament, and legitimacy of EU trade policy at large'.662 The European 
Parliament's resolution of 8 July 2015 includes very detailed recommendations by the Parliament to the 
European Commission on many aspects of the TTIP negotiations, including proposals to replace the 
ISDS mechanism by a new system of public law courts. Yet, also this parliamentary resolution nowhere 
mentions the EU mandate to ‘place the individual at the heart of its activities’ (Preamble EUCFR); nor 
does it explain why FTAs with non-European countries explicitly exclude rights of citizens that are 
protected as fundamental rights in FTAs with European countries. The civil society protests succeeded 
in pushing the EU Commission to renegotiate the CETA investment rules and to publish more 
information on EU positions in TTIP negotiations. Yet, rights and remedies of citizens remain excluded 
under transatlantic FTAs, with the exception of privileged arbitration procedures for foreign investors. 
The persistently decreasing confidence of EU citizens in EU governance663 is linked to the perception 
that bureaucratic disregard for the EU requirements of taking ‘decisions as openly as possible and as 
closely as possible to the citizen’ (Article 1 TEU) - and of protecting fundamental rights of all citizens 
                                                     
661 J.Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 Chikago Law Review (1997), 765, 769 (citizens ‘fulfil their duty of civility 
and support the idea of public reason by doing what they can to hold government officials to it’).  
662 European Commission, Communication concerning transparency in TTIP negotiations, 25 November 2014 (C 2014 9052 
final). 
663 Cf. J.Zalc, Overcoming Democratic Breakdown in the EU, Fondation Robert Schuman, European Issues No 333 of 18 
November 2014, at 1. 
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- has become systemic in EU external market regulations since the global financial crisis in 2008, the 
‘debt-crises’ since 2010, and the EU’s ‘border protection’- and ‘immigration-crises’ since 2014.  
From ‘constitutionalism 1.0 and 2.0’ to ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism 3.0 and 4.0’? 
Democratic constitutionalism explains why, in order to be legitimate, law and governance must not only 
be justified by ‘principles of social justice’ to be agreed in ‘constitutional contracts’ supported by 
citizens; constitutionalism is even more necessary for transforming the agreed ‘principles of justice’ into 
socially effective ‘living law’ and ‘public reason’ based on democratic legislation, administration, 
adjudication and multilevel international regulation of transnational cooperation supported by civil 
society as ‘just’ (e.g. in the sense of sufficiently justified by ‘public reason’). The impact of the 
globalization of markets, law, governance and related security risks on the transformation of national 
Constitutions can be illustrated by Somek’s distinction between  
 ‘constitutionalism 1.0’ (like the post-revolutionary, emancipatory US and French ‘constitutions of 
liberty’ during the 18th century establishing legislative, executive and judicial powers for 
democratic self-government);  
 ‘constitutionalism 2.0’ (like many post-World War II democratic ‘human rights constitutions’ 
committed to protection of human dignity and civil, political, economic and social rights for 
everybody); and  
 ‘constitutionalism 3.0’ like the ‘cosmopolitan constitutions’ of EU member states supporting 
multilevel constitutionalization of multilevel governance of transnational PGs, such as European 
common market law based on common market rights, other fundamental rights, non-
discrimination of citizens on grounds of nationality, and respect for the democratic reality of 
‘constitutional pluralism’.664  
The constitutional principles of liberty, equality and solidarity have become universally recognized parts 
of UN human rights law (HRL). The legal need for multilevel regulation of ‘market failures’ and 
‘governance failures’ and judicial powers of review of legislative and administrative restrictions of 
fundamental rights are increasingly recognized in national and international jurisdictions (e.g. by 
resorting to multilevel ‘proportionality review’ rather than only to more limited, judicial review of 
whether governance institutions pursue legitimate ends through rational means within their limited 
powers), even if many rulers inside UN member states impede effective ‘constitutionalization’ of HRL 
and empowerment of citizens. 
Due to globalization and its transformation of ever more national into transnational PGs (like human 
rights and multilevel governance of transnational rule of law, common markets, democratic 
peace, ’sustainable development’), the constitutional rights and other ‘principles of social justice’ are 
progressively adjusted to the new needs for multilevel governance of collective supply of transnational 
PGs. For instance, citizens pursue their individual and social development no longer only as private 
citizens (e.g. invoking privacy rights), ‘economic citizens’ (e.g. invoking labour and social rights) and 
‘state citizens’ (e.g. invoking civil and political rights). In multilevel governance of transnational PGs, 
citizens also increasingly act as ‘cosmopolitan citizens’ (e.g. invoking EU citizenship rights) so as to 
protect transnational PGs and exercise related, transnational rights (e.g. as producers, investors, traders 
and consumers protected by EU common market, competition and social law, as refugees, migrants, 
tourists entitled to human rights and other cosmopolitan rights). Also economic agreements outside 
Europe increasingly protect individual rights (e.g. under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, common market rights 
under MERCOSUR, investor rights under BITs, intellectual property rights under the WTO TRIPS and 
WIPO Agreements) in order to empower citizens and non-governmental actors participating in 
collective supply of transnational PGs. The customary rules of treaty interpretation require interpreting 
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treaties ‘in conformity with the principles of justice’, including ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all’ too, as explicitly recalled in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (cf. the Preamble an 
Article 31). Yet, the related governance practices and jurisprudence (e.g. of investment and trade courts) 
often disregard ‘principles of social justice’; inside many UN member states, they fail to transform the 
‘law in the books’ (e.g. UN human rights law) into effective ‘law in action’. How should citizens and 
civil society respond to such ‘governance failures’? 
Dis-integration rather than ‘constitutionalization’ of EU law? 
The EU Treaty provisions on ‘enhanced cooperation’ among some EU member states (Article 20 TEU) 
and on withdrawal from the EU (Article 50 TEU) recognize that diversity and ‘legal fragmentation’ are 
democratically inevitable parts of European integration. Yet, ‘enhanced cooperation’ does not apply to 
exclusive EU competencies like the common commercial policy, where national and European 
parliaments may no longer approve ‘mixed agreements’ unless citizens and parliaments are convinced 
that FTAs comply with EU fundamental rights. This case-study suggests that FTAs among democracies 
must be designed as ‘cosmopolitan international law’ aimed at ‘protection of citizens’ and ‘strict 
observance of international law’, as prescribed in Articles 3 and 31 TEU. Unelected ‘Eurocrats’665 
promoting ‘Westphalian power politics’ have neither constitutional nor democratic legitimacy. Even if 
global constitutionalism and global democracy remain utopias in the 21st century, constitutional and 
international lawyers must not succumb to claims that modern ‘constitutional pluralism’ and some 
‘disabling effects’ of global integration necessarily result in a ‘law of the jungle’ undermining 
democratic self-government.666 The dynamic evolution of EU law illustrates (e.g. by its legal and 
institutional creation of a European ‘banking Union’ in response to the financial and debt crises since 
2008/2010) that market-failures also offer political opportunities for limiting related ‘governance 
failures’, for instance by using ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ for ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down 
constitutionalisation’ of multilevel governance of functionally limited PGs like undistorted common 
markets. Arguably, globalisation requires to transform national democratic and republican 
constitutionalism into multilevel cosmopolitan and republican constitutionalism supported by 
reasonable state citizens and ‘cosmopolitan citizens’ alike.  
This political need for reforming multilevel governance of transnational PGs - and the legal possibility 
of promoting ‘constitutionalism 4.0’ through empowering citizens, civil society, parliamentary and 
judicial cooperation across national frontiers - are unduly neglected in Somek’s account of 
‘constitutionalism 3.0’ and of multilevel ‘constitutional failures’ (e.g. to contain arbitrary abuses of 
foreign policy powers). The universal recognition of human rights by UN member states does not bring 
about ‘the end of history’ nor universal protection of ‘social justice’ for the least-advantaged members 
of society. Nor does UN HRL guarantee effective democratic control of the ‘executive power grab’ in 
UN/WTO governance and of its ‘administrative rationality’ (e.g. relying on ‘experts’ and 
‘confidentiality’). ‘Cosmopolitan emancipation’ and legal empowerment of citizens vis-à-vis foreign 
policy powers require multilevel ‘constitutionalism 4.0’ based on multilevel constitutional rights of 
citizens and corresponding restraints of foreign policy discretion. The good news is that UN, WTO and 
EU law already include such multilevel guarantees of equal freedoms, non-discrimination and judicial 
remedies that could be construed and legally protected for the benefit of citizens. Yet, as long as UN, 
WTO and EU diplomats prioritize their own rights and diplomatic self-interests over equal rights of 
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citizens, cosmopolitan constitutionalism remains a ‘Sisyphean up-hill struggle’ that is difficult to win 
by a ‘sleeping democratic sovereign’. The ‘Brexit referendum’ of June 2016 is a timely reminder that – 
unless citizens promote ‘public reason’ and democratic self-reflection – opportunist politicians may 
exploit economic and political crises for ‘populist power grabs’ that may even succeed in dismantling 
‘constitutionalism 3.0’ if citizens and their ‘protest communities’ no longer understand the ‘principles 
of social justice’ justifying multilevel governance of transnational PGs, and no longer see EU institutions 
defending these principles vis-à-vis abuses of public and private powers. International trade is not only 
an engine of economic welfare but, as explained by Kant more than 200 years ago, also a potential 
engine for cosmopolitan international law and ‘democratic peace’.667 Hence, EU citizens must remind 
EU politicians of their promise to use transatlantic FTAs as instruments for transforming multilevel 
governance of transnational PGs for the benefit of citizens and their equal rights as ‘the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world’ (Preamble to the 1948 UDHR). 
                                                     
667 On Kantian legal and constitutional philosophy see: E.U.Petersmann, International Economic Law in the 21st Century. 
Constitutional Pluralism and Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods, Hart Publishers 2012, chapter III. 
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